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Ucan fix life in1day 1
0xff5d…4444
BNB Chain
Not verifiedThis record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →
Last checked 8d ago 1 audit on record
DexScreener ↗
How is this score calculated? → High Risk
Executive SummaryAI Copilot

The provided `FourERC20` contract is intended to be an ERC-20 token but critically lacks a constructor or any public minting mechanism, rendering it non-functional as a standalone token. Key metadata like name and symbol are also uninitialized. This audit identifies critical functionality flaws that prevent the token from being used as intended.

2 Critical1 High1 Medium
Volume 24h
$159.7K
Liquidity
$71.7K
Price
$0.0005362
Token Age
7mo
Top 10 Holders
75.9%

Security Findings

2 Crit1 High1 Med
Critical

No Token Minting Mechanism

C-01The `FourERC20` contract implements the internal `_mint` function but does not expose any public or external function to call it. Consequently, no tokens can ever be created, and the `_totalSupply` will always remain zero, rendering the token non-functional.
IssueThe `FourERC20` contract implements the internal `_mint` function but does not expose any public or external function to call it. Consequently, no tokens can ever be created, and the `_totalSupply` will always remain zero, rendering the token non-functional.
FixImplement a public or owner-controlled function (e.g., `mint(address to, uint256 amount)`) that calls the internal `_mint` function. This function should typically be protected by an access control mechanism (e.g., `onlyOwner`).
StatusUnresolved
Critical

Uninitialized Token Metadata

C-02The `_init` function, responsible for setting the token's `_name` and `_symbol`, is declared as `internal` but is never called by a constructor or any other function. As a result, the token's name and symbol will remain uninitialized (empty strings), impacting its usability and display in wallets and explorers.
IssueThe `_init` function, responsible for setting the token's `_name` and `_symbol`, is declared as `internal` but is never called by a constructor or any other function. As a result, the token's name and symbol will remain uninitialized (empty strings), impacting its usability and display in wallets and explorers.
FixAdd a public constructor to the `FourERC20` contract that calls `_init(string memory name_, string memory symbol_)` with the desired token name and symbol upon deployment.
StatusUnresolved
High

Missing Access Control for Administrative Functions

H-01The contract currently lacks any form of ownership or role-based access control (e.g., `Ownable` from OpenZeppelin). While the current contract is non-functional, if minting or other administrative functions were added, they would lack protection, potentially allowing anyone to perform privileged actions.
IssueThe contract currently lacks any form of ownership or role-based access control (e.g., `Ownable` from OpenZeppelin). While the current contract is non-functional, if minting or other administrative functions were added, they would lack protection, potentially allowing anyone to perform privileged actions.
FixIntegrate an access control mechanism, such as OpenZeppelin's `Ownable` or `AccessControl` contracts, to restrict sensitive functions (like minting, burning, or pausing) to authorized addresses.
StatusUnresolved
Medium

No Pause Mechanism

M-01The contract does not include a pause functionality, which is a common security feature in ERC-20 tokens. A pause mechanism allows contract administrators to temporarily halt critical operations (e.g., transfers) in case of an emergency, exploit, or upgrade, mitigating potential damage.
IssueThe contract does not include a pause functionality, which is a common security feature in ERC-20 tokens. A pause mechanism allows contract administrators to temporarily halt critical operations (e.g., transfers) in case of an emergency, exploit, or upgrade, mitigating potential damage.
FixConsider integrating OpenZeppelin's `Pausable` contract. This would allow an authorized entity (e.g., the owner) to pause and unpause token transfers and other sensitive operations when necessary.
StatusUnresolved

Category Ratings

TechnicalMedium5/10

The contract leverages robust OpenZeppelin ERC-20 patterns for core functionalities like `transfer`, `approve`, and allowance management, which are well-audited and secure (7.2 Code Security). However, a critical architectural flaw exists as the contract lacks a constructor to initialize token metadata (`_name`, `_symbol`) and, more importantly, a public or protected function to mint tokens (7.1 Architecture). This renders the `_totalSupply` permanently zero and the token non-functional, preventing any token creation or distribution. Furthermore, there is no explicit access control mechanism for potential administrative functions (7.3 Access Control).

GovernanceMedium5/10

The contract does not incorporate any specific governance mechanisms or complex economic models, simplifying its design in these areas (7.5 Governance, 7.4 Economic). The primary economic risk is inherent in the token's current non-functional state, as it cannot be minted or distributed, making it economically valueless. There are no external dependencies or oracle integrations, thus eliminating risks associated with oracle manipulation or external protocol failures (7.6 External).

UpgradesLow7/10

The contract is not designed with any upgradeability patterns, such as UUPS or Transparent proxies (7.7 Upgrades). This design choice means that any future modifications would necessitate a new contract deployment and a token migration process. While this implies a lack of flexibility for in-place updates, it also eliminates the specific security risks associated with proxy upgrade mechanisms.

Security Checklist

4/5 checks passed
Contract VerifiedPass
Ownership RenouncedPass
No Mint FunctionPass
Liquidity LockedFail
Not a ProxyPass
HoneypotNoneBuy Tax0.0%Sell Tax0.0%

Holder Composition

75.9% in top 10
12.4% in wallets63.5% in contracts
Effective Concentration37.8%

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Liquidity Depth

$109.3K across 6 pairs
Pancakeswap v3USD1analysed$71.7K65.6%UniswapUSDT$35.7K32.7%UniswapWBNB$1.8K1.7%Pancakeswap v2Subject 3$230.0%Pancakeswap v3memes$20.0%Pancakeswap v2WBNB$10.0%

The risk score reads depth across every pair. The volume figure and the volume-to-liquidity ratio elsewhere on this page describe only the pair this audit analysed, so the two are not directly comparable.

LP Distribution

Top-1 Unlocked Holder16.2%
Top-3 Unlocked46.7%

Key Addresses

11 addresses
Deployer
0xe6af…1116
Unlocked LP Held By
0xbc7a…3e710xaaf2…a6010x26b3…c34c0x1498…d27e0x0f2f…03fb0x0360…692a0x0dff…71660x2799…64c30x5fbe…94c40x95e4…e0ac

No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.

What Raised This Score

5 factors
  • Top-10 concentration > 30% (75.9% total → 37.8% effective; 12.4% in EOAs, 63.5% in contracts — moderate)
  • Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
  • 2 Critical finding(s) from audit
  • 1 High finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Medium finding(s) from audit

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

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