The WrappedOCT contract is an ERC20 token with bridging and pausing capabilities, built upon battle-tested OpenZeppelin libraries. The audit identified a Medium risk related to centralized control over critical functions, where a single compromised address could impact token supply and operations. Minor issues include non-standard decimal precision and immutable supply cap. The contract's architecture is straightforward and does not employ upgradeability patterns.

On-chain security analysis — is it a scam or legit?
Is Octra Safe?
Not verified
This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →The WrappedOCT contract is an ERC20 token with bridging and pausing capabilities, built upon battle-tested OpenZeppelin libraries.
Read the full analysis- Ownership status UNKNOWN
- Top-10 concentration > 30%
- Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
- LP top1 unlocked holder = 100.0%
- LP top3 unlocked holders = 100.0%
- 1 Medium finding(s) from audit
- 1 Low finding(s) from audit
Exact factors
- Ownership status UNKNOWN (owner could not be resolved)
- Top-10 concentration > 30% (47.0% total → 37.8% effective; 31.7% in EOAs, 15.4% in contracts — moderate)
- Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
- LP top1 unlocked holder = 100.0% (independent LP — depth risk)
- LP top3 unlocked holders = 100.0% (independent LP — depth risk)
- 1 Medium finding(s) from audit
- 1 Low finding(s) from audit
Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed
Security Checklist
as of audit · Sep 4Holders
as of audit · Sep 4, 2026- Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking15.4%
- Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell31.7%
- Everyone elsethe rest of the supply53.0%
How holder types affect the score
Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.
Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Sep 4, 2026
Liquidity
as of audit · Sep 4The risk score reads depth across every pair.
The LP tokens of the analysed pool are not locked or burned, so whoever holds them can withdraw that liquidity.
0xffab…fb3f0x0e85…e008No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.
Security Findings
MediumCentralized Control Over Token Supply and Operations
The WrappedOCT contract grants significant power to specific roles, particularly the DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, BRIDGE_ROLE, and PAUSER_ROLE. The DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE (initially the deployer) has the ability to grant and revoke any role, effectively controlling all administrative functions. The BRIDGE_ROLE can mint new tokens up to the MAX_SUPPLY and burn existing tokens, directly impacting the token's supply. The PAUSER_ROLE can unilaterally pause all token transfers. This high degree of centralization means that a compromise of any of these key addresses could lead to unauthorized minting, burning, or a complete halt of token operations, posing a significant risk to the protocol's…M-01
Issue
The WrappedOCT contract grants significant power to specific roles, particularly the DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, BRIDGE_ROLE, and PAUSER_ROLE. The DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE (initially the deployer) has the ability to grant and revoke any role, effectively controlling all administrative functions. The BRIDGE_ROLE can mint new tokens up to the MAX_SUPPLY and burn existing tokens, directly impacting the token's supply. The PAUSER_ROLE can unilaterally pause all token transfers. This high degree of centralization means that a compromise of any of these key addresses could lead to unauthorized minting, burning, or a complete halt of token operations, posing a significant risk to the protocol's…
Fix
Implement multi-signature wallets (e.g., Gnosis Safe) for the DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, BRIDGE_ROLE, and PAUSER_ROLE. This requires multiple independent approvals for critical actions, distributing control and significantly reducing the risk associated with a single point of failure. Consider adding time-locks for highly sensitive operations to allow for community review or emergency intervention.
Status
Unresolved
LowNon-Standard ERC20 Decimals
The WrappedOCT contract overrides the default ERC20 decimals() function to return 6, instead of the commonly used 18. While this is an explicit design choice and not a vulnerability in itself, it deviates from the widely adopted ERC20 standard. This non-standard decimal precision can lead to compatibility issues, incorrect display of token balances, or miscalculations when integrating with exchanges, wallets, or DeFi protocols that implicitly assume 18 decimals without proper handling.L-01
Issue
The WrappedOCT contract overrides the default ERC20 decimals() function to return 6, instead of the commonly used 18. While this is an explicit design choice and not a vulnerability in itself, it deviates from the widely adopted ERC20 standard. This non-standard decimal precision can lead to compatibility issues, incorrect display of token balances, or miscalculations when integrating with exchanges, wallets, or DeFi protocols that implicitly assume 18 decimals without proper handling.
Fix
Ensure all off-chain systems, front-end applications, and integrated smart contracts are explicitly aware of and correctly handle the 6-decimal precision of the WrappedOCT token. Thoroughly test all integrations to confirm that token values are displayed and processed accurately to prevent user confusion or financial discrepancies.
Status
Unresolved
InfoImmutable MAX_SUPPLY Constant
The MAX_SUPPLY for the WrappedOCT token is defined as a public constant with a value of 1_000_000_000 * 1e6. This means the maximum total supply of the token is hardcoded into the contract and cannot be altered after deployment. While providing predictability and transparency regarding the token's supply cap, this design choice removes any flexibility to adjust the maximum supply in the future, even if unforeseen circumstances or protocol evolution might warrant such a change.I-01
Issue
The MAX_SUPPLY for the WrappedOCT token is defined as a public constant with a value of 1_000_000_000 * 1e6. This means the maximum total supply of the token is hardcoded into the contract and cannot be altered after deployment. While providing predictability and transparency regarding the token's supply cap, this design choice removes any flexibility to adjust the maximum supply in the future, even if unforeseen circumstances or protocol evolution might warrant such a change.
Fix
Acknowledge that the MAX_SUPPLY is immutable. If future flexibility for supply cap adjustments is ever considered necessary, a different design pattern involving a state variable managed by a governance or admin role would be required. However, such a change would introduce its own set of governance and security considerations.
Status
Unresolved
Analysis
AI Copilotas of audit · Sep 4The contract leverages well-audited OpenZeppelin libraries for ERC20, AccessControl, and Pausable functionalities (7.2 Code Security). It implements clear checks for zero addresses and amounts in bridgeMint and bridgeBurn, and enforces a MAX_SUPPLY limit to prevent unbounded minting (7.1 Architecture). A non-standard decimals value of 6 is explicitly set, which is a design choice but requires careful integration (7.6 External).
The contract exhibits centralized control over key functions (7.3 Access Control, 7.5 Governance). The DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE (deployer) can manage all roles, including the BRIDGE_ROLE which controls token minting and burning, and the PAUSER_ROLE which can halt all transfers. While a MAX_SUPPLY is enforced, the power of the BRIDGE_ROLE to mint up to this limit and burn tokens represents a significant single point of failure (7.4 Economic, 7.8 Operations).
The WrappedOCT contract is not designed with an upgradeability pattern (7.7 Upgrades). It is a standard, immutable contract deployment. This eliminates risks associated with upgrade proxies, such as storage collisions or faulty upgrade logic, but also means the contract's logic cannot be modified post-deployment.
To mitigate the identified risks, it is strongly recommended to implement multi-signature wallets for all critical roles, including DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, BRIDGE_ROLE, and PAUSER_ROLE.
This distributes control and significantly reduces the impact of a single private key compromise. Additionally, ensure all external systems interacting with WrappedOCT are fully aware of and correctly handle its 6-decimal precision to prevent integration issues.
Contract & Record
Free for any token on the record. It links to this page and always shows the current score and the date it was checked.
- Sep 4, 202638Medium
- Jul 23, 202633Low
Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is Octra a scam?
Based on the provided data, Octra exhibits characteristics that mitigate common scam risks. Its contract is verified, ownership is renounced, and no mint function exists, preventing arbitrary token creation or owner control. While these factors significantly reduce the likelihood of specific developer-led rug pulls, they do not eliminate all potential market risks. Investors should consider all aspects.
Is Octra safe to buy?
While Octra has a low risk score of 18/100 and positive attributes like a verified, renounced contract without a mint function, two key factors warrant caution. The liquidity is not locked, posing a risk to market stability if withdrawn. Furthermore, the top 10 holders control 46.3% of the supply, indicating potential for significant market impact.
Has Octra been audited?
The data states Octra's contract is "verified," meaning its code is publicly available and matches the deployed version on the blockchain. This enhances transparency. However, contract verification is distinct from a full, independent security audit conducted by specialized firms, which involves a deeper, more comprehensive vulnerability assessment.
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