The audit of the Token contract, a mock ERC20 implementation with owner-controlled minting, identified a Medium overall risk level. The contract is well-structured, leveraging battle-tested OpenZeppelin libraries, which contributes to its technical robustness. The primary risks stem from the centralized control over token supply via the owner's minting capability and the associated operational security requirements for the owner's private key. No critical code vulnerabilities were found.
On-chain security analysis — is it a scam or legit?
Is OWB Safe?
Not verified
This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →The audit of the Token contract, a mock ERC20 implementation with owner-controlled minting, identified a Medium overall risk level.
Read the full analysis- Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded
- Top-10 concentration > 30%
- 1 High finding(s) from audit
- 1 Low finding(s) from audit
Exact factors
- Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded
- Top-10 concentration > 30% (72.2% total → 34.0% effective; 8.6% in EOAs, 63.7% in contracts — moderate)
- 1 High finding(s) from audit
- 1 Low finding(s) from audit
Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed
Security Checklist
as of audit · Sep 4Holders
as of audit · Sep 4, 2026- Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking63.7%
- Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell8.6%
- Everyone elsethe rest of the supply27.8%
How holder types affect the score
Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.
Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Sep 4, 2026
Liquidity
as of audit · Sep 4- AerodromeUSDCAnalysed$67.9K50.6%
- Uniswap v3USDC$47.5K35.4%
- Uniswap v4USDC$9.5K7.0%
- Uniswap v3USDC$6.4K4.7%
- Uniswap v4USDC$2.8K2.1%
- AerodromeWETH$920.1%
The risk score reads depth across every pair.
The LP tokens of the analysed pool are locked or burned.
0x5a01…a692No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.
Security Findings
HighOwner Key Compromise Leads to Supply Manipulation
The Token contract grants the owner exclusive control over the mint function, allowing arbitrary inflation of the token supply. If the owner's private key is compromised, an attacker could mint an unlimited number of tokens, severely devaluing the asset and causing significant economic damage. This represents a single point of failure for the token's economic integrity (7.3 Access Control, 7.4 Economic, 7.8 Operations).H-01
Issue
The Token contract grants the owner exclusive control over the mint function, allowing arbitrary inflation of the token supply. If the owner's private key is compromised, an attacker could mint an unlimited number of tokens, severely devaluing the asset and causing significant economic damage. This represents a single point of failure for the token's economic integrity (7.3 Access Control, 7.4 Economic, 7.8 Operations).
Fix
Implement robust security measures for the owner's private key, such as a hardware security module (HSM) or a multi-signature wallet. For production systems, consider a time-locked mechanism or a governance-controlled minting process to mitigate the risk of a single point of failure or malicious action.
Status
Unresolved
LowIrreversible Loss of Owner Privileges
The renounceOwnership function allows the current owner to permanently relinquish ownership of the contract by transferring it to address(0). If this function is called without a plan for re-establishing control or if it's done accidentally, all onlyOwner functions, including mint, will become permanently inaccessible (7.8 Operations).L-01
Issue
The renounceOwnership function allows the current owner to permanently relinquish ownership of the contract by transferring it to address(0). If this function is called without a plan for re-establishing control or if it's done accidentally, all onlyOwner functions, including mint, will become permanently inaccessible (7.8 Operations).
Fix
Exercise extreme caution when using renounceOwnership. Ensure that renouncing ownership is an intentional and well-understood action, typically only performed when the contract is designed to be immutable after deployment or when control is transferred to a governance mechanism.
Status
Unresolved
InfoEIP-2612 Permit Signature Replay Considerations
The contract utilizes ERC20Permit (EIP-2612) for gasless approvals. While the OpenZeppelin implementation correctly uses nonces to prevent on-chain replay of signatures, users should be aware that off-chain signature replay attacks are still possible if a signed permit message is broadcast multiple times by different relayers before it's processed on-chain (7.2 Code Security).I-01
Issue
The contract utilizes ERC20Permit (EIP-2612) for gasless approvals. While the OpenZeppelin implementation correctly uses nonces to prevent on-chain replay of signatures, users should be aware that off-chain signature replay attacks are still possible if a signed permit message is broadcast multiple times by different relayers before it's processed on-chain (7.2 Code Security).
Fix
Users should be educated on the mechanics of EIP-2612 and the importance of using unique signatures for each transaction. Relay services should implement robust mechanisms to prevent replaying signatures.
Status
Unresolved
Analysis
AI Copilotas of audit · Sep 4The Token contract exhibits high technical quality, primarily due to its reliance on battle-tested OpenZeppelin libraries for ERC20, ERC20Permit, ERC20Burnable, and Ownable functionalities (7.2 Code Security). Custom logic is minimal and correctly implemented, specifically the mint function which is properly restricted to the owner (7.3 Access Control). No reentrancy, integer overflow/underflow, or other common EVM vulnerabilities were identified in the custom code.
The contract's economic model is highly centralized, with the owner possessing absolute control over the token supply through the mint function (7.4 Economic). This design, while intended for a 'mock USDC', introduces a significant single point of failure: a compromise of the owner's private key would allow an attacker to mint unlimited tokens, severely impacting the token's value and trust (7.3 Access Control). Robust operational security for the owner's key is paramount to mitigate this inherent risk (7.8 Operations).
The contract is not designed as an upgradeable proxy, meaning its core logic cannot be changed post-deployment (7.7 Upgrades). While the Ownable pattern allows for administrative control transfer via transferOwnership, this does not facilitate code upgrades. The risk related to upgrades is therefore minimal, as the contract's functionality is fixed.
To enhance the security posture of the Token contract, prioritize the implementation of robust operational security measures for the owner's private key.
Consider utilizing a multi-signature wallet for the owner address to distribute control and require multiple approvals for sensitive actions like minting. Additionally, ensure comprehensive monitoring of owner-controlled functions to detect any unauthorized activity promptly. For any future production deployments, carefully evaluate the implications of centralized minting and explore decentralized alternatives or time-locked mechanisms if appropriate for the project's long-term vision.
Contract & Record
Free for any token on the record. It links to this page and always shows the current score and the date it was checked.
- Sep 4, 202633Low
- Jul 27, 20269Low
- Jul 27, 202666High
Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is OWB a scam?
Based on automated analysis, OWB scores 66/100 (High Risk) on our risk scale. No honeypot was detected, but always verify independently before investing.
Is OWB safe to buy?
Our scanner flagged a risk score of 66/100. Ownership has not been renounced, which is a risk factor. DYOR before purchasing any token.
Has OWB been audited?
The contract has not been verified on-chain. Verification is not the same as a full security audit. Use Quantum Audit's free tool to run a deeper analysis of the contract code.
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