Is Zama Safe? Smart Contract Security Analysis

Security Checklist

3/5 checks passed

Contract VerifiedPass

Ownership RenouncedUnknown

No Mint FunctionPass

Liquidity LockedFail

Not a ProxyPass

Audit History

3 audits on record

Jul 2248Jul 2366Jul 2346

Every audit run adds a dated snapshot — history is append-only and cannot be edited.

Audit Summary

This audit focuses exclusively on the provided OpenZeppelin `AccessControl.sol` contract. While the prefilled contract name indicated 'ZamaERC20', only the `AccessControl` source was available for review. The `AccessControl` module provides a robust, battle-tested role-based access control system. No critical or high-severity vulnerabilities were identified within this specific module. The primary considerations revolve around the secure implementation and diligent management of roles by any inheriting contracts.

Final Recommendation: For any contract inheriting `AccessControl`, prioritize robust key management for accounts holding administrative roles, especially the `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE`. Implement multi-signature wallets or time-locks for critical role-granting/revoking operations to enhance security. Regularly review and audit role assignments to ensure the principle of least privilege is maintained. Consider integrating `AccessControlDefaultAdminRules` for additional security measures around the `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` if the application's complexity and risk profile warrant it.

Category Ratings

TechnicalLow

8/10

The `AccessControl` contract (7.1 Architecture, 7.2 Code Security) is a well-designed and extensively audited OpenZeppelin module, providing a robust role-based access control system. It leverages custom errors for gas efficiency and adheres to ERC-165 for interface detection. The code is clear, mod

GovernanceHigh

1/10

The `AccessControl` module itself does not introduce direct economic or governance risks (7.4 Economic, 7.5 Governance). Its security implications are primarily derived from how it is integrated and managed within a larger protocol. The system's integrity relies on the secure assignment and rev

UpgradesMedium

6/10

The `AccessControl` contract is an abstract base component and is not inherently upgradeable (7.7 Upgrades). If a contract inheriting `AccessControl` is designed to be upgradeable (e.g., via a proxy pattern), careful consideration must be given to how roles and their states are managed across upgrad

LP Distribution

Top-1 Unlocked Holder99.8%

Top-3 Unlocked100.0%

What Raised This Score

6 factors

Ownership status UNKNOWN (owner could not be resolved)
Top-10 concentration > 70% (94.4% total → 81.0% effective; 72.1% in EOAs, 22.3% in contracts — extreme)
Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
LP top1 unlocked holder = 99.8% (independent LP — depth risk, pool = 99% of DEX liquidity)
LP top3 unlocked holders = 100.0% (independent LP — depth risk, pool = 99% of DEX liquidity)
1 Low finding(s) from audit

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Security Findings

4 total

1 Low 3 Info

L-01LowUnresolved

Criticality of Proper Role Management

The overall security of any system utilizing `AccessControl` is highly dependent on the correct and secure management of roles (7.3 Access Control, 7.8 Operations). Misconfigurations, such as granting excessive privileges or failing to revoke roles from compromised accounts, can lead to unauthorized access to sensitive functions or assets.

Recommendation: Establish clear policies and procedures for role assignment, revocation, and administration. Regularly audit current role holders and their permissions. Adhere to the principle of least privilege, ensuring accounts only have the roles necessary for their intended functions.

I-01InformationalUnresolved

`DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` Self-Administration Requires Vigilance

The `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` is designed to be its own administrator. This means any account holding the `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` can grant or revoke this role from other accounts, as well as administer all other roles. While a standard OpenZeppelin design, it concentrates significant power (7.3 Access Control).

Recommendation: Implement robust operational security measures for accounts holding the `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE`, such as multi-signature wallets, hardware security modules, or time-locks for critical operations. Consider using OpenZeppelin's `AccessControlDefaultAdminRules` for enhanced security around this role.

I-02InformationalUnresolved

Abstract Nature and Integration Dependency

`AccessControl` is an abstract contract (7.1 Architecture) designed to be inherited by other contracts. Its security and functionality are fully realized only when correctly integrated into a concrete contract. The audit of this module alone does not cover potential vulnerabilities arising from its specific implementation within a larger system.

Recommendation: Ensure that the inheriting contract correctly implements and utilizes the `AccessControl` functions. A comprehensive audit of the concrete contract that inherits `AccessControl` is recommended to assess the full security posture of the system.

I-03InformationalUnresolved

No On-Chain Role Enumeration

This version of `AccessControl` (7.1 Architecture) does not provide functions to enumerate all accounts holding a specific role on-chain. Role membership can only be determined by parsing past `RoleGranted` and `RoleRevoked` events off-chain. For some applications, on-chain enumerability might be desired.

Recommendation: If on-chain enumeration of role members is a requirement, consider using OpenZeppelin's `AccessControlEnumerable` module instead, which provides this functionality.

Is Zama Safe? ZAMA