Is Cross Safe? Smart Contract Security Analysis

Security Findings

1 High1 Med1 Info

High

Centralized Control Over Token Supply via Burn Function

H-01The `burn` function in the `CrossToken` contract is protected by the `onlyOwner` modifier. This grants the contract owner exclusive power to reduce the total supply of tokens at any time. While this can be a desired feature for supply management, it introduces a significant centralization risk (7.4 Economic). A malicious or compromised owner could burn a substantial amount of tokens, leading to a drastic devaluation or even a rug pull scenario for token holders.

IssueThe `burn` function in the `CrossToken` contract is protected by the `onlyOwner` modifier. This grants the contract owner exclusive power to reduce the total supply of tokens at any time. While this can be a desired feature for supply management, it introduces a significant centralization risk (7.4 Economic). A malicious or compromised owner could burn a substantial amount of tokens, leading to a drastic devaluation or even a rug pull scenario for token holders.

FixIf the ability to burn tokens is essential, consider implementing a more decentralized approach, such as requiring a multi-signature approval for burn operations or integrating a time-lock mechanism. Alternatively, if the owner's control is intentional, ensure robust security measures for the owner's private key and transparently communicate this capability to the community.

StatusUnresolved

Medium

Single Point of Failure Due to EOA Ownership

M-01The `CrossToken` contract is currently owned by an External Owned Account (EOA) (7.5 Governance). This creates a single point of failure, as the security of the entire contract's administrative functions (including the ability to burn tokens) relies solely on the security of that single EOA's private key. If this EOA is compromised, an attacker could gain full control over the owner-restricted functions, leading to potential misuse and loss of funds.

IssueThe `CrossToken` contract is currently owned by an External Owned Account (EOA) (7.5 Governance). This creates a single point of failure, as the security of the entire contract's administrative functions (including the ability to burn tokens) relies solely on the security of that single EOA's private key. If this EOA is compromised, an attacker could gain full control over the owner-restricted functions, leading to potential misuse and loss of funds.

FixTransfer ownership of the contract to a multi-signature wallet (e.g., Gnosis Safe). A multi-sig wallet requires multiple independent approvals for transactions, significantly enhancing security by distributing control and reducing the risk associated with a single compromised key.

StatusUnresolved

Info

Immutability of Contract Logic

I-01The `CrossToken` contract is deployed directly and does not implement any upgradeability mechanism (7.7 Upgrades). This means that once deployed, the contract's logic cannot be modified. While this eliminates risks associated with upgrade mechanisms (e.g., proxy vulnerabilities), it also implies that any discovered bugs or desired feature enhancements would necessitate deploying an entirely new contract and migrating all token holders, which can be a complex and costly process.

IssueThe `CrossToken` contract is deployed directly and does not implement any upgradeability mechanism (7.7 Upgrades). This means that once deployed, the contract's logic cannot be modified. While this eliminates risks associated with upgrade mechanisms (e.g., proxy vulnerabilities), it also implies that any discovered bugs or desired feature enhancements would necessitate deploying an entirely new contract and migrating all token holders, which can be a complex and costly process.

FixThis is a design choice. If immutability is intended, no action is required. If future flexibility is desired, consider implementing an upgradeable proxy pattern (e.g., UUPS) for future deployments, though this adds complexity and its own set of risks.

StatusUnresolved

Category Ratings

TechnicalLow8/10

The `CrossToken` contract is built upon battle-tested OpenZeppelin ERC20, ERC20Burnable, ERC20Permit, and Ownable libraries, ensuring a high degree of code security and adherence to ERC standards (7.2 Code Security). The architecture is straightforward, implementing a standard token with an owner-controlled burn function (7.1 Architecture). No complex custom logic or external interactions are present, minimizing technical attack vectors and ensuring robust operation.

GovernanceHigh1/10

The primary economic and governance risk stems from the centralized control over the token's `burn` function, which is restricted to the contract owner (7.4 Economic). This allows a single entity to reduce the total supply, potentially impacting token value. Furthermore, the contract is owned by an External Owned Account (EOA) (7.5 Governance), which presents a single point of failure; compromise of this EOA could lead to misuse of the burn capability, posing a significant risk to token holders.

UpgradesMedium6/10

The `CrossToken` contract is not designed with upgradeability in mind (7.7 Upgrades). It is deployed as an immutable contract, meaning its logic cannot be altered post-deployment. While this eliminates upgrade-specific risks like proxy misconfigurations, it also means that any future bug fixes or feature enhancements would necessitate a new contract deployment and token migration, which can be a complex and costly process.

Security Checklist

3/5 checks passed

Contract VerifiedPass

Ownership RenouncedFail

No Mint FunctionPass

Liquidity LockedFail

Not a ProxyPass

Holder Composition

98.3% in top 10

6.8% in wallets91.4% in contracts

Effective Concentration43.4%

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Liquidity Depth

$1.07M across 4 pairs

Pancakeswap v3USDTanalysed$1.07M UniswapUSDT$7 Pancakeswap v2USD1$1

The risk score reads depth across every pair. The volume figure and the volume-to-liquidity ratio elsewhere on this page describe only the pair this audit analysed, so the two are not directly comparable.

LP Distribution

Top-1 Unlocked Holder100.0%

Top-3 Unlocked100.0%

Key Addresses

3 addresses

Deployer

0xc360…4a41

Unlocked LP Held By

0x8c5f…984e0x6458…2df5

No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.

What Raised This Score

7 factors

Ownership NOT renounced — owner is an EOA (single private key)
Top-10 concentration > 30% (98.3% total → 43.4% effective; 6.8% in EOAs, 91.4% in contracts — moderate)
Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
LP top1 unlocked holder = 100.0% (independent LP — depth risk)
LP top3 unlocked holders = 100.0% (independent LP — depth risk)
1 High finding(s) from audit
1 Medium finding(s) from audit

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Is Cross Safe?

Security Findings

Centralized Control Over Token Supply via Burn Function

Single Point of Failure Due to EOA Ownership

Immutability of Contract Logic

Category Ratings

Security Checklist

Holder Composition

Liquidity Depth

LP Distribution

Key Addresses

What Raised This Score

Related Audits

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