Early-stage security check — honeypot & rug-pull analysis
BNB ChainThe BabyAnsem ERC20 token contract exhibits a critical flaw where no mechanism exists to mint or initialize the token supply.
Read the full analysisEach factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed
Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.
Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Sep 4, 2026
The risk score reads depth across every pair.
The LP tokens of the analysed pool are locked or burned.
0x1e78…71400x0ed9…9706No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.
ERC20 contract lacks any mechanism to mint new tokens or set an initial supply. The _totalSupply variable is private and never increased, and there is no _mint function or constructor logic to populate _balances. Consequently, _totalSupply will always be zero, and all account balances (_balances) will remain zero. Any attempt to transfer or transferFrom an amount greater than zero will revert due to fromBalance >= amount check failing, making the token completely unusable.C-01The ERC20 contract lacks any mechanism to mint new tokens or set an initial supply. The _totalSupply variable is private and never increased, and there is no _mint function or constructor logic to populate _balances. Consequently, _totalSupply will always be zero, and all account balances (_balances) will remain zero. Any attempt to transfer or transferFrom an amount greater than zero will revert due to fromBalance >= amount check failing, making the token completely unusable.
Implement a _mint function (e.g., in the constructor or via a controlled function) to set an initial token supply and update _totalSupply and _balances. For example, add _mint(_msgSender(), initialSupply); to the constructor, or create a privileged mint function.
Unresolved
approve Race Condition Riskapprove function is susceptible to a known front-running attack. If an owner increases an allowance from X to Y, a malicious spender could observe the transaction, spend the original X amount, and then front-run the owner's transaction to approve Y, effectively spending X+Y. This risk is explicitly mentioned in the ERC20 interface comments.L-01The standard ERC20 approve function is susceptible to a known front-running attack. If an owner increases an allowance from X to Y, a malicious spender could observe the transaction, spend the original X amount, and then front-run the owner's transaction to approve Y, effectively spending X+Y. This risk is explicitly mentioned in the ERC20 interface comments.
While this is an inherent ERC20 design pattern, users should be advised to use increaseAllowance and decreaseAllowance functions when modifying existing allowances, as these mitigate the race condition by atomically adjusting the allowance relative to its current value.
Unresolved
decimals() function returns 9. While technically valid, the vast majority of ERC20 tokens, especially those mimicking Ether, use 18 decimals. This non-standard value can lead to display issues in wallets, exchanges, and other DeFi platforms that might default to 18 decimals, potentially misrepresenting token values to users.I-01The decimals() function returns 9. While technically valid, the vast majority of ERC20 tokens, especially those mimicking Ether, use 18 decimals. This non-standard value can lead to display issues in wallets, exchanges, and other DeFi platforms that might default to 18 decimals, potentially misrepresenting token values to users.
Consider changing the decimals() function to return 18 for better compatibility and consistency with the broader ERC20 ecosystem. If 9 is intentional, ensure all integrations are aware of this specific value.
Unresolved
The BabyAnsem ERC20 token contract exhibits a critical flaw where no mechanism exists to mint or initialize the token supply. This renders the token completely non-functional, as _totalSupply and all account balances will perpetually remain zero, preventing any transfers. Additionally, the contract uses a non-standard decimal value and the approve function carries inherent ERC20 race condition risks.
The contract leverages a structure similar to OpenZeppelin's ERC20 implementation, benefiting from Solidity 0.8.x's built-in overflow/underflow protections. However, a critical architectural flaw (7.1 Architecture) prevents the token from ever having a supply, as _totalSupply is never initialized or increased, making all transfers impossible. The decimals() function (7.2 Code Security) returns 9, which is non-standard for ERC20 tokens.
The contract is a basic ERC20 token with no complex governance or economic mechanisms (7.5 Governance, 7.4 Economic). Its simplicity inherently reduces risks associated with intricate protocol interactions or privileged roles. There are no specific economic incentives or governance structures to analyze for vulnerabilities.
This contract is not implemented as an upgradeable proxy (7.7 Upgrades). Therefore, it does not carry the specific risks associated with proxy patterns, such as storage collisions or improper initialization. Once deployed, its logic is immutable.
It is critical to address the fundamental flaw preventing token supply initialization.
Implement a _mint function or an initial supply mechanism within the constructor to ensure the token is functional. Additionally, consider aligning the decimals() value with common ERC20 standards (e.g., 18) for better ecosystem compatibility and user experience. Users should be aware of the inherent approve race condition risk.
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