SenseiToken is a standard ERC-20 token with additional administrative controls allowing the minter to manage supply and transfer restrictions. The architecture is straightforward, utilizing OpenZeppelin standards for core functionality. However, the centralization of power in the minter role introduces significant trust requirements for token holders.
Early-stage security check — honeypot & rug-pull analysis
Is SENSEI a Scam?
Not verified
This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →SenseiToken is a standard ERC-20 token with additional administrative controls allowing the minter to manage supply and transfer restrictions.
Read the full analysis- A privileged address controls a switch that decides whether transfers go through; held by minter: Other-Contract
- Owner can blacklist or freeze individual holders; held by minter: Other-Contract
- Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded; held by minter: Other-Contract
- Ownership status UNKNOWN
- Liquidity < $50k
- Volume/Liquidity > 15×
Exact factors
- A privileged address controls a switch that decides whether transfers go through; held by minter: Other-Contract
- Owner can blacklist or freeze individual holders; held by minter: Other-Contract
- Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded; held by minter: Other-Contract
- Ownership status UNKNOWN (owner could not be resolved)
- Liquidity < $50k ($22,225 across 1 pairs — thin market)
- Volume/Liquidity > 15× (17.0× — wash-trading signal)
Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed
Security Checklist
as of audit · Nov 1Holders
as of audit · Nov 1, 2026- Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking4.3%
- Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell4.4%
- Burnedout of circulation27.9%
- DEX poolsthe pools' own liquidity25.5%
- Everyone else5,315 holders38.0%
How holder types affect the score
Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.
Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Nov 1, 2026
Liquidity
as of audit · Nov 1The risk score reads depth across every pair.
The LP tokens of the analysed pool are locked or burned.
0x0ed9…9706No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.
Security Findings
MediumCentralized Minting Authority
The minter role can call mint() or restoreFrom() to increase the total supply of tokens. This allows the controller to dilute the value of existing holdings at their discretion.CP-01
Issue
The minter role can call mint() or restoreFrom() to increase the total supply of tokens. This allows the controller to dilute the value of existing holdings at their discretion.
Fix
Implement a time-lock or a multi-signature requirement for minting operations to prevent unilateral supply changes.
Status
Unresolved
MediumTransfer Restriction Switch
The disableBlocks() function allows the minter to toggle a global switch that can halt or restrict token transfers. This creates a risk where the minter can effectively freeze the market for the token.CP-05
Issue
The disableBlocks() function allows the minter to toggle a global switch that can halt or restrict token transfers. This creates a risk where the minter can effectively freeze the market for the token.
Fix
Remove the ability to globally disable transfers or restrict this function to emergency-only scenarios governed by a decentralized vote.
Status
Unresolved
MediumIndividual Address Blocking
The setPoolBlocked() function allows the minter to blacklist specific addresses from interacting with the token. This gives the controller the power to censor individual users or liquidity pools.CP-06
Issue
The setPoolBlocked() function allows the minter to blacklist specific addresses from interacting with the token. This gives the controller the power to censor individual users or liquidity pools.
Fix
Limit the use of blacklisting to specific, transparent, and pre-defined compliance scenarios, or remove the functionality entirely to ensure censorship resistance.
Status
Unresolved
InfoWho holds the supply
The ten largest holders own 62.0% of supply. Of that, 27.9% burned, 25.5% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 4.4% in wallets, 4.3% in other contracts. 5,325 holders in total.QA-HOLDERS
Issue
The ten largest holders own 62.0% of supply. Of that, 27.9% burned, 25.5% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 4.4% in wallets, 4.3% in other contracts. 5,325 holders in total.
Fix
Watch the largest wallets that are not exchanges, pools or locks — those are the ones that can move the price.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoNot listed by any independent source
5,325 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.QA-IDENTITY
Issue
5,325 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.
Fix
Match the contract address against the project's official channels before trading.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoLiquidity burned — cannot be withdrawn
99.4% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 99.4% of the LP tokens were sent to a burn address — that liquidity can never be withdrawn by anyone. 0.6% is held, unlocked, by 1 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. No single one holds a majority: their exits thin the market rather than hand anyone the pool.QA-LIQUIDITY
Issue
99.4% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 99.4% of the LP tokens were sent to a burn address — that liquidity can never be withdrawn by anyone. 0.6% is held, unlocked, by 1 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. No single one holds a majority: their exits thin the market rather than hand anyone the pool.
Fix
Check the lock's end date and beneficiary on the locker's own page before relying on it.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoThe market for this token
Liquidity $22K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $378K (DexScreener, all pools).QA-MARKET
Issue
Liquidity $22K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $378K (DexScreener, all pools).
Fix
Size any position to the liquidity and daily volume shown — they set how much you can sell and at what price.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoAsset class: Project token
A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: mintable with no on-chain cap found. Control: an owner that could not be resolved. Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: 1% on buy, 2% on sell. Market: $22K of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: under a day of market history.QA-PROFILE
Issue
A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: mintable with no on-chain cap found. Control: an owner that could not be resolved. Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: 1% on buy, 2% on sell. Market: $22K of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: under a day of market history.
Fix
Check the project's own documentation for what the token is used for; this report covers what the contract allows.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoRecently launched — less than a day of market history
The token's oldest DEX pool is less than a day old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.QA-RECENT
Issue
The token's oldest DEX pool is less than a day old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.
Fix
Re-check ownership, liquidity and holder distribution as the token matures; those are the facts that move early.
Status
Acknowledged
Analysis
AI Copilotas of audit · Nov 1The contract follows standard ERC-20 implementation patterns, ensuring compatibility with major DEXs and wallets. 7.1 Architecture is clean, relying on established libraries for core logic. 7.2 Code Security is high due to the use of modern Solidity 0.8.x features which prevent overflow/underflow. 7.6 External interactions are limited, reducing the attack surface for reentrancy or flash loan exploits.
The protocol relies on a single privileged minter role, which creates a high degree of centralization. 7.3 Access Control is strictly enforced but grants the minter total authority over supply and user balances. 7.4 Economic risks are significant as the minter can dilute holders via minting or restrict liquidity via blocking. 7.5 Governance is currently non-existent, as all power is concentrated in a single address.
The contract is not upgradeable, which provides immutability for the logic layer. 7.7 Upgrades are not supported, meaning the current rules are fixed unless the minter uses existing administrative functions. 7.8 Operations are stable due to the lack of complex proxy patterns or external dependencies.
Token holders should be aware that the minter role possesses significant power to alter the token's economic state and restrict individual access.
It is recommended to transition the minter role to a multi-signature wallet or a decentralized governance contract to mitigate single-point-of-failure risks. Ensure that the minter address is secured with hardware-based multi-factor authentication. Regularly monitor the minter's activity on-chain to ensure that administrative functions are only used for legitimate protocol maintenance.
Contract & Record
Free for any token on the record. It links to this page and always shows the current score and the date it was checked.
- Nov 1, 202657Medium
Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.
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