The TeleBTC contract is a centralized token implementation utilizing a Transparent Proxy pattern. The architecture relies heavily on a single owner address with extensive administrative privileges, including the ability to burn user tokens and blacklist addresses. While the code follows standard OpenZeppelin patterns, the centralization of power presents a significant trust requirement for token holders.

On-chain security analysis — is it a scam or legit?
Is teleBTC Safe?
Not verified
This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →The TeleBTC contract is a centralized token implementation utilizing a Transparent Proxy pattern.
Read the full analysis- Owner can change any holder's balance
- Owner can blacklist or freeze individual holders
- Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded
- Upgradeable proxy — the admin can replace the logic; admin: EOA
- Liquidity not locked
- Top-10 concentration > 30%
- The deployer has launched a honeypot before
Exact factors
- Owner can change any holder's balance (seize or credit tokens)
- Owner can blacklist or freeze individual holders
- Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded
- Upgradeable proxy — the admin can replace the logic; admin: EOA
- Liquidity NOT locked (100% of the pool) — held by independent providers — market-depth risk
- Top-10 concentration > 30% (99.7% total → 42.1% effective; 3.6% in EOAs, 96.1% in contracts)
- The deployer has launched a honeypot before
Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed
Security Checklist
as of audit · Oct 20Holders
as of audit · Oct 20, 2026- Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking96.1%
- Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell3.6%
- Everyone else212 holders0.3%
How holder types affect the score
Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.
Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Oct 20, 2026
Liquidity
as of audit · Oct 20The risk score reads depth across every pair.
The LP tokens of the analysed pool are not locked or burned, so whoever holds them can withdraw that liquidity.
0x1da9…89b0No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.
Security Findings
HighPrivileged Token Burning
The ownerBurn function allows the contract owner to directly reduce the balance of any user's wallet. This grants the owner the power to unilaterally seize or destroy tokens held by any participant in the ecosystem.CP-02
Issue
The ownerBurn function allows the contract owner to directly reduce the balance of any user's wallet. This grants the owner the power to unilaterally seize or destroy tokens held by any participant in the ecosystem.
Fix
Restrict the use of this function to specific, transparent scenarios or remove it entirely in favor of a user-initiated burn mechanism. If required for regulatory compliance, implement a multi-signature requirement for its execution.
Status
Unresolved
MediumCentralized Blacklisting Capability
The owner can add addresses to a blacklist, which prevents those addresses from transferring tokens. This mechanism is controlled entirely by the owner, allowing them to freeze any user's assets at will.CP-06
Issue
The owner can add addresses to a blacklist, which prevents those addresses from transferring tokens. This mechanism is controlled entirely by the owner, allowing them to freeze any user's assets at will.
Fix
Implement a decentralized process for blacklisting, such as a community vote or a multi-signature approval, to prevent the abuse of this power by a single entity.
Status
Unresolved
MediumLiquidity not locked
0.0% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 100.0% is held, unlocked, by 1 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. One of them — a wallet, 0x1da9…89b0 — holds 100.0% and can remove that share at once; who controls it is not visible on-chain, so it is not treated as an independent provider. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them.QA-LIQUIDITY
Issue
0.0% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 100.0% is held, unlocked, by 1 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. One of them — a wallet, 0x1da9…89b0 — holds 100.0% and can remove that share at once; who controls it is not visible on-chain, so it is not treated as an independent provider. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them.
Fix
Check the lock's end date and beneficiary on the locker's own page before relying on it.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoWho holds the supply
The ten largest holders own 99.7% of supply. What remains: 3.6% in wallets, 96.1% in other contracts. 222 holders in total.QA-HOLDERS
Issue
The ten largest holders own 99.7% of supply. What remains: 3.6% in wallets, 96.1% in other contracts. 222 holders in total.
Fix
Watch the largest wallets that are not exchanges, pools or locks — those are the ones that can move the price.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoListed, but not independently verified
Listed on CoinGecko as teleBTC (TELEBTC). 222 holders.QA-IDENTITY
Issue
Listed on CoinGecko as teleBTC (TELEBTC). 222 holders.
Fix
Match the contract address against the project's official channels before trading.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoThe market for this token
Liquidity $199K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $1.1M (CoinGecko, all markets, daily snapshot). 24h trading volume $298K (DexScreener, all pools).QA-MARKET
Issue
Liquidity $199K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $1.1M (CoinGecko, all markets, daily snapshot). 24h trading volume $298K (DexScreener, all pools).
Fix
Size any position to the liquidity and daily volume shown — they set how much you can sell and at what price.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoAsset class: Project token
A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: mintable with no on-chain cap found. Control: a single wallet (EOA). Code: upgradeable proxy. Fees: no buy or sell tax. Market: $199K of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: 711 days of market history.QA-PROFILE
Issue
A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: mintable with no on-chain cap found. Control: a single wallet (EOA). Code: upgradeable proxy. Fees: no buy or sell tax. Market: $199K of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: 711 days of market history.
Fix
Check the project's own documentation for what the token is used for; this report covers what the contract allows.
Status
Acknowledged
Analysis
AI Copilotas of audit · Oct 20The contract utilizes standard, well-audited libraries like ReentrancyGuard and Ownable. 7.1 Architecture follows the EIP-1967 standard for proxies, ensuring clear separation between logic and storage. 7.2 Code Security is maintained through consistent use of modifiers and standard ERC-20 implementations. 7.6 External interactions are minimal, reducing the attack surface for external exploits.
The protocol exhibits high centralization risks regarding 7.3 Access Control and 7.5 Governance. The owner holds absolute authority to modify balances and restrict transfers, which is a significant economic risk. 7.4 Economic parameters like mint limits and epoch lengths are fully controlled by the owner without community oversight. This design requires users to place total trust in the owner's address.
The contract uses a Transparent Proxy pattern, which is a standard and safe approach for 7.7 Upgrades. However, the proxy admin is an EOA, which is a single point of failure for the entire upgrade process. 7.8 Operations are currently managed by this EOA, lacking the security of a multi-signature wallet or DAO-based governance for critical changes.
It is strongly recommended to transition the ownership and proxy administration from an EOA to a multi-signature wallet (e.g., Gnosis Safe) to mitigate the risk of a single compromised key.
Additionally, implementing a timelock for sensitive administrative functions would provide transparency and allow users to react to significant changes in protocol rules. For long-term security, consider decentralizing the minter and burner roles to a governance contract. This would reduce the trust burden on the current owner and align the protocol with industry standards for decentralized assets.
Contract & Record
- Oct 20, 202684High
Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.
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