The contract is a standard ERC-20 implementation with custom fee logic. Ownership has been renounced, meaning the privileged functions for fee management are now permanently disabled. The audit identified critical issues regarding token movement and lack of ETH withdrawal mechanisms.

Early-stage security check — honeypot & rug-pull analysis
Is Flying Tesla Roadster a Scam?
Not verified
This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →The contract is a standard ERC-20 implementation with custom fee logic.
Read the full analysis- Volume/Liquidity > 15×
- Code: Unauthorized Token Movement
- Code: Rounding Errors due to Division Before Multiplication
- Code: Locked ETH in Contract
- Code: Ignored Transfer Return Values
Exact factors
- Volume/Liquidity > 15× (263.9× — wash-trading signal)
- Code: Unauthorized Token Movement (Critical, static analysis)
- Code: Rounding Errors due to Division Before Multiplication (Low, static analysis)
- Code: Locked ETH in Contract (Medium, static analysis)
- Code: Ignored Transfer Return Values (High, static analysis)
Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed
Security Checklist
as of audit · Oct 26Holders
as of audit · Oct 26, 2026- Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell0.7%
- Burnedout of circulation19.4%
- DEX poolsthe pools' own liquidity0.5%
- Everyone else14,561 holders79.3%
How holder types affect the score
Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.
Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Oct 26, 2026
Liquidity
as of audit · Oct 26The risk score reads depth across every pair.
The LP tokens of the analysed pool are locked or burned.
0x0ed9…97060x1ee8…427bNo privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.
Security Findings
CriticalUnauthorized Token Movement
The _executeSwapAndLiquify function uses transferFrom to move tokens from arbitrary addresses, potentially allowing unauthorized drainage of user funds.CD-01
Issue
The _executeSwapAndLiquify function uses transferFrom to move tokens from arbitrary addresses, potentially allowing unauthorized drainage of user funds.
Fix
Restrict the source address in transferFrom to only the contract itself or authorized liquidity pools.
Status
Unresolved
HighIgnored Transfer Return Values
The contract ignores the boolean return value of ERC-20 transfers in _executeSwapAndLiquify, which can lead to silent failures where tokens are not moved but the state updates as if they were.CD-04
Issue
The contract ignores the boolean return value of ERC-20 transfers in _executeSwapAndLiquify, which can lead to silent failures where tokens are not moved but the state updates as if they were.
Fix
Always check the return value of transfer and transferFrom calls using a library like SafeERC20.
Status
Unresolved
MediumLocked ETH in Contract
The contract includes a receive function allowing it to accept ETH, but provides no mechanism for the owner or any other party to withdraw these funds.CD-03
Issue
The contract includes a receive function allowing it to accept ETH, but provides no mechanism for the owner or any other party to withdraw these funds.
Fix
Implement a withdrawal function to allow the recovery of accidentally sent ETH.
Status
Unresolved
LowRounding Errors due to Division Before Multiplication
Calculations in _executeSwapAndLiquify and _transfer perform division before multiplication, leading to precision loss.CD-02
Issue
Calculations in _executeSwapAndLiquify and _transfer perform division before multiplication, leading to precision loss.
Fix
Rearrange arithmetic operations to perform multiplication before division to maintain precision.
Status
Unresolved
InfoWho holds the supply
The ten largest holders own 20.7% of supply. Of that, 19.4% burned, 0.5% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 0.7% in wallets, 0.0% in other contracts. 14,571 holders in total.QA-HOLDERS
Issue
The ten largest holders own 20.7% of supply. Of that, 19.4% burned, 0.5% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 0.7% in wallets, 0.0% in other contracts. 14,571 holders in total.
Fix
Watch the largest wallets that are not exchanges, pools or locks — those are the ones that can move the price.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoNot listed by any independent source
14,571 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.QA-IDENTITY
Issue
14,571 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.
Fix
Match the contract address against the project's official channels before trading.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoLiquidity time-locked
95.0% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 95.0% is locked in PinkLock02 until 28 Nov 2026 (32 days). Until then nobody — the project included — can withdraw it unless the locker contract itself is flawed; after that date the lock's owner can. 5.0% is held, unlocked, by 2 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. No single one holds a majority: their exits thin the market rather than hand anyone the pool. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them.QA-LIQUIDITY
Issue
95.0% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 95.0% is locked in PinkLock02 until 28 Nov 2026 (32 days). Until then nobody — the project included — can withdraw it unless the locker contract itself is flawed; after that date the lock's owner can. 5.0% is held, unlocked, by 2 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. No single one holds a majority: their exits thin the market rather than hand anyone the pool. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them.
Fix
Check the lock's end date and beneficiary on the locker's own page before relying on it.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoThe market for this token
Liquidity $243K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $64.1M (DexScreener, all pools).QA-MARKET
Issue
Liquidity $243K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $64.1M (DexScreener, all pools).
Fix
Size any position to the liquidity and daily volume shown — they set how much you can sell and at what price.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoAsset class: Project token
A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: fixed — the contract has no mint function. Control: nobody (ownership renounced). Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: 4.5% on buy, 4.54% on sell. Market: $243K of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: under a day of market history.QA-PROFILE
Issue
A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: fixed — the contract has no mint function. Control: nobody (ownership renounced). Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: 4.5% on buy, 4.54% on sell. Market: $243K of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: under a day of market history.
Fix
Check the project's own documentation for what the token is used for; this report covers what the contract allows.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoRecently launched — less than a day of market history
The token's oldest DEX pool is less than a day old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.QA-RECENT
Issue
The token's oldest DEX pool is less than a day old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.
Fix
Re-check ownership, liquidity and holder distribution as the token matures; those are the facts that move early.
Status
Acknowledged
Analysis
AI Copilotas of audit · Oct 26The architecture follows standard ERC-20 patterns with additional fee-on-transfer logic. 7.1 Architecture and 7.2 Code Security are compromised by improper handling of external calls. 7.6 External interactions are risky due to ignored return values in swap functions. The code lacks robust error handling for critical financial operations.
7.4 Economic and 7.5 Governance risks are mitigated by the renounced ownership status. No further changes can be made to fee exclusions or contract parameters. The economic model is static and cannot be adjusted by any party.
7.7 Upgrades are not applicable as the contract is not a proxy. The logic is immutable. 7.8 Operations are limited to standard token transfers.
Immediate action is required to address the critical token movement vulnerability.
Since ownership is renounced, the contract cannot be patched; users should be advised of the risks associated with the current implementation.
Contract & Record
Free for any token on the record. It links to this page and always shows the current score and the date it was checked.
- Oct 26, 202676High
Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the FTR contract address?
The Flying Tesla Roadster (FTR) contract on BNB Chain is 0x23ce28d7d9f642bb544ac0ac521bb441a2b1e514. Compare it with the address the project itself publishes before trading: other contracts can carry the same name and ticker.
Is Flying Tesla Roadster a scam?
Quantum Audit's risk score for Flying Tesla Roadster is 76/100 (High risk) as of Oct 26, 2026, computed by a deterministic function from on-chain facts — Contract verified: Verified; Ownership: Renounced; Mint: No mint; Liquidity lock: Locked; Upgradeability: Fixed code; Honeypot: None found; Buy / sell tax: 4.5% / 4.5%. A score is a dated snapshot of those facts, not a guarantee; each one is listed on this page.
Is FTR liquidity locked?
Liquidity lock: Locked (as of Oct 26, 2026). Total DEX liquidity: $242.9K.
Who holds FTR?
As of Oct 26, 2026, the 10 largest holders own 20.7% of the supply across 14,571 holders. The Holders section on this page shows who they are by holder type.
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