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On-chain security analysis — is it a scam or legit?

Is OWB Safe?

Base
Not verified This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →
Last checked Sep 4, 2026 · 2 audits on record
SummaryAI Copilot

The audit of the Token contract, a mock ERC20 implementation with owner-controlled minting, identified a Medium overall risk level.

Read the full analysis
What raised the score
  • Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded
  • Top-10 concentration > 30%
  • 1 High finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Low finding(s) from audit
Exact factors
  • Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded
  • Top-10 concentration > 30% (72.2% total → 34.0% effective; 8.6% in EOAs, 63.7% in contracts — moderate)
  • 1 High finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Low finding(s) from audit

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Security Checklist

as of audit · Sep 44 of 5 checks passed
Contract verifiedVerified
OwnershipRenounced
MintMintable
Liquidity lockLocked
UpgradeabilityFixed code

Holders

as of audit · Sep 4, 2026
63.7%Contracts8.6%Wallets27.8%Everyone else
63.7%Contracts8.6%27.8%Everyone else
ContractsWalletsEveryone elseBubble area = share of supply
72.2%of supply sits with the top 10 holders
  • Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking63.7%
  • Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell8.6%
  • Everyone elsethe rest of the supply27.8%
Effective concentrationwhat the score reads34.0%
How holder types affect the score

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Sep 4, 2026

Liquidity

as of audit · Sep 4$134.1K across 6 pairs
LP tokensLocked

The LP tokens of the analysed pool are locked or burned.

Analysed pool$67.9KShare of depth50.6%
LP Locked100.0% · UNCX Locker
Unlocked LP held by
0x5a01…a692

No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.

Security Findings

1 High1 Low1 Info
High

Owner Key Compromise Leads to Supply Manipulation

The Token contract grants the owner exclusive control over the mint function, allowing arbitrary inflation of the token supply. If the owner's private key is compromised, an attacker could mint an unlimited number of tokens, severely devaluing the asset and causing significant economic damage. This represents a single point of failure for the token's economic integrity (7.3 Access Control, 7.4 Economic, 7.8 Operations).H-01

Issue

The Token contract grants the owner exclusive control over the mint function, allowing arbitrary inflation of the token supply. If the owner's private key is compromised, an attacker could mint an unlimited number of tokens, severely devaluing the asset and causing significant economic damage. This represents a single point of failure for the token's economic integrity (7.3 Access Control, 7.4 Economic, 7.8 Operations).

Fix

Implement robust security measures for the owner's private key, such as a hardware security module (HSM) or a multi-signature wallet. For production systems, consider a time-locked mechanism or a governance-controlled minting process to mitigate the risk of a single point of failure or malicious action.

Status

Unresolved

Low

Irreversible Loss of Owner Privileges

The renounceOwnership function allows the current owner to permanently relinquish ownership of the contract by transferring it to address(0). If this function is called without a plan for re-establishing control or if it's done accidentally, all onlyOwner functions, including mint, will become permanently inaccessible (7.8 Operations).L-01

Issue

The renounceOwnership function allows the current owner to permanently relinquish ownership of the contract by transferring it to address(0). If this function is called without a plan for re-establishing control or if it's done accidentally, all onlyOwner functions, including mint, will become permanently inaccessible (7.8 Operations).

Fix

Exercise extreme caution when using renounceOwnership. Ensure that renouncing ownership is an intentional and well-understood action, typically only performed when the contract is designed to be immutable after deployment or when control is transferred to a governance mechanism.

Status

Unresolved

Info

EIP-2612 Permit Signature Replay Considerations

The contract utilizes ERC20Permit (EIP-2612) for gasless approvals. While the OpenZeppelin implementation correctly uses nonces to prevent on-chain replay of signatures, users should be aware that off-chain signature replay attacks are still possible if a signed permit message is broadcast multiple times by different relayers before it's processed on-chain (7.2 Code Security).I-01

Issue

The contract utilizes ERC20Permit (EIP-2612) for gasless approvals. While the OpenZeppelin implementation correctly uses nonces to prevent on-chain replay of signatures, users should be aware that off-chain signature replay attacks are still possible if a signed permit message is broadcast multiple times by different relayers before it's processed on-chain (7.2 Code Security).

Fix

Users should be educated on the mechanics of EIP-2612 and the importance of using unique signatures for each transaction. Relay services should implement robust mechanisms to prevent replaying signatures.

Status

Unresolved

Analysis

AI Copilotas of audit · Sep 4
Executive SummaryWhat the contract is and what the review found

The audit of the Token contract, a mock ERC20 implementation with owner-controlled minting, identified a Medium overall risk level. The contract is well-structured, leveraging battle-tested OpenZeppelin libraries, which contributes to its technical robustness. The primary risks stem from the centralized control over token supply via the owner's minting capability and the associated operational security requirements for the owner's private key. No critical code vulnerabilities were found.

Technical7/10Low risk

The Token contract exhibits high technical quality, primarily due to its reliance on battle-tested OpenZeppelin libraries for ERC20, ERC20Permit, ERC20Burnable, and Ownable functionalities (7.2 Code Security). Custom logic is minimal and correctly implemented, specifically the mint function which is properly restricted to the owner (7.3 Access Control). No reentrancy, integer overflow/underflow, or other common EVM vulnerabilities were identified in the custom code.

Governance8/10Low risk

The contract's economic model is highly centralized, with the owner possessing absolute control over the token supply through the mint function (7.4 Economic). This design, while intended for a 'mock USDC', introduces a significant single point of failure: a compromise of the owner's private key would allow an attacker to mint unlimited tokens, severely impacting the token's value and trust (7.3 Access Control). Robust operational security for the owner's key is paramount to mitigate this inherent risk (7.8 Operations).

Upgrades7/10Low risk

The contract is not designed as an upgradeable proxy, meaning its core logic cannot be changed post-deployment (7.7 Upgrades). While the Ownable pattern allows for administrative control transfer via transferOwnership, this does not facilitate code upgrades. The risk related to upgrades is therefore minimal, as the contract's functionality is fixed.

Final RecommendationWhat to do about this score

To enhance the security posture of the Token contract, prioritize the implementation of robust operational security measures for the owner's private key.

Consider utilizing a multi-signature wallet for the owner address to distribute control and require multiple approvals for sensitive actions like minting. Additionally, ensure comprehensive monitoring of owner-controlled functions to detect any unauthorized activity promptly. For any future production deployments, carefully evaluate the implications of centralized minting and explore decentralized alternatives or time-locked mechanisms if appropriate for the project's long-term vision.

Contract & Record

2 audits on record
TypeToken
NetworkBase
Token age9mo
Contract0xef59…b3c1
Deployer0x8fed…1e0e
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Audit History
  1. Sep 4, 202633Low
  2. Jul 27, 20269Low
  3. Jul 27, 202666High

Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.

Frequently Asked Questions

Is OWB a scam?

Based on automated analysis, OWB scores 66/100 (High Risk) on our risk scale. No honeypot was detected, but always verify independently before investing.

Is OWB safe to buy?

Our scanner flagged a risk score of 66/100. Ownership has not been renounced, which is a risk factor. DYOR before purchasing any token.

Has OWB been audited?

The contract has not been verified on-chain. Verification is not the same as a full security audit. Use Quantum Audit's free tool to run a deeper analysis of the contract code.

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