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Is OpenAI Safe?

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Last checked Sep 4, 2026 · 1 audit on record
Chart
Low RiskHow is this score calculated?
How the score breaks downratings: 10 is safest
Technical10/10Governance3/10Upgrades9/10Checks passed4 of 5Findings2 Medium · 1 Low · 3 Info6
SummaryAI Copilot

The ClankerToken contract is an ERC20 token with extensions for burning, permits, and voting, designed for cross-chain functionality.

Read the full analysis
What raised the score
  • Top-10 concentration > 70%
  • Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
  • LP top1 unlocked holder = 100.0%
  • LP top3 unlocked holders = 100.0%
  • 2 Medium finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Low finding(s) from audit
Exact factors
  • Top-10 concentration > 70% (100.0% total → 100.0% effective; 100.0% in EOAs, 0.0% in contracts — extreme)
  • Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
  • LP top1 unlocked holder = 100.0% (independent LP — depth risk)
  • LP top3 unlocked holders = 100.0% (independent LP — depth risk)
  • 2 Medium finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Low finding(s) from audit

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Security Checklist

as of audit · Sep 44 of 5 checks passed
Contract verifiedVerified
OwnershipRenounced
MintNo mint
Liquidity lockNot locked
UpgradeabilityFixed code

Holders

as of audit · Sep 4, 2026
100.0%Wallets
100.0%Wallets
WalletsBubble area = share of supply
100.0%of supply sits with the top 10 holders
  • Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell100.0%
Effective concentrationwhat the score reads100.0%
How holder types affect the score

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Sep 4, 2026

Liquidity

as of audit · Sep 4$9.70M across 3 pairs

The risk score reads depth across every pair.

LP tokensNot locked

The LP tokens of the analysed pool are not locked or burned, so whoever holds them can withdraw that liquidity.

Analysed pool$9.70MShare of depth100.0%
Top-1 Unlocked Holder100.0%
Top-3 Unlocked100.0%
Unlocked LP held by
0x170f…7cec

No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.

Security Findings

2 Medium1 Low3 Info
Medium

Centralized Admin Control

The _admin role has significant control over critical token parameters, including the ability to update the token's image, metadata, and context strings. Furthermore, the _admin can transfer its own role to any address via updateAdmin. This high degree of centralization (7.3 Access Control, 7.5 Governance) means that a compromise of the _admin's private key could lead to unauthorized changes to the token's public representation or even a malicious transfer of administrative control.M-01

Issue

The _admin role has significant control over critical token parameters, including the ability to update the token's image, metadata, and context strings. Furthermore, the _admin can transfer its own role to any address via updateAdmin. This high degree of centralization (7.3 Access Control, 7.5 Governance) means that a compromise of the _admin's private key could lead to unauthorized changes to the token's public representation or even a malicious transfer of administrative control.

Fix

Consider implementing a multi-signature wallet for the _admin role to require multiple approvals for sensitive operations like updateAdmin, updateImage, and updateMetadata. Alternatively, introduce a time-lock mechanism for updateAdmin to provide a window for community review or intervention before a new admin takes full control.

Status

Unresolved

Medium

Misleading maxSupply_ Parameter in Constructor

The constructor takes a maxSupply_ parameter, which is used to mint an initial supply to msg.sender under a specific block.chainid condition. However, the crosschainMint function, controlled by Predeploys.SUPERCHAIN_TOKEN_BRIDGE, allows for additional minting without any explicit cap related to maxSupply_. This implies that maxSupply_ is effectively an initial supply on the primary chain rather than a true global maximum supply. This discrepancy (7.4 Economic) can lead to confusion among users and investors regarding the token's total circulating supply and inflation mechanics.M-02

Issue

The constructor takes a maxSupply_ parameter, which is used to mint an initial supply to msg.sender under a specific block.chainid condition. However, the crosschainMint function, controlled by Predeploys.SUPERCHAIN_TOKEN_BRIDGE, allows for additional minting without any explicit cap related to maxSupply_. This implies that maxSupply_ is effectively an initial supply on the primary chain rather than a true global maximum supply. This discrepancy (7.4 Economic) can lead to confusion among users and investors regarding the token's total circulating supply and inflation mechanics.

Fix

Clarify the purpose of the maxSupply_ parameter in the contract's documentation, explicitly stating that it refers to the initial supply on the designated chain and not a global hard cap. If a global hard cap is intended, implement a mechanism within crosschainMint to enforce it, or rename the parameter to initialChainSupply or similar for better clarity.

Status

Unresolved

Low

Single-Use _originalAdmin Role

The _originalAdmin role is an immutable address set in the constructor, but its only function is to call verify() once. After verify() is successfully executed, the _originalAdmin address holds no further special privileges or responsibilities within the contract (7.3 Access Control, 7.8 Operations). While not a direct vulnerability, if this key were compromised *before* verify() is called, it could be used to prematurely verify the token, potentially against the project's intended timeline.L-01

Issue

The _originalAdmin role is an immutable address set in the constructor, but its only function is to call verify() once. After verify() is successfully executed, the _originalAdmin address holds no further special privileges or responsibilities within the contract (7.3 Access Control, 7.8 Operations). While not a direct vulnerability, if this key were compromised *before* verify() is called, it could be used to prematurely verify the token, potentially against the project's intended timeline.

Fix

Consider if the _originalAdmin role is strictly necessary post-deployment, or if its functionality could be integrated into the _admin role with appropriate safeguards. If kept, ensure the _originalAdmin key is secured with the highest standards, especially prior to the verify() call. After verify() is called, the key can be safely archived or even burned if no other off-chain responsibilities are tied to it.

Status

Unresolved

Info

Non-Upgradeable Contract

The ClankerToken contract is deployed as a standard, non-proxy implementation. This means that its logic cannot be modified or upgraded after deployment (7.7 Upgrades). Any future bug fixes, feature additions, or changes to the token's behavior would require deploying an entirely new contract and migrating all existing token holders and integrations, which can be a complex, costly, and disruptive process.I-01

Issue

The ClankerToken contract is deployed as a standard, non-proxy implementation. This means that its logic cannot be modified or upgraded after deployment (7.7 Upgrades). Any future bug fixes, feature additions, or changes to the token's behavior would require deploying an entirely new contract and migrating all existing token holders and integrations, which can be a complex, costly, and disruptive process.

Fix

Acknowledge the implications of a non-upgradeable contract. For projects requiring long-term flexibility or potential for future enhancements, consider adopting an upgradeable proxy pattern (e.g., UUPS or Transparent Proxy) for future contract deployments. If non-upgradeability is a deliberate design choice, ensure all current functionalities are thoroughly tested and robust.

Status

Unresolved

Info

Reliance on External Superchain Token Bridge

The crosschainMint and crosschainBurn functions are exclusively callable by Predeploys.SUPERCHAIN_TOKEN_BRIDGE. This design makes the token's cross-chain functionality entirely dependent on the security, availability, and correct operation of this external bridge (7.6 External). Any vulnerabilities or compromises within the SUPERCHAIN_TOKEN_BRIDGE could directly impact the integrity and supply of the ClankerToken across different chains.I-02

Issue

The crosschainMint and crosschainBurn functions are exclusively callable by Predeploys.SUPERCHAIN_TOKEN_BRIDGE. This design makes the token's cross-chain functionality entirely dependent on the security, availability, and correct operation of this external bridge (7.6 External). Any vulnerabilities or compromises within the SUPERCHAIN_TOKEN_BRIDGE could directly impact the integrity and supply of the ClankerToken across different chains.

Fix

Ensure that the Predeploys.SUPERCHAIN_TOKEN_BRIDGE is a highly secure and audited component. Maintain continuous monitoring of the bridge's operational status and security posture. Document the trust assumptions made regarding the bridge for users and integrators.

Status

Unresolved

Info

Chain-Specific Initial Minting Condition

The constructor includes a condition if (block.chainid == initialSupplyChainId_) { _mint(msg.sender, maxSupply_); }. This means that the initial maxSupply_ will only be minted if the contract is deployed on a specific, predefined chain (7.1 Architecture, 7.4 Economic). If deployed on any other chain, the initial supply will be zero, requiring crosschainMint operations to introduce tokens into circulation.I-03

Issue

The constructor includes a condition if (block.chainid == initialSupplyChainId_) { _mint(msg.sender, maxSupply_); }. This means that the initial maxSupply_ will only be minted if the contract is deployed on a specific, predefined chain (7.1 Architecture, 7.4 Economic). If deployed on any other chain, the initial supply will be zero, requiring crosschainMint operations to introduce tokens into circulation.

Fix

Clearly document this chain-specific initial minting behavior to avoid confusion regarding token distribution and deployment strategies. Ensure that the initialSupplyChainId_ is correctly set for the intended primary deployment chain.

Status

Unresolved

Analysis

AI Copilotas of audit · Sep 4
Executive SummaryWhat the contract is and what the review found

The ClankerToken contract is an ERC20 token with extensions for burning, permits, and voting, designed for cross-chain functionality. It incorporates administrative roles for metadata management and relies on a Superchain Token Bridge for cross-chain minting and burning. The contract exhibits good code quality, leveraging battle-tested OpenZeppelin libraries. Key risks identified include the centralized control of the _admin role and potential for misunderstanding regarding the maxSupply_ parameter's implications for total supply. The contract is not upgradeable, which limits future flexibility.

Technical10/10Low risk

The ClankerToken contract demonstrates good technical architecture (7.1 Architecture) by extending standard ERC20 functionalities with ERC20Permit, ERC20Votes, and ERC20Burnable from OpenZeppelin, which are well-audited and secure. Code security (7.2 Code Security) is strong, with no apparent reentrancy, integer overflows (due to Solidity 0.8.x), or other common vulnerabilities. The contract correctly implements supportsInterface for multiple ERC standards. A minor technical observation is the single-use nature of the _originalAdmin role after verify() is called, which could be simplified or removed post-verification.

Governance3/10High risk

The contract features a centralized _admin role (7.3 Access Control) that can update token metadata (image, context, metadata) and transfer the admin role itself. This centralization (7.5 Governance) introduces a single point of failure; compromise of this key could lead to reputational damage or manipulation of token representation. Economically (7.4 Economic), the maxSupply_ parameter in the constructor is potentially misleading as crosschainMint allows minting beyond this initial value, implying it's an initial supply on a specific chain rather than a global hard cap. The reliance on Predeploys.SUPERCHAIN_TOKEN_BRIDGE for cross-chain operations (7.6 External) means the token's cross-chain integrity is dependent on the bridge's security.

Upgrades9/10Low risk

The ClankerToken contract is implemented as a standard, non-upgradeable contract (7.7 Upgrades). This means there is no inherent upgrade mechanism (e.g., proxy pattern) to modify its logic post-deployment. While this eliminates risks associated with upgrade mechanisms themselves, it also means that any future bug fixes, feature enhancements, or changes to the token's logic would necessitate deploying an entirely new contract and migrating existing token holders, which can be a complex and costly process.

Final RecommendationWhat to do about this score

It is recommended to implement a robust multi-signature wallet or a time-locked governance mechanism for the _admin role to mitigate the risks associated with centralized control.

Clearly document the intended behavior of the maxSupply_ parameter, clarifying that it represents an initial supply on a specific chain rather than a global hard cap, to prevent economic misunderstandings. For long-term flexibility, consider a proxy-based upgradeable architecture for future token deployments, or acknowledge the implications of non-upgradeability for future maintenance and evolution.

Contract & Record

1 audit on record
TypeClankerToken
NetworkBase
Token age1y
Contract0xa4a9…7b07
Deployer0x00aa…ce61
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Audit History
  1. Sep 4, 202632Low
  2. Aug 14, 202617Low

Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.

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