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Is Toshi a Scam?

TOSHIBase
Not verified This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →
Last checked Sep 4, 2026 · 1 audit on record
SummaryAI Copilot

The ToshiToken contract is an ERC20 token implementation based on OpenZeppelin Contracts v4.x.

Read the full analysis
What raised the score
  • Top-10 concentration > 30%
  • LP lock status UNKNOWN — the pool's LP could not be read
  • 1 Low finding(s) from audit
Exact factors
  • Top-10 concentration > 30% (38.5% total → 38.5% effective; 38.5% in EOAs, 0.0% in contracts — moderate)
  • LP lock status UNKNOWN — the pool's LP could not be read
  • 1 Low finding(s) from audit

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Our automated scanner reviewed Toshi (TOSHI) on Base. 4 of 5 security checks passed — see the full breakdown below.

Security Checklist

as of audit · Sep 44 of 5 checks passed
Contract verifiedVerified
OwnershipRenounced
MintNo mint
Liquidity lockUnknown
UpgradeabilityFixed code

Holders

as of audit · Sep 4, 2026
38.5%Wallets61.5%Everyone else
38.5%Wallets61.5%Everyone else
WalletsEveryone elseBubble area = share of supply
38.5%of supply sits with the top 10 holders
  • Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell38.5%
  • Everyone elsethe rest of the supply61.5%
Effective concentrationwhat the score reads38.5%
How holder types affect the score

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Sep 4, 2026

Liquidity

as of audit · Sep 4$1.45M across 30 pairs
LP tokensUnknown

Whether the LP tokens are locked could not be determined.

Analysed pool$1.13MShare of depth78.1%

Security Findings

1 Low3 Info
Low

Potential for Token Lock if Custom Logic Were Present

While the provided code is a standard ERC20 implementation, any contract that holds tokens and does not include a mechanism for withdrawing arbitrary ERC20 tokens (e.g., a recoverERC20 function) risks locking tokens sent to it mistakenly or from unsupported protocols. This is a general consideration for contracts holding assets.L-01

Issue

While the provided code is a standard ERC20 implementation, any contract that holds tokens and does not include a mechanism for withdrawing arbitrary ERC20 tokens (e.g., a recoverERC20 function) risks locking tokens sent to it mistakenly or from unsupported protocols. This is a general consideration for contracts holding assets.

Fix

For contracts intended to hold tokens, consider implementing a recoverERC20 function, callable only by the owner, to retrieve accidentally sent or stuck tokens. This enhances operational flexibility (7.8 Operations) without compromising core functionality.

Status

Unresolved

Info

Use of pragma experimental ABIEncoderV2

The contract includes pragma experimental ABIEncoderV2;. While not a vulnerability, ABIEncoderV2 has been standard since Solidity 0.8.0 and is typically not required to be explicitly enabled in 0.8.17. Its presence might indicate legacy code patterns or specific complex data structures not fully visible in the provided snippet.I-01

Issue

The contract includes pragma experimental ABIEncoderV2;. While not a vulnerability, ABIEncoderV2 has been standard since Solidity 0.8.0 and is typically not required to be explicitly enabled in 0.8.17. Its presence might indicate legacy code patterns or specific complex data structures not fully visible in the provided snippet.

Fix

Review if ABIEncoderV2 is strictly necessary for the contract's functionality. If not, it can be removed to simplify the pragma declarations. This is a minor code quality point.

Status

Unresolved

Info

Centralized Ownership

The contract utilizes OpenZeppelin's Ownable pattern, which grants a single address (the owner) exclusive control over certain administrative functions (7.3 Access Control). This design introduces a single point of failure, as a compromise of the owner's private key could lead to unauthorized actions.I-02

Issue

The contract utilizes OpenZeppelin's Ownable pattern, which grants a single address (the owner) exclusive control over certain administrative functions (7.3 Access Control). This design introduces a single point of failure, as a compromise of the owner's private key could lead to unauthorized actions.

Fix

For enhanced security and decentralization, consider transitioning ownership to a multi-signature wallet (e.g., Gnosis Safe) or a robust governance mechanism. This mitigates the risk associated with a single point of failure.

Status

Unresolved

Info

ERC20 approve Race Condition

The ERC20 approve function is susceptible to a known race condition. If a user increases their allowance for a spender, a malicious actor could front-run this transaction, spend the original allowance, and then spend the newly increased allowance before the user's second transaction confirms. This is a characteristic of the ERC20 standard itself, as noted in the OpenZeppelin IERC20 interface comments.I-03

Issue

The ERC20 approve function is susceptible to a known race condition. If a user increases their allowance for a spender, a malicious actor could front-run this transaction, spend the original allowance, and then spend the newly increased allowance before the user's second transaction confirms. This is a characteristic of the ERC20 standard itself, as noted in the OpenZeppelin IERC20 interface comments.

Fix

Educate users about this inherent ERC20 limitation. Recommend using increaseAllowance and decreaseAllowance functions (if implemented in the full ERC20 contract) or setting the allowance to zero before setting a new value to mitigate this risk. This is a user-side operational concern (7.8 Operations).

Status

Unresolved

Analysis

AI Copilotas of audit · Sep 4
Executive SummaryWhat the contract is and what the review found

The ToshiToken contract is an ERC20 token implementation based on OpenZeppelin Contracts v4.x. The provided code snippet indicates a standard, well-tested foundation. No critical or high-severity vulnerabilities were identified. Minor informational findings relate to standard ERC20 characteristics and a non-critical pragma usage.

Technical10/10Low risk

The ToshiToken contract is built upon battle-tested OpenZeppelin ERC20 and Ownable implementations, which significantly reduces the likelihood of common technical vulnerabilities (7.2 Code Security). The contract uses Solidity 0.8.17, benefiting from default checked arithmetic. The architecture (7.1 Architecture) is a standard token, minimizing complexity. A minor point is the use of pragma experimental ABIEncoderV2, which is often unnecessary in Solidity 0.8.x.

Governance7/10Low risk

The contract implements a standard ERC20 token with no complex economic models or governance mechanisms (7.5 Governance). Ownership is centralized via OpenZeppelin's Ownable pattern (7.3 Access Control), meaning a single address controls administrative functions (if any were added). This introduces a single point of failure, but is common for simple tokens. There are no external dependencies that introduce oracle manipulation risks (7.6 External).

Upgrades9/10Low risk

The provided contract is not designed as an upgradeable proxy (7.7 Upgrades). It is a standard, non-upgradeable implementation. Therefore, upgrade safety concerns are not applicable to this specific contract, but any system integrating it should consider its own upgradeability strategy.

Final RecommendationWhat to do about this score

The ToshiToken contract is a robust implementation of the ERC20 standard, leveraging OpenZeppelin's audited libraries.

It is recommended to ensure that the owner address is secured with multi-signature wallets or robust access controls to mitigate the single point of failure inherent in the Ownable pattern. Additionally, users interacting with the approve function should be educated on the known ERC20 race condition to prevent potential front-running issues.

Contract & Record

1 audit on record
TypeToshiToken
NetworkBase
Token age2y
Contract0xac1b…b2b4
Deployer0xbd11…856c
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Audit History
  1. Jul 23, 20263Low

Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.

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