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On-chain security analysis — is it a scam or legit?

Is Yooldo Games Safe?

ESPORTSBNB Chain
Not verified This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →
Last checked Sep 4, 2026 · 2 audits on record
SummaryAI Copilot

The YooldoToken contract is an ERC20 token built on OpenZeppelin standards, incorporating burnable, pausable, permit, and voting functionalities.

Read the full analysis
What raised the score
  • Ownership not renounced — Multisig
  • Top-10 concentration > 50%
  • Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
  • LP top1 unlocked holder = 68.9%
  • LP top3 unlocked holders = 80.1%
  • 1 High finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Medium finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Low finding(s) from audit
Exact factors
  • Ownership NOT renounced — Multisig (3-of-3)
  • Top-10 concentration > 50% (75.3% total → 51.3% effective; 35.4% in EOAs, 39.9% in contracts — heavy)
  • Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
  • LP top1 unlocked holder = 68.9% (independent LP — depth risk, pool = 56% of DEX liquidity)
  • LP top3 unlocked holders = 80.1% (independent LP — depth risk, pool = 56% of DEX liquidity)
  • 1 High finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Medium finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Low finding(s) from audit

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Security Checklist

as of audit · Sep 43 of 5 checks passed
Contract verifiedVerified
OwnershipRetained
MintNo mint
Liquidity lockNot locked
UpgradeabilityFixed code

Holders

as of audit · Sep 4, 2026
39.9%Contracts35.4%Wallets24.7%Everyone else
39.9%Contracts35.4%Wallets24.7%Everyone else
ContractsWalletsEveryone elseBubble area = share of supply
75.3%of supply sits with the top 10 holders
  • Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking39.9%
  • Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell35.4%
  • Everyone elsethe rest of the supply24.7%
Effective concentrationwhat the score reads51.3%
How holder types affect the score

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Sep 4, 2026

Liquidity

as of audit · Sep 4$134.9K across 6 pairs
LP tokensNot locked

The LP tokens of the analysed pool are not locked or burned, so whoever holds them can withdraw that liquidity.

Analysed pool$76.0KShare of depth56.4%
Top-1 Unlocked Holder68.9%
Top-3 Unlocked80.1%
Unlocked LP held by
0xc7d0…82ad0x5b8e…be530x3bbf…b54a0x8e0a…76c10x31ec…4b5a0xff93…18500xd906…472c0x5c83…35c20xffc6…58010x8fda…2bf3

No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.

Security Findings

1 High1 Medium1 Low1 Info
High

Centralized Control by Owner

The Ownable contract grants significant power to a single address (or multisig) to control critical token functionalities. The owner can pause all token transfers, freezeAccount or unfreezeAccount any address, and burn tokens. While the use of a multisig mitigates some risk, a compromise or malicious act by the owner could severely impact token functionality, user funds, and the overall ecosystem (7.3 Access Control, 7.4 Economic, 7.8 Operations).H-01

Issue

The Ownable contract grants significant power to a single address (or multisig) to control critical token functionalities. The owner can pause all token transfers, freezeAccount or unfreezeAccount any address, and burn tokens. While the use of a multisig mitigates some risk, a compromise or malicious act by the owner could severely impact token functionality, user funds, and the overall ecosystem (7.3 Access Control, 7.4 Economic, 7.8 Operations).

Fix

While centralization is a design choice for this token, consider implementing a multi-signature wallet with a high threshold for the owner address. Additionally, explore community governance mechanisms for critical decisions in the future. Ensure robust security practices for the owner's private keys or multisig setup.

Status

Unresolved

Medium

Lack of Timelock for Critical Operations

Critical owner-controlled functions such as pause, unpause, freezeAccount, unfreezeAccount, and transferOwnership can be executed immediately by the owner. The absence of a timelock means there is no delay for sensitive operations, preventing users from reacting to potentially malicious or erroneous actions and reducing transparency (7.3 Access Control, 7.5 Governance, 7.8 Operations).M-01

Issue

Critical owner-controlled functions such as pause, unpause, freezeAccount, unfreezeAccount, and transferOwnership can be executed immediately by the owner. The absence of a timelock means there is no delay for sensitive operations, preventing users from reacting to potentially malicious or erroneous actions and reducing transparency (7.3 Access Control, 7.5 Governance, 7.8 Operations).

Fix

Implement a timelock mechanism for all critical owner-controlled functions. This would introduce a mandatory delay between the owner initiating an action and its actual execution, providing a window for review and reaction by the community or other stakeholders.

Status

Unresolved

Low

Unused Modifier notFrozen

The notFrozen modifier is defined in the YooldoToken contract but is not utilized in any function. The logic for checking frozen accounts is directly implemented within the _update function. While this does not introduce a vulnerability, the presence of an unused modifier can lead to confusion and suggests potential for code cleanup or refactoring (7.2 Code Security).L-01

Issue

The notFrozen modifier is defined in the YooldoToken contract but is not utilized in any function. The logic for checking frozen accounts is directly implemented within the _update function. While this does not introduce a vulnerability, the presence of an unused modifier can lead to confusion and suggests potential for code cleanup or refactoring (7.2 Code Security).

Fix

Remove the unused notFrozen modifier to improve code clarity and maintainability, or integrate it into relevant functions if its intended use was overlooked. The current implementation in _update is correct and sufficient.

Status

Unresolved

Info

Non-Upgradeable Contract

The YooldoToken contract is deployed directly and does not implement an upgrade mechanism (e.g., proxy pattern). This means the contract's logic is immutable once deployed to the blockchain. While this avoids upgrade-related complexities and risks, it implies that any future bug fixes, feature enhancements, or changes to the token's core logic would necessitate deploying a new contract and migrating the token supply, which can be a complex and disruptive process (7.7 Upgrades).I-01

Issue

The YooldoToken contract is deployed directly and does not implement an upgrade mechanism (e.g., proxy pattern). This means the contract's logic is immutable once deployed to the blockchain. While this avoids upgrade-related complexities and risks, it implies that any future bug fixes, feature enhancements, or changes to the token's core logic would necessitate deploying a new contract and migrating the token supply, which can be a complex and disruptive process (7.7 Upgrades).

Fix

Acknowledge the immutability of the contract. For future projects requiring flexibility, consider using an upgradeable proxy pattern (e.g., UUPS) to allow for future logic updates without requiring a token migration. For this contract, ensure thorough testing before deployment given its immutability.

Status

Unresolved

Analysis

AI Copilotas of audit · Sep 4
Executive SummaryWhat the contract is and what the review found

The YooldoToken contract is an ERC20 token built on OpenZeppelin standards, incorporating burnable, pausable, permit, and voting functionalities. It introduces custom logic for freezing/unfreezing accounts. The contract exhibits strong technical security due to its reliance on audited libraries, but presents medium economic and governance risks due to the high degree of centralized control held by the owner, despite the use of a multisig.

Technical8/10Low risk

The contract YooldoToken is built upon battle-tested OpenZeppelin ERC20 standards, including ERC20Burnable, ERC20Pausable, ERC20Permit, and ERC20Votes. The implementation correctly overrides the _update function to enforce custom pausing and account freezing logic (7.2 Code Security). No reentrancy or integer overflow vulnerabilities were identified due to the use of modern Solidity and OpenZeppelin libraries. A minor issue is the presence of an unused notFrozen modifier (7.2 Code Security).

Governance2/10High risk

The token design grants significant centralized control to the Ownable address, which is configured as a multisig (7.3 Access Control). The owner can pause all token transfers, freeze individual accounts, and burn tokens, which introduces a high economic risk if the owner's key is compromised or acts maliciously (7.4 Economic). While a multisig mitigates some of this risk, the absence of a timelock for critical operations means these actions can be executed immediately (7.5 Governance, 7.8 Operations).

Upgrades7/10Low risk

The YooldoToken contract is not designed to be upgradeable (7.7 Upgrades), meaning its logic is immutable once deployed. This eliminates risks associated with proxy patterns, such as storage collisions or incorrect upgrade paths. However, it implies that any future bug fixes or feature enhancements would necessitate a new contract deployment and a potentially complex token migration process.

Final RecommendationWhat to do about this score

Implement a timelock for all critical owner-controlled functions, such as pause, unpause, freezeAccount, unfreezeAccount, and transferOwnership.

This will provide a delay for sensitive operations, enhancing transparency and allowing users to react to proposed changes. Additionally, ensure the multisig wallet controlling the Ownable address is secured with robust operational procedures and strong key management practices to mitigate the risks associated with centralized control.

Contract & Record

2 audits on record
TypeYooldoToken
NetworkBNB Chain
Token age1y
Contract0xf39e…8e48
Deployer0x30bc…2370
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Audit History
  1. Sep 4, 202652Medium
  2. Jul 27, 202642Medium
  3. Jul 24, 202667High

Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.

Frequently Asked Questions

Is Yooldo Games a scam?

Based on automated analysis, Yooldo Games scores 67/100 (High Risk) on our risk scale. No honeypot was detected, but always verify independently before investing.

Is Yooldo Games safe to buy?

Our scanner flagged a risk score of 67/100. Ownership has not been renounced, which is a risk factor. DYOR before purchasing any token.

Has Yooldo Games been audited?

The contract has not been verified on-chain. Verification is not the same as a full security audit. Use Quantum Audit's free tool to run a deeper analysis of the contract code.

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