The AnXiaoJiangToken is a standard ERC-20 implementation with added administrative controls that allow a designated 'minter' address to mint tokens, block specific addresses, and toggle transfer restrictions. While the core ERC-20 logic follows standard patterns, the centralized control over token supply and transferability introduces significant trust requirements for token holders. 7.1 Architecture: Standard ERC-20 with centralized administrative roles. 7.2 Code Security: Standard OpenZeppelin-like implementation. 7.3 Access Control: High centralization via the 'minter' role. 7.4 Economic: Inflationary risk via minting. 7.5 Governance: No decentralized governance. 7.6 External: No external dependencies. 7.7 Upgrades: Not upgradeable. 7.8 Operations: Administrative functions are active.
Early-stage security check — honeypot & rug-pull analysis
Is 安小将 a Scam?
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This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →The AnXiaoJiangToken is a standard ERC-20 implementation with added administrative controls that allow a designated 'minter' address to mint tokens, block specific addresses, and toggle transfer restrictions.
Read the full analysis- A privileged address controls a switch that decides whether transfers go through; held by minter: Other-Contract
- Owner can blacklist or freeze individual holders; held by minter: Other-Contract
- Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded; held by minter: Other-Contract
- Ownership status UNKNOWN
- Liquidity < $50k
- Volume/Liquidity > 15×
Exact factors
- A privileged address controls a switch that decides whether transfers go through; held by minter: Other-Contract
- Owner can blacklist or freeze individual holders; held by minter: Other-Contract
- Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded; held by minter: Other-Contract
- Ownership status UNKNOWN (owner could not be resolved)
- Liquidity < $50k ($12,830 across 1 pairs — thin market)
- Volume/Liquidity > 15× (20.6× — wash-trading signal)
Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed
Security Checklist
as of audit · Nov 1Holders
as of audit · Nov 1, 2026- Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking3.6%
- Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell3.2%
- Burnedout of circulation52.8%
- DEX poolsthe pools' own liquidity8.4%
- Everyone else692 holders31.9%
How holder types affect the score
Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.
Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Nov 1, 2026
Liquidity
as of audit · Nov 1The risk score reads depth across every pair.
The LP tokens of the analysed pool are locked or burned.
0x0ed9…9706No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.
Security Findings
MediumCentralized Minting Authority
The 'minter' address has the authority to call the mint() function, which increases the total supply of tokens. This allows the controller to dilute the value of existing holdings at any time.CP-01
Issue
The 'minter' address has the authority to call the mint() function, which increases the total supply of tokens. This allows the controller to dilute the value of existing holdings at any time.
Fix
Implement a hard cap on total supply or transition the minting authority to a decentralized governance mechanism.
Status
Unresolved
MediumCentralized Transfer Restriction Switch
The 'minter' address can call disableBlocks() to toggle global transfer restrictions. This grants the controller the ability to halt all token trading activity across the network.CP-05
Issue
The 'minter' address can call disableBlocks() to toggle global transfer restrictions. This grants the controller the ability to halt all token trading activity across the network.
Fix
Remove the ability to globally halt transfers or require a community-approved governance vote to trigger such a state.
Status
Unresolved
MediumArbitrary Address Blacklisting
The 'minter' address can call setPoolBlocked() to add specific addresses to a blacklist. This prevents targeted users from transferring or selling their tokens.CP-06
Issue
The 'minter' address can call setPoolBlocked() to add specific addresses to a blacklist. This prevents targeted users from transferring or selling their tokens.
Fix
Restrict the blacklisting capability to specific, transparent, and legally defined scenarios, or remove it entirely to ensure censorship resistance.
Status
Unresolved
InfoWho holds the supply
The ten largest holders own 68.1% of supply. Of that, 52.8% burned, 8.4% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 3.2% in wallets, 3.6% in other contracts. 702 holders in total.QA-HOLDERS
Issue
The ten largest holders own 68.1% of supply. Of that, 52.8% burned, 8.4% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 3.2% in wallets, 3.6% in other contracts. 702 holders in total.
Fix
Watch the largest wallets that are not exchanges, pools or locks — those are the ones that can move the price.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoNot listed by any independent source
702 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.QA-IDENTITY
Issue
702 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.
Fix
Match the contract address against the project's official channels before trading.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoLiquidity burned — cannot be withdrawn
99.6% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 99.6% of the LP tokens were sent to a burn address — that liquidity can never be withdrawn by anyone. 0.4% is held, unlocked, by 1 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. No single one holds a majority: their exits thin the market rather than hand anyone the pool.QA-LIQUIDITY
Issue
99.6% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 99.6% of the LP tokens were sent to a burn address — that liquidity can never be withdrawn by anyone. 0.4% is held, unlocked, by 1 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. No single one holds a majority: their exits thin the market rather than hand anyone the pool.
Fix
Check the lock's end date and beneficiary on the locker's own page before relying on it.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoThe market for this token
Liquidity $13K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $264K (DexScreener, all pools).QA-MARKET
Issue
Liquidity $13K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $264K (DexScreener, all pools).
Fix
Size any position to the liquidity and daily volume shown — they set how much you can sell and at what price.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoAsset class: Project token
A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: mintable with no on-chain cap found. Control: an owner that could not be resolved. Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: 2% on buy, 2% on sell. Market: $13K of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: under a day of market history.QA-PROFILE
Issue
A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: mintable with no on-chain cap found. Control: an owner that could not be resolved. Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: 2% on buy, 2% on sell. Market: $13K of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: under a day of market history.
Fix
Check the project's own documentation for what the token is used for; this report covers what the contract allows.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoRecently launched — less than a day of market history
The token's oldest DEX pool is less than a day old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.QA-RECENT
Issue
The token's oldest DEX pool is less than a day old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.
Fix
Re-check ownership, liquidity and holder distribution as the token matures; those are the facts that move early.
Status
Acknowledged
Analysis
AI Copilotas of audit · Nov 1The contract utilizes standard OpenZeppelin-style ERC-20 logic, ensuring reliable token transfers and allowance management. The code is clean and follows established patterns for state updates. However, the inclusion of custom administrative hooks in the transfer path increases the complexity of the execution flow. The use of a 'minter' role is implemented correctly using standard modifier patterns.
The economic model is highly centralized, granting the 'minter' address total control over supply and transferability. This creates a significant trust dependency, as the minter can dilute holders or freeze assets at will. There are no time-locks or multi-signature requirements for these sensitive administrative actions.
The contract is not upgradeable and does not utilize proxy patterns. The logic is immutable once deployed. This eliminates risks associated with implementation changes but prevents fixing potential issues without a migration.
Token holders should be aware that the 'minter' address possesses significant power to alter the token's economic state and restrict individual access.
It is recommended to transition these administrative functions to a multi-signature wallet or a decentralized governance contract to mitigate single-point-of-failure risks. Ensure that the private keys associated with the 'minter' role are stored in a highly secure environment, such as a hardware security module or a multi-party computation (MPC) wallet, to prevent unauthorized access to these sensitive functions.
Contract & Record
Free for any token on the record. It links to this page and always shows the current score and the date it was checked.
- Nov 1, 202657Medium
Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.
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