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Is DIAToken Safe?

DIAEthereum
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Last checked Sep 4, 2026 · 2 audits on record
Chart
High RiskHow is this score calculated?
How the score breaks downratings: 10 is safest
Technical6/10Governance1/10Upgrades6/10Checks passed4 of 5Findings1 High · 1 Medium · 1 Low · 1 Info4
SummaryAI Copilot

This audit covers the provided Solidity source code for the DIAToken contract, which appears to be a standard ERC20 token implementation.

Read the full analysis
What raised the score
  • Ownership not renounced — owner is an EOA
  • Top-10 concentration > 50%
  • LP top1 unlocked holder = 100.0%
  • LP top3 unlocked holders = 100.0%
  • LP claimed locked but only 0.0% actually locked
  • 1 High finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Medium finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Low finding(s) from audit
Exact factors
  • Ownership NOT renounced — owner is an EOA (single private key)
  • Top-10 concentration > 50% (63.0% total → 60.6% effective; 59.1% in EOAs, 3.9% in contracts — heavy)
  • LP top1 unlocked holder = 100.0% (independent LP — depth risk, pool = 46% of DEX liquidity)
  • LP top3 unlocked holders = 100.0% (independent LP — depth risk, pool = 46% of DEX liquidity)
  • LP claimed locked but only 0.0% actually locked
  • 1 High finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Medium finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Low finding(s) from audit

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Security Checklist

as of audit · Sep 44 of 5 checks passed
Contract verifiedVerified
OwnershipRetained
MintNo mint
Liquidity lockLocked
UpgradeabilityFixed code

Holders

as of audit · Sep 4, 2026
3.9%59.1%Wallets37.0%Everyone else
3.9%59.1%Wallets37.0%Everyone else
ContractsWalletsEveryone elseBubble area = share of supply
63.0%of supply sits with the top 10 holders
  • Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking3.9%
  • Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell59.1%
  • Everyone elsethe rest of the supply37.0%
Effective concentrationwhat the score reads60.6%
How holder types affect the score

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Sep 4, 2026

Liquidity

as of audit · Sep 4$126.4K across 5 pairs

The risk score reads depth across every pair.

LP tokensLocked

The LP tokens of the analysed pool are locked or burned.

Analysed pool$58.4KShare of depth46.2%
Top-1 Unlocked Holder100.0%
Top-3 Unlocked100.0%
Unlocked LP held by
0x9c52…e1450x6684…a64f0x5ad6…e277

No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.

Security Findings

1 High1 Medium1 Low1 Info
High

Incomplete Contract Code Provided

The provided source code for the DIAToken contract is truncated, specifically the main contract body. This prevents a comprehensive security analysis of its full functionality, internal logic, access control mechanisms, and potential custom vulnerabilities. Without the complete code, critical security flaws could remain undetected.H-01

Issue

The provided source code for the DIAToken contract is truncated, specifically the main contract body. This prevents a comprehensive security analysis of its full functionality, internal logic, access control mechanisms, and potential custom vulnerabilities. Without the complete code, critical security flaws could remain undetected.

Fix

Provide the complete and verified source code for the DIAToken contract. A full audit cannot be performed without access to all relevant contract logic.

Status

Unresolved

Medium

Outdated Solidity Compiler Version

The contract uses pragma solidity ^0.5.0, which is an outdated Solidity compiler version. While SafeMath mitigates common arithmetic issues, older compiler versions may contain known bugs, have less efficient bytecode generation, or lack modern security features and optimizations available in newer versions (e.g., 0.8.x).M-01

Issue

The contract uses pragma solidity ^0.5.0, which is an outdated Solidity compiler version. While SafeMath mitigates common arithmetic issues, older compiler versions may contain known bugs, have less efficient bytecode generation, or lack modern security features and optimizations available in newer versions (e.g., 0.8.x).

Fix

Consider upgrading the Solidity compiler version to a more recent, stable release (e.g., 0.8.x). This would allow the contract to benefit from the latest security patches, gas optimizations, and language features. A thorough re-audit would be required after such an upgrade.

Status

Unresolved

Low

Potential Centralized Control by Owner

External information indicates that the contract has an owner (EOA: 0x5737…e157). While the full contract code is not available to confirm specific owner privileges, it is common for ERC20 tokens of this era to grant significant control (e.g., minting, burning, pausing) to an owner. Such centralization introduces a single point of failure and potential for abuse or compromise.L-01

Issue

External information indicates that the contract has an owner (EOA: ). While the full contract code is not available to confirm specific owner privileges, it is common for ERC20 tokens of this era to grant significant control (e.g., minting, burning, pausing) to an owner. Such centralization introduces a single point of failure and potential for abuse or compromise.

Fix

If the owner has privileged functions, clearly document these capabilities. Consider implementing a multi-signature wallet for critical administrative actions to distribute control and reduce the risk associated with a single EOA. Explore mechanisms to progressively decentralize control over time if feasible.

Status

Unresolved

Info

ERC20 approve Race Condition Warning

The IERC20 interface documentation correctly highlights a known race condition vulnerability when changing an allowance with the approve function. If a user calls approve to increase an allowance, a malicious spender could front-run this transaction, spend the old allowance, and then spend the newly increased allowance, effectively spending more than intended.I-01

Issue

The IERC20 interface documentation correctly highlights a known race condition vulnerability when changing an allowance with the approve function. If a user calls approve to increase an allowance, a malicious spender could front-run this transaction, spend the old allowance, and then spend the newly increased allowance, effectively spending more than intended.

Fix

Users of the approve function should be advised to first set the allowance to zero before setting a new, non-zero allowance. While this is a user-side concern, contract developers can provide helper functions or clear warnings in their dApp interfaces to guide users.

Status

Unresolved

Analysis

AI Copilotas of audit · Sep 4
Executive SummaryWhat the contract is and what the review found

This audit covers the provided Solidity source code for the DIAToken contract, which appears to be a standard ERC20 token implementation. The analysis is significantly limited by the truncation of the main DIAToken contract code. Key strengths include the use of OpenZeppelin's SafeMath library for arithmetic safety. However, the outdated Solidity compiler version and the inability to fully assess the contract's logic due to missing code present considerable risks. Potential centralized control by an owner, as suggested by external data, also introduces governance and economic risks.

Technical6/10Medium risk

The technical architecture benefits from the use of well-vetted OpenZeppelin libraries like SafeMath (7.2 Code Security), which significantly mitigates integer overflow/underflow risks. However, the contract uses an outdated Solidity compiler version (7.2 Code Security), which may expose it to known compiler bugs or less optimized bytecode. A major limitation for this technical review is the truncation of the main DIAToken contract code, preventing a comprehensive analysis of its internal logic and potential vulnerabilities (7.1 Architecture).

Governance1/10High risk

The contract implements the standard ERC20 interface, providing predictable token behavior (7.4 Economic). However, external information suggests the presence of an owner (EOA) for the contract (7.5 Governance). Without the full contract code, the extent of this owner's privileges (e.g., minting, burning, pausing, or other administrative functions) cannot be determined. This potential for centralized control introduces significant governance and economic risk, as a malicious or compromised owner could manipulate the token supply or freeze assets (7.3 Access Control).

Upgrades6/10Medium risk

The contract is not deployed as a proxy (7.7 Upgrades), which eliminates the complexities and specific risks associated with upgradeable contracts, such as storage collisions or improper initialization. This design choice provides a simpler and more predictable deployment. However, it also means that any discovered vulnerabilities or desired feature enhancements would necessitate a new contract deployment and migration of assets, which can be a complex and costly process (7.8 Operations).

Final RecommendationWhat to do about this score

It is strongly recommended to provide the complete and verified source code for a thorough security audit.

Address the use of an outdated Solidity compiler by upgrading to a more recent, stable version (e.g., 0.8.x) and re-auditing the contract. Clearly document and implement robust access control mechanisms for any privileged functions, ensuring that owner capabilities are transparent and minimized to reduce centralization risks. Consider implementing a multi-signature wallet for critical administrative actions if centralized control is necessary.

Contract & Record

2 audits on record
TypeDIAToken
NetworkEthereum
Token age1y
Contract0x84ca…9419
Deployer0x5737…e157
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Audit History
  1. Sep 4, 202667High
  2. Jul 27, 202666High
  3. Jul 27, 202665High

Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.

Frequently Asked Questions

Is DIAToken a scam?

Based on automated analysis, DIAToken scores 65/100 (High Risk) on our risk scale. No honeypot was detected, but always verify independently before investing.

Is DIAToken safe to buy?

Our scanner flagged a risk score of 65/100. Ownership has not been renounced, which is a risk factor. DYOR before purchasing any token.

Has DIAToken been audited?

The contract has not been verified on-chain. Verification is not the same as a full security audit. Use Quantum Audit's free tool to run a deeper analysis of the contract code.

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