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Is TartSwap Safe?

TARTBNB Chain
Not verified This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →
Last checked Sep 4, 2026 · 1 audit on record
Chart
High RiskHow is this score calculated?
How the score breaks downratings: 10 is safest
Technical6/10Governance3/10Upgrades6/10Checks passed5 of 7Findings1 Critical · 1 High · 2 Medium · 1 Low5
SummaryAI Copilot

A security audit was conducted on the provided partial source code for the TartToken contract.

Read the full analysis
What raised the score
  • Ownership not renounced — owner is an EOA
  • Top-10 concentration > 30%
  • Token age < 30 days
  • 1 Critical finding(s) from audit
  • 1 High finding(s) from audit
  • 2 Medium finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Low finding(s) from audit
Exact factors
  • Ownership NOT renounced — owner is an EOA (single private key)
  • Top-10 concentration > 30% (82.0% total → 46.0% effective; 22.0% in EOAs, 60.0% in contracts — moderate)
  • Token age < 30 days (still settling)
  • 1 Critical finding(s) from audit
  • 1 High finding(s) from audit
  • 2 Medium finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Low finding(s) from audit

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Security Checklist

as of audit · Sep 45 of 7 checks passed
Contract verifiedVerified
OwnershipRetained
MintNo mint
Liquidity lockLocked
UpgradeabilityFixed code
HoneypotNone found
Buy / sell tax5% / 5%

Holders

as of audit · Sep 4, 2026
60.0%Contracts22.0%Wallets18.0%Everyone else
60.0%Contracts22.0%Wallets18.0%Everyone else
ContractsWalletsEveryone elseBubble area = share of supply
82.0%of supply sits with the top 10 holders
  • Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking60.0%
  • Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell22.0%
  • Everyone elsethe rest of the supply18.0%
Effective concentrationwhat the score reads46.0%
How holder types affect the score

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Sep 4, 2026

Liquidity

as of audit · Sep 4$228.9K

The risk score reads depth across every pair.

LP tokensLocked

The LP tokens of the analysed pool are locked or burned.

Analysed pool$228.9KShare of depth100.0%
LP Burned13.0%
LP Locked95.7% · Null Address, OnlyMoons Lock
Top-1 Unlocked Holder3.6%
Unlocked LP held by
0x4f6e…f3160x591d…8a740x0ed9…97060xc8f0…99e20x778a…1e8e0x09eb…81b60xd8df…26080xfe49…4f3d

No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.

Security Findings

1 Critical1 High2 Medium1 Low
Critical

Incomplete Source Code Provided

Only a partial source code snippet for the TartToken contract was provided, consisting primarily of interfaces and a utility library. The core implementation of the TartToken contract itself is missing. This prevents a comprehensive security audit, making it impossible to identify vulnerabilities related to the token's logic, state management, access control, or interactions with other contracts (7.1 Architecture, 7.2 Code Security).C-01

Issue

Only a partial source code snippet for the TartToken contract was provided, consisting primarily of interfaces and a utility library. The core implementation of the TartToken contract itself is missing. This prevents a comprehensive security audit, making it impossible to identify vulnerabilities related to the token's logic, state management, access control, or interactions with other contracts (7.1 Architecture, 7.2 Code Security).

Fix

Provide the complete and verifiable source code for the TartToken contract, including all imported libraries and dependencies, to allow for a thorough security assessment.

Status

Unresolved

High

Potential for Reentrancy and External Call Vulnerabilities

Given the inclusion of Uniswap V2 router interfaces, it is highly probable that the TartToken contract interacts with external DeFi protocols for liquidity provision or swapping. Without the full contract implementation, it is impossible to verify if these external calls are properly guarded against reentrancy attacks or other unexpected behaviors from untrusted contracts (7.2 Code Security, 7.6 External).H-01

Issue

Given the inclusion of Uniswap V2 router interfaces, it is highly probable that the TartToken contract interacts with external DeFi protocols for liquidity provision or swapping. Without the full contract implementation, it is impossible to verify if these external calls are properly guarded against reentrancy attacks or other unexpected behaviors from untrusted contracts (7.2 Code Security, 7.6 External).

Fix

Ensure that all external calls are made after state changes (Checks-Effects-Interactions pattern) and consider using reentrancy guards for functions that interact with external contracts and modify critical state variables.

Status

Unresolved

Medium

Undetermined Access Control Mechanisms

The full contract logic for TartToken is unavailable, making it impossible to determine what administrative functions exist (e.g., setting fees, pausing transfers, blacklisting) and how their access is controlled. Improper or overly centralized access control could lead to unauthorized critical operations, single points of failure, or governance risks (7.3 Access Control, 7.5 Governance).M-01

Issue

The full contract logic for TartToken is unavailable, making it impossible to determine what administrative functions exist (e.g., setting fees, pausing transfers, blacklisting) and how their access is controlled. Improper or overly centralized access control could lead to unauthorized critical operations, single points of failure, or governance risks (7.3 Access Control, 7.5 Governance).

Fix

Clearly define and implement robust access control for all sensitive functions, preferably using a multi-signature wallet or a well-tested access control library. Document all privileged roles and their associated permissions.

Status

Unresolved

Medium

Unverified Tokenomics and DEX Compatibility

Custom token logic, such as fee-on-transfer mechanisms, reflections, or burning, can lead to unexpected behavior or break compatibility with standard DeFi protocols like Uniswap. Without the full TartToken implementation, its specific tokenomics and their impact on external integrations (e.g., swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens) cannot be assessed, potentially leading to lost funds or failed transactions (7.4 Economic, 7.6 External).M-02

Issue

Custom token logic, such as fee-on-transfer mechanisms, reflections, or burning, can lead to unexpected behavior or break compatibility with standard DeFi protocols like Uniswap. Without the full TartToken implementation, its specific tokenomics and their impact on external integrations (e.g., swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens) cannot be assessed, potentially leading to lost funds or failed transactions (7.4 Economic, 7.6 External).

Fix

If custom tokenomics are implemented, thoroughly test their compatibility with all intended external protocols, especially DEXes. Consider using established patterns for fee-on-transfer tokens that account for DEX liquidity pools.

Status

Unresolved

Low

Lack of Emergency Pause Functionality

Many DeFi protocols include a mechanism to pause critical operations (e.g., transfers, swaps) in emergencies, such as severe bugs, exploits, or market manipulation. The absence of the full contract prevents verification of such a safety feature, which could leave the protocol vulnerable to cascading failures without a quick mitigation strategy (7.8 Operations).L-01

Issue

Many DeFi protocols include a mechanism to pause critical operations (e.g., transfers, swaps) in emergencies, such as severe bugs, exploits, or market manipulation. The absence of the full contract prevents verification of such a safety feature, which could leave the protocol vulnerable to cascading failures without a quick mitigation strategy (7.8 Operations).

Fix

Consider implementing a well-designed pause mechanism, controlled by a trusted entity (e.g., a multi-sig wallet), to allow for emergency halts of critical contract functionalities. Ensure the pause mechanism itself is secure and cannot be abused.

Status

Unresolved

Analysis

AI Copilotas of audit · Sep 4
Executive SummaryWhat the contract is and what the review found

A security audit was conducted on the provided partial source code for the TartToken contract. Due to the incomplete nature of the provided source, a comprehensive security assessment of the core token logic and its interactions is not possible. The audit identifies critical risks associated with the inability to review the full contract implementation, alongside potential high and medium risks common to token contracts interacting with external DeFi protocols.

Technical6/10Medium risk

The provided code snippet includes standard Uniswap V2 interfaces and a robust Address utility library, which correctly handles low-level calls (7.2 Code Security). However, the core TartToken contract implementation is missing, preventing any meaningful technical assessment of its logic, state transitions, or external interactions (7.1 Architecture). Without the full code, potential vulnerabilities like reentrancy, arithmetic errors, or improper event emissions cannot be verified (7.2 Code Security).

Governance3/10High risk

Without the full TartToken contract, the economic model and governance structure (7.5 Governance) cannot be fully evaluated. There is an inherent risk of centralization if the owner () retains extensive control over critical parameters like fees, minting, or pausing (7.3 Access Control). Custom tokenomics, such as fee-on-transfer mechanisms, could introduce unexpected behavior or compatibility issues with external DeFi protocols like Uniswap (7.4 Economic).

Upgrades6/10Medium risk

The provided contract does not appear to implement any upgradeability pattern (7.7 Upgrades). It is a standard, non-upgradeable contract, which eliminates upgrade-specific risks but means any future changes would require a new deployment and migration.

Final RecommendationWhat to do about this score

To enable a comprehensive security assessment, the complete source code for the TartToken contract must be provided.

A full audit would then focus on verifying ERC-20 compliance, assessing custom tokenomics for compatibility with DeFi protocols, scrutinizing access control mechanisms, and ensuring robust error handling for all external interactions. Implement a multi-signature wallet for critical administrative functions to mitigate centralization risks.

Contract & Record

1 audit on record
TypeTartToken
NetworkBNB Chain
Token age8d
Contract0x7ab8…0314
Deployer0x6ab8…e352
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Audit History
  1. Sep 1, 202676High

Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.

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