Quantum Audit Logo
Launch App

On-chain security analysis — is it a scam or legit?

Is EVAA Safe?

BNB Chain
Not verified This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →
Last checked Sep 4, 2026 · 1 audit on record
Chart
Medium RiskHow is this score calculated?
How the score breaks downratings: 10 is safest
Technical8/10Governance6/10Upgrades7/10Checks passed4 of 5Findings6 Info6
SummaryAI Copilot

The provided source code consists solely of standard OpenZeppelin interfaces for ERC-20, ERC-721, and ERC-1155 tokens, including ERC-6093 custom error definitions.

Read the full analysis
What raised the score
  • Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded
  • Top-10 concentration > 50%
  • LP top1 unlocked holder = 99.9%
  • LP top3 unlocked holders = 100.0%
  • LP claimed locked but only 0.0% actually locked
Exact factors
  • Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded
  • Top-10 concentration > 50% (82.4% total → 51.9% effective; 31.6% in EOAs, 50.8% in contracts — heavy)
  • LP top1 unlocked holder = 99.9% (independent LP — depth risk, pool = 60% of DEX liquidity)
  • LP top3 unlocked holders = 100.0% (independent LP — depth risk, pool = 60% of DEX liquidity)
  • LP claimed locked but only 0.0% actually locked

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Security Checklist

as of audit · Sep 44 of 5 checks passed
Contract verifiedVerified
OwnershipRenounced
MintMintable
Liquidity lockLocked
UpgradeabilityFixed code

Holders

as of audit · Sep 4, 2026
50.8%Contracts31.6%Wallets17.6%Everyone else
50.8%Contracts31.6%Wallets17.6%Everyone else
ContractsWalletsEveryone elseBubble area = share of supply
82.4%of supply sits with the top 10 holders
  • Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking50.8%
  • Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell31.6%
  • Everyone elsethe rest of the supply17.6%
Effective concentrationwhat the score reads51.9%
How holder types affect the score

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Sep 4, 2026

Liquidity

as of audit · Sep 4$241.5K across 7 pairs
Show 1 more pair

The risk score reads depth across every pair.

LP tokensLocked

The LP tokens of the analysed pool are locked or burned.

Analysed pool$144.9KShare of depth60.0%
Top-1 Unlocked Holder99.9%
Top-3 Unlocked100.0%
Unlocked LP held by
0xec1b…28030xa0fd…985b

No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.

Security Findings

6 Info
Info

Informational - Only Interfaces Provided

The provided source code consists exclusively of standard OpenZeppelin interfaces (IERC20Errors, IERC721Errors, IERC1155Errors, IERC20). There is no executable contract logic, state variables, or function implementations beyond interface definitions. This limits the scope of a security audit to the structural correctness of the interfaces themselves.I-01

Issue

The provided source code consists exclusively of standard OpenZeppelin interfaces (IERC20Errors, IERC721Errors, IERC1155Errors, IERC20). There is no executable contract logic, state variables, or function implementations beyond interface definitions. This limits the scope of a security audit to the structural correctness of the interfaces themselves.

Fix

This is an observation rather than a vulnerability. Ensure that any actual contract implementations built upon these interfaces are provided for a comprehensive security audit to assess functional risks.

Status

Unresolved

Info

Informational - Broad Pragma Directive

The pragma solidity directive specifies a very broad range (>=0.4.16 >=0.6.2 >=0.8.4 ^0.8.20 ^0.8.22). While the contract was compiled with 0.8.28, a more specific pragma (e.g., pragma solidity 0.8.28; or pragma solidity ^0.8.22;) is generally recommended. A broad pragma can lead to unexpected behavior or compilation issues with future compiler versions, as breaking changes might be introduced.I-02

Issue

The pragma solidity directive specifies a very broad range (>=0.4.16 >=0.6.2 >=0.8.4 ^0.8.20 ^0.8.22). While the contract was compiled with 0.8.28, a more specific pragma (e.g., pragma solidity 0.8.28; or pragma solidity ^0.8.22;) is generally recommended. A broad pragma can lead to unexpected behavior or compilation issues with future compiler versions, as breaking changes might be introduced.

Fix

Consider narrowing the pragma solidity directive to the specific compiler version used for deployment (e.g., pragma solidity 0.8.28;) or the narrowest compatible range (e.g., pragma solidity ^0.8.22;) to ensure consistent compilation behavior and prevent potential issues with future compiler updates.

Status

Unresolved

Info

Informational - Reliance on Audited OpenZeppelin Standards

The project leverages well-established and extensively audited OpenZeppelin interfaces (IERC20, IERC721Errors, IERC1155Errors, IERC20Errors). This practice significantly reduces the risk of introducing custom errors or non-standard ERC implementations, contributing to higher overall code quality and security by building on battle-tested components.I-03

Issue

The project leverages well-established and extensively audited OpenZeppelin interfaces (IERC20, IERC721Errors, IERC1155Errors, IERC20Errors). This practice significantly reduces the risk of introducing custom errors or non-standard ERC implementations, contributing to higher overall code quality and security by building on battle-tested components.

Fix

Continue to utilize reputable and audited libraries and standards like OpenZeppelin. This is a strong security practice that minimizes the attack surface and leverages community-vetted code.

Status

Unresolved

Info

Informational - No Access Control Mechanisms Defined

As the provided code consists solely of interfaces, no access control mechanisms (e.g., Ownable, AccessControl) are defined or implemented (7.3 Access Control). Access control is critical for restricting sensitive operations to authorized entities in functional contracts.I-04

Issue

As the provided code consists solely of interfaces, no access control mechanisms (e.g., Ownable, AccessControl) are defined or implemented (7.3 Access Control). Access control is critical for restricting sensitive operations to authorized entities in functional contracts.

Fix

Any concrete contract implementation built upon these interfaces must carefully design and implement robust access control mechanisms to protect sensitive functions and prevent unauthorized actions. Thoroughly audit these access control implementations.

Status

Unresolved

Info

Informational - No Complex External Interactions

The interfaces define standard token interactions and error types but do not specify any complex external calls or integrations with other protocols (7.6 External). This inherently limits the scope of external attack vectors for the interfaces themselves.I-05

Issue

The interfaces define standard token interactions and error types but do not specify any complex external calls or integrations with other protocols (7.6 External). This inherently limits the scope of external attack vectors for the interfaces themselves.

Fix

While the interfaces themselves are simple, any implementing contract that interacts with external protocols or contracts should be rigorously audited for reentrancy, unexpected return values, and other external interaction vulnerabilities. Ensure all external calls are handled securely.

Status

Unresolved

Info

Informational - No Operational Procedures Defined

The provided interfaces do not define any specific operational procedures, roles, or multi-signature requirements (7.8 Operations). Operational security is crucial for managing a deployed protocol, including emergency pauses, parameter changes, and administrative actions.I-06

Issue

The provided interfaces do not define any specific operational procedures, roles, or multi-signature requirements (7.8 Operations). Operational security is crucial for managing a deployed protocol, including emergency pauses, parameter changes, and administrative actions.

Fix

For any functional contract implementing these interfaces, define clear operational procedures, including multi-signature requirements for critical actions, emergency pause mechanisms, and robust key management practices. These operational aspects should be part of the overall security strategy.

Status

Unresolved

Analysis

AI Copilotas of audit · Sep 4
Executive SummaryWhat the contract is and what the review found

The provided source code consists solely of standard OpenZeppelin interfaces for ERC-20, ERC-721, and ERC-1155 tokens, including ERC-6093 custom error definitions. As no executable contract logic was provided, a comprehensive security assessment for functional vulnerabilities such as reentrancy, access control, or economic exploits cannot be performed. The interfaces themselves are well-established and do not introduce inherent vulnerabilities.

Technical8/10Low risk

The provided code consists solely of standard OpenZeppelin interfaces for ERC-20, ERC-721, and ERC-1155 tokens, including ERC-6093 custom errors. These interfaces define contract structures and error types without implementing any executable logic. As such, there are no inherent technical vulnerabilities like reentrancy or integer overflows within the provided code (7.2 Code Security). The architecture (7.1 Architecture) is straightforward, defining standard interfaces, which is a robust design choice.

Governance6/10Medium risk

The provided code consists only of interfaces and does not contain any governance or economic mechanisms (7.4 Economic, 7.5 Governance). Therefore, there are no associated risks related to economic manipulation, tokenomics, or governance flaws. Any economic or governance risks would arise from the specific implementation of these interfaces in a functional contract.

Upgrades7/10Low risk

The provided code defines standard interfaces and does not include any upgradeability patterns (7.7 Upgrades). As interfaces, they are not directly upgradeable contracts. Any contract implementing these interfaces would need to define and manage its own upgradeability strategy, if required.

Final RecommendationWhat to do about this score

Since the audit was conducted on interfaces only, the primary recommendation is to ensure that any concrete contract implementations utilizing these interfaces undergo a thorough and independent security audit.

This audit should specifically focus on the implemented logic, access control mechanisms, economic models, and potential interactions with external protocols. Adherence to secure development practices and comprehensive testing is crucial for any functional contract built upon these foundational interfaces.

Contract & Record

1 audit on record
TypeToken
NetworkBNB Chain
Token age9mo
Contract0xaa03…28c1
Deployer0xb8b3…3426
Badge for your website
EVAA security record badge

Free for any token on the record. It links to this page and always shows the current score and the date it was checked.

Audit History
  1. Sep 4, 202651Medium
  2. Jul 23, 202641Medium
  3. Jul 22, 202647Medium

Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is the EVAA contract address?

The EVAA contract on BNB Chain is 0xaa036928c9c0df07d525b55ea8ee690bb5a628c1. Compare it with the address the project itself publishes before trading: other contracts can carry the same name and ticker.

Is EVAA a scam?

Quantum Audit's risk score for EVAA is 51/100 (Medium risk) as of Sep 4, 2026, computed by a deterministic function from on-chain facts — Contract verified: Verified; Ownership: Renounced; Mint: Mintable; Liquidity lock: Locked; Upgradeability: Fixed code. A score is a dated snapshot of those facts, not a guarantee; each one is listed on this page.

Is EVAA liquidity locked?

Liquidity lock: Locked (as of Sep 4, 2026). Total DEX liquidity: $241.5K.

Who holds EVAA?

As of Sep 4, 2026, the 10 largest holders own 82.4% of the supply. The Holders section on this page shows who they are by holder type.

Related Audits

6 more on the recordAll audits
Baby AnsemBABYANSEM · BNB Chain51MediumBubblemapsBMT · BNB Chain51MediumPIZZABNB Chain51MediumDGrid AIDGAI · BNB Chain51MediumStupid Kid傻孩子 · BNB Chain51MediumCycle Network TokenCYC · BNB Chain51Medium

Would You Like a More Detailed Audit of EVAA?

Our AI-powered scanner gives you a deeper, real-time smart contract analysis — free, with every scoring factor shown.

Get Detailed Audit Is this your token? Publish your own audit on this page