The mfercoin contract is an ERC20 token utilizing OpenZeppelin's Ownable pattern. It features a fixed maximum supply minted entirely to the deployer at creation and includes a pause mechanism that initially restricts transfers to the owner for LP setup. While the code is well-structured and uses audited libraries, the high degree of centralized control by the owner over token transfers and initial supply distribution presents significant economic and operational risks.
On-chain security analysis — is it a scam or legit?
Is mfercoin Safe?
Not verified
This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →The mfercoin contract is an ERC20 token utilizing OpenZeppelin's Ownable pattern.
Read the full analysis- Top-10 concentration > 20%
- 1 High finding(s) from audit
- 1 Medium finding(s) from audit
Exact factors
- Top-10 concentration > 20% (41.9% total → 20.2% effective; 5.6% in EOAs, 36.3% in contracts — mild)
- 1 High finding(s) from audit
- 1 Medium finding(s) from audit
Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed
Security Checklist
as of audit · Sep 4Holders
as of audit · Sep 4, 2026- Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking36.3%
- Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell5.6%
- Everyone elsethe rest of the supply58.1%
How holder types affect the score
Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.
Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Sep 4, 2026
Liquidity
as of audit · Sep 4- Uniswap v2WETHAnalysed$233.4K56.7%
- Uniswap v3WETH$177.3K43.0%
- Uniswap v2VIRTUAL$1.2K0.3%
- Hydrex CLAMMWETH$320.0%
- 9mm V3WETH$200.0%
- AerodromeBNKR$140.0%
The risk score reads depth across every pair.
The LP tokens of the analysed pool are locked or burned.
0xf901…73730x53e9…31dc0x13ee…da330x90f8…9f9a0xc0a5…eadfNo privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.
Security Findings
HighCentralized Control over Token Transfers
The contract owner has the ability to pause and unpause all token transfers for non-owner accounts via the setPause function. While the _update override allows the owner to transfer tokens even when paused (intended for LP setup), this grants significant centralized control over the token's liquidity and functionality. Misuse or compromise of the owner key could lead to a denial of service for all token holders, severely impacting market operations and user trust (7.3 Access Control, 7.4 Economic, 7.8 Operations).H-01
Issue
The contract owner has the ability to pause and unpause all token transfers for non-owner accounts via the setPause function. While the _update override allows the owner to transfer tokens even when paused (intended for LP setup), this grants significant centralized control over the token's liquidity and functionality. Misuse or compromise of the owner key could lead to a denial of service for all token holders, severely impacting market operations and user trust (7.3 Access Control, 7.4 Economic, 7.8 Operations).
Fix
Implement a multi-signature wallet or a timelock contract for ownership to introduce a higher level of security and decentralization for critical functions like pausing/unpausing. Consider a community-driven governance mechanism for such powerful actions in the future. Clearly document the conditions under which the pause function would be used.
Status
Unresolved
MediumSingle Point of Failure for Owner Key
The contract relies on a single owner address for critical administrative functions, including the ability to pause and unpause token transfers. If this private key is compromised, lost, or becomes inaccessible, the project's ability to manage the token's operational state (e.g., unpausing for general trading after LP setup) would be severely impacted or permanently lost. This creates a single point of failure for the protocol's operations (7.8 Operations).M-01
Issue
The contract relies on a single owner address for critical administrative functions, including the ability to pause and unpause token transfers. If this private key is compromised, lost, or becomes inaccessible, the project's ability to manage the token's operational state (e.g., unpausing for general trading after LP setup) would be severely impacted or permanently lost. This creates a single point of failure for the protocol's operations (7.8 Operations).
Fix
Transfer ownership to a robust multi-signature wallet (e.g., Gnosis Safe) or a timelock contract. This distributes control among multiple trusted parties and/or introduces a delay for critical actions, significantly reducing the risk associated with a single compromised or lost key. Ensure the chosen multi-sig or timelock solution is itself well-audited and securely managed.
Status
Unresolved
InfoInitial Paused State for LP Setup
The contract is deployed with the _paused state set to true in the constructor. This means that immediately after deployment, only the owner can transfer tokens, while all other transfers are restricted. The contract comments indicate this is intended for 'LP setup' (7.1 Architecture, 7.8 Operations). Users should be aware that the token will not be generally transferable until the owner explicitly calls setPause(false) to unpause it.I-01
Issue
The contract is deployed with the _paused state set to true in the constructor. This means that immediately after deployment, only the owner can transfer tokens, while all other transfers are restricted. The contract comments indicate this is intended for 'LP setup' (7.1 Architecture, 7.8 Operations). Users should be aware that the token will not be generally transferable until the owner explicitly calls setPause(false) to unpause it.
Fix
Ensure clear and prominent communication to the community regarding the initial paused state, its purpose, and the expected timeline for unpausing the contract. This transparency helps manage user expectations and builds trust.
Status
Unresolved
InfoNo Explicit Mechanism to Encourage Ownership Transfer to Secure Entity
While the Ownable contract provides a transferOwnership function, the mfercoin contract itself does not include any explicit mechanism, such as a post-deployment checklist or a time-locked transfer, to encourage or enforce the transfer of ownership to a more secure entity like a multi-signature wallet or a timelock contract (7.8 Operations). This leaves the decision entirely to the deployer, who might not prioritize this critical security step.I-02
Issue
While the Ownable contract provides a transferOwnership function, the mfercoin contract itself does not include any explicit mechanism, such as a post-deployment checklist or a time-locked transfer, to encourage or enforce the transfer of ownership to a more secure entity like a multi-signature wallet or a timelock contract (7.8 Operations). This leaves the decision entirely to the deployer, who might not prioritize this critical security step.
Fix
Consider adding a comment or a post-deployment script that explicitly recommends transferring ownership to a multi-signature wallet or a timelock contract. This serves as a strong reminder and best practice guidance for the project team to enhance the long-term security and decentralization of the token.
Status
Unresolved
Analysis
AI Copilotas of audit · Sep 4The contract leverages battle-tested OpenZeppelin libraries for ERC20 and Ownable functionalities, contributing to robust code security (7.2 Code Security). The _update function correctly prevents zero-value transfers and implements a pause mechanism that exempts the owner for LP distribution. However, the owner's ability to pause all non-owner transfers introduces a significant centralization point (7.3 Access Control), which is a technical risk. No reentrancy or integer overflow vulnerabilities were identified.
The economic model is based on a fixed supply ERC20 token, with the entire MAX_SUPPLY minted to the deployer at inception (7.4 Economic). This creates a highly centralized initial distribution. The owner possesses significant power through the setPause function, allowing them to halt all non-owner transfers, which can severely impact market liquidity and user trust (7.5 Governance). This centralized control represents a high economic and governance risk.
The mfercoin contract is not designed with upgradeability features (7.7 Upgrades). This simplifies the contract's architecture and eliminates risks associated with proxy patterns, such as storage collisions or upgrade path vulnerabilities. The immutability of the contract ensures that its logic cannot be changed post-deployment.
To mitigate the identified risks, it is strongly recommended that the project owner secure the owner's private key with the highest level of operational security, such as a hardware wallet or a multi-signature wallet.
Consider transferring ownership to a multi-signature wallet or a timelock contract to decentralize control and introduce a delay for critical operations, enhancing trust and reducing the single point of failure risk. Clearly communicate the purpose and duration of the initial paused state to the community to manage expectations and ensure transparency.
Contract & Record
Free for any token on the record. It links to this page and always shows the current score and the date it was checked.
- Sep 4, 20263Low
- Jul 28, 20260Low
Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the $MFER contract address?
The mfercoin ($MFER) contract on Base is 0xe3086852a4b125803c815a158249ae468a3254ca. Compare it with the address the project itself publishes before trading: other contracts can carry the same name and ticker.
Is mfercoin a scam?
Quantum Audit's risk score for mfercoin is 3/100 (Low risk) as of Sep 4, 2026, computed by a deterministic function from on-chain facts — Contract verified: Verified; Ownership: Renounced; Mint: No mint; Liquidity lock: Locked; Upgradeability: Fixed code. A score is a dated snapshot of those facts, not a guarantee; each one is listed on this page.
Is $MFER liquidity locked?
Liquidity lock: Locked (as of Sep 4, 2026). Total DEX liquidity: $412.0K.
Who holds $MFER?
As of Sep 4, 2026, the 10 largest holders own 41.9% of the supply. The Holders section on this page shows who they are by holder type.
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