On-chain security analysis — is it a scam or legit?
PolygonThe CES_tokenV1 is a standard ERC-20 implementation utilizing the UUPS proxy pattern.
Read the full analysisEach factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed
Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.
Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Oct 20, 2026
The risk score reads depth across every pair.
The LP tokens of the analysed pool are not locked or burned, so whoever holds them can withdraw that liquidity.
0xa741…0c2a0x5e02…85be0x9bb3…23f40x4733…c3620xf56d…bbd40x96da…66000x40a7…2d100x3aaf…0b1f0xf985…82920x1b42…010aThe contract includes a blacklist mechanism managed by the admin. The functions blockUser and unblockUser allow the administrator to prevent specific addresses from transferring or receiving tokens, effectively freezing their assets.
Implement a timelock or multi-signature requirement for the admin role to prevent unilateral and potentially malicious use of the blacklisting functionality.
Unresolved
0.0% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 98.1% is held, unlocked, by 10 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. One of them — a contract, 0xa741…0c2a — holds 83.9% and can remove that share at once; who controls it is not visible on-chain, so it is not treated as an independent provider. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them.
Check the lock's end date and beneficiary on the locker's own page before relying on it.
Acknowledged
The ten largest holders own 83.5% of supply. What remains: 4.8% in wallets, 78.6% in other contracts. 294,785 holders in total.
Watch the largest wallets that are not exchanges, pools or locks — those are the ones that can move the price.
Acknowledged
Listed on CoinGecko as Whalebit (CES). 294,785 holders.
Match the contract address against the project's official channels before trading.
Acknowledged
Liquidity $49K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $1.1M (CoinGecko, all markets, daily snapshot). 24h trading volume $483K (DexScreener, all pools). CoinGecko's record for this coin: all-time high $7.08 on 2025-09-29; the price is now 97.8707% below it.
Size any position to the liquidity and daily volume shown — they set how much you can sell and at what price.
Acknowledged
A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: mintable, capped at 0.0% of supply per year. Control: an owner that could not be resolved. Code: upgradeable proxy. Fees: no buy or sell tax. Market: $49K of DEX liquidity across 8 pools. Launch: 535 days of market history.
Check the project's own documentation for what the token is used for; this report covers what the contract allows.
Acknowledged
The CES_tokenV1 is a standard ERC-20 implementation utilizing the UUPS proxy pattern. The contract includes centralized administrative controls for minting, token metadata management, and user blacklisting. While the code follows standard OpenZeppelin patterns, the presence of a blacklist mechanism introduces a degree of centralization risk for token holders.
The architecture leverages UUPS proxy patterns for upgradeability, ensuring gas efficiency and standard compliance. 7.1 Architecture is robust, utilizing OpenZeppelin's battle-tested libraries. 7.2 Code Security is high, with clear separation of concerns and proper use of modifiers. 7.3 Access Control is strictly enforced via AccessControlUpgradeable, though it grants significant power to the admin role.
7.4 Economic and 7.5 Governance aspects are centralized, as the admin holds the ability to mint tokens and blacklist users. This design allows for rapid response to security incidents but creates a single point of failure. 7.6 External interactions are limited to standard ERC-20 operations, minimizing external dependency risks.
7.7 Upgrades are managed via the UUPS pattern, which is the industry standard for secure proxy updates. 7.8 Operations are supported by clear administrative functions for role management and stuck token recovery. The implementation is verified and follows standard upgradeability workflows.
The protocol should consider implementing a multi-signature wallet or a timelock controller for the DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE to mitigate the risks associated with centralized control.
This would ensure that sensitive operations like blacklisting or minting require consensus rather than a single point of failure. Additionally, users should be aware that the token is subject to administrative intervention. We recommend documenting the criteria for blacklisting to provide transparency to the community regarding the use of the blockUser function.
Free for any token on the record. It links to this page and always shows the current score and the date it was checked.
Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.
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