The MEBT contract is a standard ERC-20 token with added tax and minting capabilities. It relies on centralized governance and oracle roles to manage supply and transfer fees. While the code is clean and follows standard OpenZeppelin patterns, the high degree of centralization poses significant risks to token holders.

On-chain security analysis — is it a scam or legit?
Is MEBT Safe?
Not verified
This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →The MEBT contract is a standard ERC-20 token with added tax and minting capabilities.
Read the full analysis- Owner can change the buy/sell tax; held by governance: EOA
- Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded; held by oracle: EOA, rbs: EOA
- Top-10 concentration > 30%
- Code: Redundant Logic in Tax Rate Setters
Exact factors
- Owner can change the buy/sell tax; held by governance: EOA
- Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded; held by oracle: EOA, rbs: EOA
- Top-10 concentration > 30% (99.8% total → 37.5% effective; 0.3% in EOAs, 93.1% in contracts; 6.5% burned, locked or in pools excluded)
- Code: Redundant Logic in Tax Rate Setters (Medium, static analysis)
Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed
Security Checklist
as of audit · Oct 20Holders
as of audit · Oct 20, 2026- Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking93.1%
- Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell0.3%
- DEX poolsthe pools' own liquidity6.5%
- Everyone else7,535 holders0.2%
How holder types affect the score
Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.
Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Oct 20, 2026
Liquidity
as of audit · Oct 20The risk score reads depth across every pair.
The LP tokens of the analysed pool are locked or burned.
0xe54a…13340x9808…3348No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.
Security Findings
MediumRedundant Logic in Tax Rate Setters
The functions setBuyRates and setSellRates contain redundant checks and logic structures that could be simplified to reduce the attack surface.CD-01
Issue
The functions setBuyRates and setSellRates contain redundant checks and logic structures that could be simplified to reduce the attack surface.
Fix
Refactor the tax rate setting logic into a single internal function to ensure consistency and reduce code duplication.
Status
Unresolved
MediumCentralized Minting Authority
The mint function allows the oracle or rbs addresses to create new tokens at any time, which can dilute the value of existing holdings.CP-01
Issue
The mint function allows the oracle or rbs addresses to create new tokens at any time, which can dilute the value of existing holdings.
Fix
Implement a hard cap on the total supply or move the minting authority to a decentralized governance process.
Status
Unresolved
MediumGovernance Control Over Transfer Fees
The governance role can change the tax rates for buys and sells at any time via setBuyRates and setSellRates, potentially impacting user liquidity.CP-07
Issue
The governance role can change the tax rates for buys and sells at any time via setBuyRates and setSellRates, potentially impacting user liquidity.
Fix
Introduce a maximum fee cap or a time-lock delay for any changes to the tax rates.
Status
Unresolved
InfoWho holds the supply
The ten largest holders own 99.8% of supply. Of that, 6.5% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 0.3% in wallets, 93.1% in other contracts. 7,545 holders in total.QA-HOLDERS
Issue
The ten largest holders own 99.8% of supply. Of that, 6.5% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 0.3% in wallets, 93.1% in other contracts. 7,545 holders in total.
Fix
Watch the largest wallets that are not exchanges, pools or locks — those are the ones that can move the price.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoNot listed by any independent source
7,545 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.QA-IDENTITY
Issue
7,545 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.
Fix
Match the contract address against the project's official channels before trading.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoLiquidity time-locked
92.7% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 44.0% is locked in PinkLock02 until 30 Jun 2029 (984 days). Until then nobody — the project included — can withdraw it unless the locker contract itself is flawed; after that date the lock's owner can. 16.1% is locked in PinkLock02 until 31 Jul 2029 (1015 days). Until then nobody — the project included — can withdraw it unless the locker contract itself is flawed; after that date the lock's owner can. 12.3% is locked in PinkLock02 until 31 Jul 2029 (1015 days). Until then nobody — the project included — can withdraw it unless the locker contract itself is flawed; after that date the lock's owner can. 10.6% is locked in PinkLock02 until 31 Aug 2029 (1045 days). Until then nobody — the project included — can withdraw it unless the locker contract itself is flawed; after that date the lock's owner can. 9.7% is locked in PinkLock02 until 31 Oct 2029 (1106 days). Until then nobody — the project included — can withdraw it unless the locker contract itself is flawed; after that date the lock's owner can. 7.3% is held, unlocked, by 1 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. No single one holds a majority: their exits thin the market rather than hand anyone the pool. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them.QA-LIQUIDITY
Issue
92.7% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 44.0% is locked in PinkLock02 until 30 Jun 2029 (984 days). Until then nobody — the project included — can withdraw it unless the locker contract itself is flawed; after that date the lock's owner can. 16.1% is locked in PinkLock02 until 31 Jul 2029 (1015 days). Until then nobody — the project included — can withdraw it unless the locker contract itself is flawed; after that date the lock's owner can. 12.3% is locked in PinkLock02 until 31 Jul 2029 (1015 days). Until then nobody — the project included — can withdraw it unless the locker contract itself is flawed; after that date the lock's owner can. 10.6% is locked in PinkLock02 until 31 Aug 2029 (1045 days). Until then nobody — the project included — can withdraw it unless the locker contract itself is flawed; after that date the lock's owner can. 9.7% is locked in PinkLock02 until 31 Oct 2029 (1106 days). Until then nobody — the project included — can withdraw it unless the locker contract itself is flawed; after that date the lock's owner can. 7.3% is held, unlocked, by 1 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. No single one holds a majority: their exits thin the market rather than hand anyone the pool. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them.
Fix
Check the lock's end date and beneficiary on the locker's own page before relying on it.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoThe market for this token
Liquidity $475K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $67K (DexScreener, all pools).QA-MARKET
Issue
Liquidity $475K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $67K (DexScreener, all pools).
Fix
Size any position to the liquidity and daily volume shown — they set how much you can sell and at what price.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoAsset class: Project token
A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: mintable with no on-chain cap found. Control: nobody (ownership renounced). Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: 0% on buy, 5% on sell. Market: $475K of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: 137 days of market history.QA-PROFILE
Issue
A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: mintable with no on-chain cap found. Control: nobody (ownership renounced). Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: 0% on buy, 5% on sell. Market: $475K of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: 137 days of market history.
Fix
Check the project's own documentation for what the token is used for; this report covers what the contract allows.
Status
Acknowledged
Analysis
AI Copilotas of audit · Oct 20The contract utilizes standard OpenZeppelin libraries for ERC-20, Burnable, and Permit functionality, ensuring 7.1 Architecture and 7.2 Code Security standards are met. 7.3 Access Control is implemented via custom modifiers, though it grants extensive power to the governance and oracle roles. 7.8 Operations are straightforward, with clear event logging for all state-changing functions.
7.4 Economic and 7.5 Governance aspects are highly centralized. The governance role can arbitrarily modify transfer fees and whitelist addresses, directly impacting 7.6 External interactions. The ability to mint tokens via the oracle role creates a risk of supply dilution for existing holders.
The contract is not a proxy and does not support 7.7 Upgrades. The logic is immutable, which provides security against hidden logic changes but prevents patching if vulnerabilities are discovered.
To improve security, consider implementing a multi-signature wallet or a time-lock mechanism for the governance role to prevent immediate, unilateral changes to token economics.
Additionally, consider replacing the single oracle/rbs minting authority with a more decentralized mechanism or a hard-capped supply to protect holders from unexpected dilution.
Contract & Record
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