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Is Power Safe?

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Power POWER
0x9dc4…1223
Ethereum
Not verifiedThis record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →
Last checked 8d ago 1 audit on record
How is this score calculated? → Medium Risk
Executive SummaryAI Copilot

The PowerToken contract is an ERC20 token implementation utilizing battle-tested OpenZeppelin and Chainlink libraries. It features a fixed supply minted entirely to a specified treasury address during deployment. The contract owner, established by Chainlink's secure `ConfirmedOwner` pattern, has limited administrative functionality within the token contract itself. The primary risk identified is the centralized control over the initial token supply by the designated treasury address.

1 Medium3 Informational
Volume 24h
$323.2K
Liquidity
$55.3K
Price
$0.1228
Token Age
9mo
Top 10 Holders
100.0%

Security Findings

Medium

Centralized Control of Initial Token Supply

M-01The entire token supply (1 billion tokens) is minted to a single `treasury` address during contract deployment. If this `treasury` address is controlled by a single entity (e.g., an Externally Owned Account - EOA), it represents a single point of failure for the entire token supply. This centralization poses a significant risk to the token's economic security and distribution, as compromise of this single address could lead to the loss or misuse of all tokens. While the contract owner is a multisig, the `treasury` address is a separate parameter and its control mechanism is not specified in the code.
IssueThe entire token supply (1 billion tokens) is minted to a single `treasury` address during contract deployment. If this `treasury` address is controlled by a single entity (e.g., an Externally Owned Account - EOA), it represents a single point of failure for the entire token supply. This centralization poses a significant risk to the token's economic security and distribution, as compromise of this single address could lead to the loss or misuse of all tokens. While the contract owner is a multisig, the `treasury` address is a separate parameter and its control mechanism is not specified in the code.
FixEnsure the `treasury` address is controlled by a robust multi-signature wallet with a sufficient threshold or a secure, audited smart contract. Clearly document the control mechanism and operational procedures for the `treasury` to enhance transparency and reduce single points of failure.
StatusUnresolved
Info

Limited Owner Functionality

I-01The `owner` role, established by Chainlink's `OwnerIsCreator` and `ConfirmedOwner` pattern, has no direct control over the token's core functionalities (e.g., minting, burning, pausing, modifying supply) within the `PowerToken` contract itself. The owner's only power is to transfer ownership of the contract. This is a design characteristic, not a vulnerability, indicating a minimal administrative surface for the token contract.
IssueThe `owner` role, established by Chainlink's `OwnerIsCreator` and `ConfirmedOwner` pattern, has no direct control over the token's core functionalities (e.g., minting, burning, pausing, modifying supply) within the `PowerToken` contract itself. The owner's only power is to transfer ownership of the contract. This is a design characteristic, not a vulnerability, indicating a minimal administrative surface for the token contract.
FixThis is a design choice. If future administrative functionalities (e.g., pausing, fee adjustments, burning) are desired, they would need to be explicitly added to the contract and gated by the `onlyOwner` modifier. Otherwise, this design limits the attack surface related to owner privileges.
StatusUnresolved
Info

Fixed Token Supply

I-02The token's total supply is fixed at deployment, with all tokens minted to the specified `treasury` address. There are no mechanisms for further minting or burning of tokens post-deployment. This design choice ensures a predictable and non-inflationary supply but removes flexibility for supply adjustments in response to market conditions or protocol needs.
IssueThe token's total supply is fixed at deployment, with all tokens minted to the specified `treasury` address. There are no mechanisms for further minting or burning of tokens post-deployment. This design choice ensures a predictable and non-inflationary supply but removes flexibility for supply adjustments in response to market conditions or protocol needs.
FixThis is a design choice. Ensure that the fixed supply model aligns with the project's long-term economic strategy. If future flexibility for supply management is ever considered, a new token contract would be required.
StatusUnresolved
Info

No Emergency Pause Mechanism

I-03The contract does not include any mechanism to pause token transfers or other operations in case of an emergency, such as a critical vulnerability in an integrated system, a market manipulation event, or a governance dispute. While not strictly necessary for a simple token, a pause mechanism can provide a safety net for critical situations.
IssueThe contract does not include any mechanism to pause token transfers or other operations in case of an emergency, such as a critical vulnerability in an integrated system, a market manipulation event, or a governance dispute. While not strictly necessary for a simple token, a pause mechanism can provide a safety net for critical situations.
FixConsider implementing a pause mechanism (e.g., using OpenZeppelin's `Pausable` contract) controlled by the contract owner or a governance mechanism. This would allow for temporary suspension of operations in emergencies, providing time to address issues without permanent disruption.
StatusUnresolved

Category Ratings

TechnicalLow8/10

The PowerToken contract demonstrates strong technical security by inheriting from OpenZeppelin's robust ERC20 standard and Chainlink's secure `ConfirmedOwner` access control pattern (7.2 Code Security). This minimizes common vulnerabilities like reentrancy and integer overflows, as these libraries are extensively audited. The contract's custom logic is minimal, primarily involving the initial minting of a fixed supply to a treasury address (7.1 Architecture). No complex interactions or external calls are introduced beyond the inherited functionalities, contributing to a low technical risk profile.

GovernanceMedium4/10

The economic model of PowerToken is straightforward, with a fixed total supply minted entirely to a single `treasury` address upon deployment (7.4 Economic). This design choice ensures predictable supply but centralizes control of all initial tokens. While the contract owner uses a multisig (7.5 Governance), the `treasury` address's control mechanism is not specified in the code, posing a potential single point of failure for the entire token supply (7.3 Access Control). The contract owner has no direct control over token supply or administrative functions beyond transferring contract ownership, limiting governance capabilities over the token's core behavior.

UpgradesMedium6/10

The PowerToken contract is not designed with upgradeability in mind (7.7 Upgrades). It does not implement any proxy patterns (e.g., UUPS, Transparent) or other mechanisms for future code modifications. This means the contract's logic is immutable once deployed, eliminating upgrade-related risks such as proxy misconfigurations or logic errors during upgrades. However, it also means that any discovered vulnerabilities or desired feature changes would necessitate a new contract deployment and token migration.

Security Checklist

Contract VerifiedPass
Ownership RenouncedFail
No Mint FunctionPass
Liquidity LockedFail
Not a ProxyPass
HoneypotNoneBuy Tax0.0%Sell Tax0.0%

Holder Composition

0.0% in wallets100.0% in contracts
Effective Concentration40.0%

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Liquidity Depth

The risk score reads depth across every pair. The volume figure and the volume-to-liquidity ratio elsewhere on this page describe only the pair this audit analysed, so the two are not directly comparable.

Key Addresses

Deployer
0xf017…b336

What Raised This Score

  • Ownership NOT renounced — strong Multisig (3-of-5)
  • Top-10 concentration > 30% (100.0% total → 40.0% effective; 0.0% in EOAs, 100.0% in contracts — moderate)
  • Liquidity NOT locked (owner can withdraw — rug-pull risk)
  • 1 Medium finding(s) from audit

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

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