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Is Velvet Safe?

VELVETBNB Chain
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Last checked Sep 4, 2026 · 1 audit on record
Chart
Medium RiskHow is this score calculated?
How the score breaks downratings: 10 is safest
Technical4/10Governance5/10Upgrades7/10Checks passed3 of 5Findings1 Critical · 2 High · 1 Medium4
SummaryAI Copilot

The VelvetToken contract implements a BEP20 token with additional features for controlled token transfers and a whitelist.

Read the full analysis
What raised the score
  • Mintable supply, but capped at 0.0%/year
  • Top-10 concentration > 30%
  • Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
  • 1 Critical finding(s) from audit
  • 2 High finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Medium finding(s) from audit
Exact factors
  • Mintable supply, but capped at 0.0%/year
  • Top-10 concentration > 30% (87.8% total → 43.6% effective; 14.1% in EOAs, 73.7% in contracts — moderate)
  • Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
  • 1 Critical finding(s) from audit
  • 2 High finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Medium finding(s) from audit

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Security Checklist

as of audit · Sep 43 of 5 checks passed
Contract verifiedVerified
OwnershipRenounced
MintMintable
Liquidity lockNot locked
UpgradeabilityFixed code

Holders

as of audit · Sep 4, 2026
73.7%Contracts14.1%Wallets12.2%Everyone else
73.7%Contracts14.1%12.2%
ContractsWalletsEveryone elseBubble area = share of supply
87.8%of supply sits with the top 10 holders
  • Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking73.7%
  • Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell14.1%
  • Everyone elsethe rest of the supply12.2%
Effective concentrationwhat the score reads43.6%
How holder types affect the score

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Sep 4, 2026

Liquidity

as of audit · Sep 4$670.9K across 7 pairs
Show 1 more pair

The risk score reads depth across every pair.

LP tokensNot locked

The LP tokens of the analysed pool are not locked or burned, so whoever holds them can withdraw that liquidity.

Analysed pool$642.4KShare of depth95.8%
Top-1 Unlocked Holder44.8%
Top-3 Unlocked67.5%
Unlocked LP held by
0x575e…fe980x6260…ee4a0x7f99…b1fe0xb16e…39f20x0295…dbbb0x0528…d2610x5fbe…94c40x7a9a…46d60x69bb…0ed10xe8f7…838d

No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.

Security Findings

1 Critical2 High1 Medium
Critical

Centralized Minting Capability

The owner address has the ability to mint an arbitrary amount of tokens up to the predefined _cap (1 billion tokens) via the mintTo and mint functions. This centralized control over the token supply poses a significant economic risk, as it can lead to inflation, dilution of existing token holders, and potential market manipulation if abused. (7.4 Economic, 7.3 Access Control)C-01

Issue

The owner address has the ability to mint an arbitrary amount of tokens up to the predefined _cap (1 billion tokens) via the mintTo and mint functions. This centralized control over the token supply poses a significant economic risk, as it can lead to inflation, dilution of existing token holders, and potential market manipulation if abused. (7.4 Economic, 7.3 Access Control)

Fix

Implement a mechanism to restrict or remove the owner's minting capability after an initial distribution phase, or introduce a time-locked schedule for minting. If minting is necessary, consider a multi-signature wallet for its execution or a community governance vote.

Status

Unresolved

High

Owner Can Indefinitely Delay Token Transfers

The setTransferAllowedTimestamp function contains logic that allows the owner to indefinitely postpone the transferAllowedTimestamp. Specifically, if transferAllowedTimestamp is in the future and ETA is 0, the owner can set transferAllowedTimestamp to any new future timestamp. This enables the owner to prevent token transfers for an arbitrary duration, impacting liquidity, user access, and potentially causing significant market uncertainty. (7.4 Economic, 7.3 Access Control)H-01

Issue

The setTransferAllowedTimestamp function contains logic that allows the owner to indefinitely postpone the transferAllowedTimestamp. Specifically, if transferAllowedTimestamp is in the future and ETA is 0, the owner can set transferAllowedTimestamp to any new future timestamp. This enables the owner to prevent token transfers for an arbitrary duration, impacting liquidity, user access, and potentially causing significant market uncertainty. (7.4 Economic, 7.3 Access Control)

Fix

Revise the setTransferAllowedTimestamp logic to prevent indefinite delays. Consider a fixed maximum delay, a one-time setting, or a mechanism that requires community consensus for changes to critical timelines. Ensure that any changes to this timestamp are clearly communicated to token holders.

Status

Unresolved

High

Whitelist Bypasses Transfer Restrictions

The owner can add any address to the whitelist mapping using addToWhitelist. Whitelisted addresses are exempt from the transferAllowedTimestamp restriction, allowing them to transfer tokens even before the general transfer period begins. This creates a mechanism for preferential treatment, potential insider trading, or selective access, undermining the fairness and transparency of the token launch and transfer restrictions. (7.4 Economic, 7.3 Access Control)H-02

Issue

The owner can add any address to the whitelist mapping using addToWhitelist. Whitelisted addresses are exempt from the transferAllowedTimestamp restriction, allowing them to transfer tokens even before the general transfer period begins. This creates a mechanism for preferential treatment, potential insider trading, or selective access, undermining the fairness and transparency of the token launch and transfer restrictions. (7.4 Economic, 7.3 Access Control)

Fix

Evaluate the necessity of the whitelist mechanism. If required, implement stricter controls, such as a time-bound whitelist, a public disclosure of whitelisted addresses, or a multi-signature approval process for adding/removing addresses. Clearly define the purpose and scope of the whitelist.

Status

Unresolved

Medium

Single Point of Failure (Owner Key)

The contract relies heavily on a single owner address for critical operations, including minting, managing the whitelist, and setting transfer timestamps. If this owner's private key is compromised, an attacker would gain full control over these sensitive functions, leading to potential financial loss, denial of service, or manipulation of the token's economy. (7.8 Operations, 7.3 Access Control)M-01

Issue

The contract relies heavily on a single owner address for critical operations, including minting, managing the whitelist, and setting transfer timestamps. If this owner's private key is compromised, an attacker would gain full control over these sensitive functions, leading to potential financial loss, denial of service, or manipulation of the token's economy. (7.8 Operations, 7.3 Access Control)

Fix

Implement a multi-signature wallet (e.g., Gnosis Safe) for the owner address to distribute control and reduce the risk associated with a single point of failure. Alternatively, consider a timelock mechanism for sensitive operations to provide a window for intervention in case of a compromise.

Status

Unresolved

Analysis

AI Copilotas of audit · Sep 4
Executive SummaryWhat the contract is and what the review found

The VelvetToken contract implements a BEP20 token with additional features for controlled token transfers and a whitelist. The contract exhibits a high degree of centralization, with the owner possessing significant control over token supply through minting and the ability to manipulate transfer restrictions and whitelist addresses. While the core BEP20 implementation is robust, the custom access control logic introduces notable economic and operational risks.

Technical4/10Medium risk

The contract leverages standard OpenZeppelin libraries for its BEP20 implementation, contributing to a solid foundation (7.2 Code Security). The custom _beforeTokenTransfer hook is correctly overridden to enforce transfer restrictions. However, the logic within setTransferAllowedTimestamp is complex, potentially leading to unexpected behavior or misinterpretation (7.2 Code Security). No reentrancy vectors or integer overflow/underflow issues were identified due to Solidity 0.8.30's checked arithmetic.

Governance5/10Medium risk

The contract grants the owner extensive centralized control, posing significant economic risks (7.4 Economic). The owner can mint up to 1 billion tokens, leading to potential inflation and dilution (7.3 Access Control). Furthermore, the owner can indefinitely delay token transfers and bypass restrictions via a whitelist, creating opportunities for market manipulation or preferential treatment (7.4 Economic). There is no decentralized governance mechanism (7.5 Governance).

Upgrades7/10Low risk

The VelvetToken contract is not designed with upgradeability features (7.7 Upgrades). It is deployed as a standard, non-proxy contract, meaning its logic cannot be modified post-deployment. This eliminates risks associated with upgrade mechanisms but also prevents future bug fixes or feature enhancements without a full redeployment and migration.

Final RecommendationWhat to do about this score

It is strongly recommended to review and potentially decentralize the extensive owner privileges, especially regarding token minting and transfer control.

Consider implementing a multi-signature wallet for critical owner functions to mitigate the single point of failure risk. For the setTransferAllowedTimestamp function, simplify the logic or add comprehensive documentation to ensure clarity and prevent unintended use.

Contract & Record

1 audit on record
TypeVelvetToken
NetworkBNB Chain
Token age1y
Contract0x8b19…1488
Deployer0x579d…116a
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Audit History
  1. Sep 4, 202654Medium
  2. Aug 12, 202652Medium

Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.

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