The UChildERC20 contract serves as a bridge-compatible token on Polygon. It utilizes standard OpenZeppelin AccessControl for role management and supports meta-transactions. The architecture is robust for its intended purpose, though it contains centralized minting capabilities and minor asset handling inefficiencies.

On-chain security analysis — is it a scam or legit?
Is Mysterium (PoS) Safe?
Not verified
This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →The UChildERC20 contract serves as a bridge-compatible token on Polygon.
Read the full analysis- Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded
- Upgradeable proxy — the admin can replace the logic
- Non-standard proxy
- Ownership status UNKNOWN
- Liquidity not locked
- Code: Stuck ETH in Contract
Exact factors
- Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded
- Upgradeable proxy — the admin can replace the logic
- Non-standard proxy (opaque upgrade path)
- Ownership status UNKNOWN (owner could not be resolved)
- Liquidity NOT locked (100% of the pool; this pool is 96% of DEX liquidity) — who holds it cannot be verified
- Code: Stuck ETH in Contract (Medium, static analysis)
Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed
Security Checklist
as of audit · Oct 29Holders
as of audit · Oct 29, 2026- Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking12.5%
- Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell13.6%
- DEX poolsthe pools' own liquidity7.9%
- Everyone else538,081 holders66.0%
How holder types affect the score
Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.
Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Oct 29, 2026
Liquidity
as of audit · Oct 29- Quickswap v2USDCAnalysed$139.2K96.2%
- UniswapWPOL$4.3K3.0%
- UniswapUSDC$1.3K0.9%
- SushiswapWPOL$130.0%
- Quickswap v3WPOL$50.0%
- UniswapWPOL$20.0%
Show 3 more pairs
The risk score reads depth across every pair.
The LP tokens of the analysed pool are not locked or burned, so whoever holds them can withdraw that liquidity.
0x3804…0bc60xd2ad…a5d20xc5e8…19410xf099…1b520x2b13…c1820x96e3…f3ec0x1165…52ef0x4457…4aa80x3af9…d73c0x3d58…407dSecurity Findings
MediumStuck ETH in Contract
The contract can receive ETH via meta-transactions or direct transfers, but it lacks a function to withdraw or transfer these funds out of the contract.CD-01
Issue
The contract can receive ETH via meta-transactions or direct transfers, but it lacks a function to withdraw or transfer these funds out of the contract.
Fix
Add an administrative function to withdraw any ETH accidentally sent to the contract address.
Status
Unresolved
MediumCentralized Minting Authority
The deposit function allows an address with the DEPOSITOR_ROLE to mint new tokens at any time. This increases the total supply and dilutes the value of existing holdings.CP-01
Issue
The deposit function allows an address with the DEPOSITOR_ROLE to mint new tokens at any time. This increases the total supply and dilutes the value of existing holdings.
Fix
Restrict the DEPOSITOR_ROLE to a multi-signature wallet or a secure bridge contract to prevent unauthorized supply inflation.
Status
Unresolved
MediumLiquidity not locked
0.0% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 100.0% is held, unlocked, by 1 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. One of them — a contract, 0x3804…0bc6 — holds 99.9% and can remove that share at once; who controls it is not visible on-chain, so it is not treated as an independent provider. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them.QA-LIQUIDITY
Issue
0.0% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 100.0% is held, unlocked, by 1 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. One of them — a contract, 0x3804…0bc6 — holds 99.9% and can remove that share at once; who controls it is not visible on-chain, so it is not treated as an independent provider. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them.
Fix
Check the lock's end date and beneficiary on the locker's own page before relying on it.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoWho holds the supply
The ten largest holders own 34.0% of supply. Of that, 7.9% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 13.6% in wallets, 12.5% in other contracts. 538,091 holders in total.QA-HOLDERS
Issue
The ten largest holders own 34.0% of supply. Of that, 7.9% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 13.6% in wallets, 12.5% in other contracts. 538,091 holders in total.
Fix
Watch the largest wallets that are not exchanges, pools or locks — those are the ones that can move the price.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoListed, but not independently verified
Listed on CoinGecko as Mysterium (MYST), market cap $3M, rank #2230. 538,091 holders.QA-IDENTITY
Issue
Listed on CoinGecko as Mysterium (MYST), market cap $3M, rank #2230. 538,091 holders.
Fix
Match the contract address against the project's official channels before trading.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoThe market for this token
Liquidity $145K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $13K (CoinGecko, all markets, daily snapshot). 24h trading volume $43K (DexScreener, all pools). CoinGecko's record for this coin: all-time high $3.86 on 2018-01-08; the price is now 97.9903% below it.QA-MARKET
Issue
Liquidity $145K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $13K (CoinGecko, all markets, daily snapshot). 24h trading volume $43K (DexScreener, all pools). CoinGecko's record for this coin: all-time high $3.86 on 2018-01-08; the price is now 97.9903% below it.
Fix
Size any position to the liquidity and daily volume shown — they set how much you can sell and at what price.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoAsset class: Project token
A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: mintable with no on-chain cap found. Control: an owner that could not be resolved. Code: upgradeable proxy. Fees: no buy or sell tax. Market: $145K of DEX liquidity across 10 pools. Launch: 2030 days of market history.QA-PROFILE
Issue
A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: mintable with no on-chain cap found. Control: an owner that could not be resolved. Code: upgradeable proxy. Fees: no buy or sell tax. Market: $145K of DEX liquidity across 10 pools. Launch: 2030 days of market history.
Fix
Check the project's own documentation for what the token is used for; this report covers what the contract allows.
Status
Acknowledged
Analysis
AI Copilotas of audit · Oct 29The contract implements standard ERC20 functionality with secure OpenZeppelin libraries. 7.1 Architecture follows a standard proxy pattern, while 7.2 Code Security is maintained through well-audited base contracts. 7.3 Access Control is correctly implemented using roles, though 7.6 External interactions are limited to bridge-specific minting logic.
7.4 Economic risk is centered on the minting authority held by the bridge role. 7.5 Governance is centralized, allowing privileged roles to increase supply at will. This is a design requirement for bridge tokens but represents a significant trust assumption for token holders.
7.7 Upgrades are handled via a proxy pattern, allowing for logic updates. 7.8 Operations are stable, with no recent changes to the implementation contract. The upgradeability mechanism is standard and well-understood.
The protocol should ensure that the DEPOSITOR_ROLE is held by a multi-signature wallet or a time-locked contract to mitigate the risk of unauthorized minting.
Additionally, implement a sweep function to recover any accidentally sent ETH to the contract address.
Contract & Record
Free for any token on the record. It links to this page and always shows the current score and the date it was checked.
- Oct 29, 202660Medium
Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.
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