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Is RISE Token Safe?

RISEPolygon
Not verified This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →
Last checked Oct 20, 2026 · 2 audits on record
Chart
High RiskHow is this score calculated?
How the score breaks downratings: 10 is safest
Technical6/10Governance1/10Upgrades5/10Checks passed4 of 7Findings4 High · 2 Medium · 2 Low8
SummaryAI Copilot

The RISEToken contract implements a highly centralized architecture where the owner or privileged system addresses maintain extensive control over token balances, transfer logic, and liquidity management.

Read the full analysis
What raised the score
  • Owner can change any holder's balance
  • A privileged address can replace a contract every transfer depends on
  • A privileged address controls a switch that decides whether transfers go through
  • Owner can change the buy/sell tax
  • A privileged address can change transfer or wallet limits
  • Liquidity not locked
  • Top-10 concentration UNKNOWN — the indexer's holder list adds up to 2648.0% of supply
  • Code: Rounding Loss via Division Before Multiplication
  • Code: Ignored Transfer Return Values
  • Code: Predictable randomness
Exact factors
  • Owner can change any holder's balance (seize or credit tokens)
  • A privileged address can replace a contract every transfer depends on
  • A privileged address controls a switch that decides whether transfers go through
  • Owner can change the buy/sell tax
  • A privileged address can change transfer or wallet limits
  • Liquidity NOT locked (23% of the pool) — withdrawable by the owner/deployer — rug-pull risk
  • Top-10 concentration UNKNOWN — the indexer's holder list adds up to 2648.0% of supply
  • Code: Rounding Loss via Division Before Multiplication (Low, static analysis)
  • Code: Ignored Transfer Return Values (High, static analysis)
  • Code: Predictable randomness (High, static analysis)

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Security Checklist

as of audit · Oct 204 of 7 checks passed
Contract verifiedVerified
OwnershipRetained
MintNo mint
Liquidity lockNot locked
UpgradeabilityFixed code
HoneypotNone found
Buy / sell tax1% / 1%

Holders

as of audit · Oct 20, 202693,765 holders

How the supply is spread across holders could not be read — the indexer's holder list does not add up to the supply. The indexer lists far more than 100% of the supply in its top 10. Check the largest holders on a block explorer, which reads current balances.

Liquidity

as of audit · Oct 20$1.17M

The risk score reads depth across every pair.

LP tokensNot locked

The LP tokens of the analysed pool are not locked or burned, so whoever holds them can withdraw that liquidity.

Analysed pool$1.17MShare of depth100.0%
LP Burned76.6%
LP Locked76.6% · Null Address
Unlocked LP held by
0xcfb2…a7770xc6ae…f70a

A privileged address — the deployer, the owner, or the token contract itself — is among these holders, so that party can withdraw liquidity.

Security Findings

4 High2 Medium2 Low
High

Ignored Transfer Return Values

The _removeLiquidity function fails to check the return value of ERC-20 transfers, which may lead to silent failures in liquidity operations.CD-02

Issue

The _removeLiquidity function fails to check the return value of ERC-20 transfers, which may lead to silent failures in liquidity operations.

Fix

Always check the boolean return value of ERC-20 transfer calls or use OpenZeppelin's SafeERC20 library.

Status

Unresolved

High

Predictable randomness

Randomness is derived from on-chain values that can be predicted or influenced. Functions: checkAndResetDailyPrice.CD-03

Issue

Randomness is derived from on-chain values that can be predicted or influenced. Functions: checkAndResetDailyPrice.

Fix

Review the flagged functions; the static analyser reported this as weak-prng.

Status

Unresolved

High

Privileged Balance Manipulation

The function externalRemoveLiquidity allows a privileged address to move or burn tokens directly from any user's balance, bypassing standard transfer logic.CP-02

Issue

The function externalRemoveLiquidity allows a privileged address to move or burn tokens directly from any user's balance, bypassing standard transfer logic.

Fix

Remove functions that allow direct modification of user balances by administrative accounts.

Status

Unresolved

High

Centralized Dependency Control

The owner can change the addresses of the GSC storage and the PancakeRouter, effectively allowing them to redirect all token transfer logic and liquidity interactions.CP-03

Issue

The owner can change the addresses of the GSC storage and the PancakeRouter, effectively allowing them to redirect all token transfer logic and liquidity interactions.

Fix

Implement a timelock for administrative changes to critical contract dependencies.

Status

Unresolved

Medium

Transfer Path Switch

The owner can control the BUY_OPEN_TIME, effectively enabling or disabling trading for all users at will.CP-05

Issue

The owner can control the BUY_OPEN_TIME, effectively enabling or disabling trading for all users at will.

Fix

Consider making trading status immutable after a set period or governed by a DAO.

Status

Unresolved

Medium

Dynamic Fee Manipulation

The updateDailyPrice function allows the owner to change transfer fees, which directly impacts the economic cost of trading.CP-07

Issue

The updateDailyPrice function allows the owner to change transfer fees, which directly impacts the economic cost of trading.

Fix

Set hard caps on fee adjustments to prevent excessive taxation of users.

Status

Unresolved

Low

Rounding Loss via Division Before Multiplication

The functions getBeijing8AmUTC and resetDailyPrice perform division before multiplication, leading to potential precision loss.CD-01

Issue

The functions getBeijing8AmUTC and resetDailyPrice perform division before multiplication, leading to potential precision loss.

Fix

Perform all multiplications before divisions to maintain precision.

Status

Unresolved

Low

Mutable Wallet Limits

The owner can change buy limits for specific addresses, allowing for discriminatory access control.CP-08

Issue

The owner can change buy limits for specific addresses, allowing for discriminatory access control.

Fix

Define limits in the contract code or via a transparent governance process.

Status

Unresolved

Analysis

AI Copilotas of audit · Oct 20
Executive SummaryWhat the contract is and what the review found

The RISEToken contract implements a highly centralized architecture where the owner or privileged system addresses maintain extensive control over token balances, transfer logic, and liquidity management. While the code is functional and follows standard ERC-20 patterns, the presence of administrative functions that can move user funds or redirect core protocol logic introduces significant trust requirements and potential for abuse. Users should be aware that the protocol's behavior is subject to change by the contract owner.

Technical6/10Medium risk

The contract architecture relies on heavy centralization, with multiple administrative functions capable of modifying internal state and external dependencies. 7.1 Architecture is modular but tightly coupled to external storage contracts. 7.2 Code Security is compromised by the lack of return value checks on ERC-20 transfers and potential rounding errors. 7.3 Access Control is overly permissive, granting privileged addresses the ability to manipulate user balances directly.

Governance1/10High risk

7.4 Economic and 7.5 Governance aspects are entirely controlled by the owner. The ability to update routers and storage contracts allows for arbitrary changes to the token's economic model. 7.6 External dependencies are managed via mutable addresses, creating a single point of failure for the entire ecosystem.

Upgrades5/10Medium risk

7.7 Upgrades are handled via address-swapping patterns rather than standard proxy patterns. While this allows for logic updates, it lacks transparency and immutability. 7.8 Operations are centralized, requiring high trust in the owner's address.

Final RecommendationWhat to do about this score

It is strongly recommended to implement a multi-signature wallet or a decentralized governance mechanism to control privileged functions, reducing the risk of single-point-of-failure attacks.

Furthermore, the contract should be updated to include proper return value checks for all ERC-20 transfers and to remove functions that allow direct manipulation of user balances.

Contract & Record

2 audits on record
TypeRISEToken
NetworkPolygon
Token age6mo
Contract0xcfb2…a777
Deployer0x0426…03f4
Audit History
  1. Oct 20, 202684High
  2. Oct 20, 202654Medium

Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.

Frequently Asked Questions

Is RISE Token a scam?

Based on automated analysis, RISE Token scores 54/100 (Medium Risk) on our risk scale. No honeypot was detected, but always verify independently before investing.

Is RISE Token safe to buy?

Our scanner flagged a risk score of 54/100. Ownership has not been renounced, which is a risk factor. DYOR before purchasing any token.

Has RISE Token been audited?

The contract is open-source and verified on-chain. Verification is not the same as a full security audit. Use Quantum Audit's free tool to run a deeper analysis of the contract code.

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