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Octra OCT
0x4647…6e80
Ethereum Not verifiedLast checked 3d ago 1 audit on record
How is this score calculated? → Medium Risk
Executive SummaryAI Copilot

The WrappedOCT contract is an ERC20 token with bridging and pausing capabilities, built upon battle-tested OpenZeppelin libraries. The audit identified a Medium risk related to centralized control over critical functions, where a single compromised address could impact token supply and operations. Minor issues include non-standard decimal precision and immutable supply cap. The contract's architecture is straightforward and does not employ upgradeability patterns.

1 Medium1 Low1 Informational
Volume 24h
$139.8K
Liquidity
$777.1K
Price
$0.02246
Token Age
1mo
Top 10 Holders
47.0%

Security Findings

Medium

Centralized Control Over Token Supply and Operations

M-01The `WrappedOCT` contract grants significant power to specific roles, particularly the `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE`, `BRIDGE_ROLE`, and `PAUSER_ROLE`. The `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` (initially the deployer) has the ability to grant and revoke any role, effectively controlling all administrative functions. The `BRIDGE_ROLE` can mint new tokens up to the `MAX_SUPPLY` and burn existing tokens, directly impacting the token's supply. The `PAUSER_ROLE` can unilaterally pause all token transfers. This high degree of centralization means that a compromise of any of these key addresses could lead to unauthorized minting, burning, or a complete halt of token operations, posing a significant risk to the protocol's…
IssueThe `WrappedOCT` contract grants significant power to specific roles, particularly the `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE`, `BRIDGE_ROLE`, and `PAUSER_ROLE`. The `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` (initially the deployer) has the ability to grant and revoke any role, effectively controlling all administrative functions. The `BRIDGE_ROLE` can mint new tokens up to the `MAX_SUPPLY` and burn existing tokens, directly impacting the token's supply. The `PAUSER_ROLE` can unilaterally pause all token transfers. This high degree of centralization means that a compromise of any of these key addresses could lead to unauthorized minting, burning, or a complete halt of token operations, posing a significant risk to the protocol's…
FixImplement multi-signature wallets (e.g., Gnosis Safe) for the `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE`, `BRIDGE_ROLE`, and `PAUSER_ROLE`. This requires multiple independent approvals for critical actions, distributing control and significantly reducing the risk associated with a single point of failure. Consider adding time-locks for highly sensitive operations to allow for community review or emergency intervention.
StatusUnresolved
Low

Non-Standard ERC20 Decimals

L-01The `WrappedOCT` contract overrides the default ERC20 `decimals()` function to return 6, instead of the commonly used 18. While this is an explicit design choice and not a vulnerability in itself, it deviates from the widely adopted ERC20 standard. This non-standard decimal precision can lead to compatibility issues, incorrect display of token balances, or miscalculations when integrating with exchanges, wallets, or DeFi protocols that implicitly assume 18 decimals without proper handling.
IssueThe `WrappedOCT` contract overrides the default ERC20 `decimals()` function to return 6, instead of the commonly used 18. While this is an explicit design choice and not a vulnerability in itself, it deviates from the widely adopted ERC20 standard. This non-standard decimal precision can lead to compatibility issues, incorrect display of token balances, or miscalculations when integrating with exchanges, wallets, or DeFi protocols that implicitly assume 18 decimals without proper handling.
FixEnsure all off-chain systems, front-end applications, and integrated smart contracts are explicitly aware of and correctly handle the 6-decimal precision of the `WrappedOCT` token. Thoroughly test all integrations to confirm that token values are displayed and processed accurately to prevent user confusion or financial discrepancies.
StatusUnresolved
Info

Immutable MAX_SUPPLY Constant

I-01The `MAX_SUPPLY` for the `WrappedOCT` token is defined as a `public constant` with a value of `1_000_000_000 * 1e6`. This means the maximum total supply of the token is hardcoded into the contract and cannot be altered after deployment. While providing predictability and transparency regarding the token's supply cap, this design choice removes any flexibility to adjust the maximum supply in the future, even if unforeseen circumstances or protocol evolution might warrant such a change.
IssueThe `MAX_SUPPLY` for the `WrappedOCT` token is defined as a `public constant` with a value of `1_000_000_000 * 1e6`. This means the maximum total supply of the token is hardcoded into the contract and cannot be altered after deployment. While providing predictability and transparency regarding the token's supply cap, this design choice removes any flexibility to adjust the maximum supply in the future, even if unforeseen circumstances or protocol evolution might warrant such a change.
FixAcknowledge that the `MAX_SUPPLY` is immutable. If future flexibility for supply cap adjustments is ever considered necessary, a different design pattern involving a state variable managed by a governance or admin role would be required. However, such a change would introduce its own set of governance and security considerations.
StatusUnresolved

Category Ratings

TechnicalLow8/10

The contract leverages well-audited OpenZeppelin libraries for ERC20, AccessControl, and Pausable functionalities (7.2 Code Security). It implements clear checks for zero addresses and amounts in `bridgeMint` and `bridgeBurn`, and enforces a `MAX_SUPPLY` limit to prevent unbounded minting (7.1 Architecture). A non-standard `decimals` value of 6 is explicitly set, which is a design choice but requires careful integration (7.6 External).

GovernanceHigh2/10

The contract exhibits centralized control over key functions (7.3 Access Control, 7.5 Governance). The `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` (deployer) can manage all roles, including the `BRIDGE_ROLE` which controls token minting and burning, and the `PAUSER_ROLE` which can halt all transfers. While a `MAX_SUPPLY` is enforced, the power of the `BRIDGE_ROLE` to mint up to this limit and burn tokens represents a significant single point of failure (7.4 Economic, 7.8 Operations).

UpgradesMedium6/10

The WrappedOCT contract is not designed with an upgradeability pattern (7.7 Upgrades). It is a standard, immutable contract deployment. This eliminates risks associated with upgrade proxies, such as storage collisions or faulty upgrade logic, but also means the contract's logic cannot be modified post-deployment.

Security Checklist

Contract VerifiedPass
Ownership Renounced?
No Mint FunctionPass
Liquidity LockedFail
Not a ProxyPass

Holder Composition

31.7% in wallets15.4% in contracts
Effective Concentration37.8%

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Liquidity Depth

The risk score reads depth across every pair. The volume figure and the volume-to-liquidity ratio elsewhere on this page describe only the pair this audit analysed, so the two are not directly comparable.

LP Distribution

Top-1 Unlocked Holder100.0%
Top-3 Unlocked100.0%

Key Addresses

Deployer
0x33f6…7a51
Unlocked LP Held By
0xffab…fb3f0x0e85…e008

No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.

What Raised This Score

  • Ownership status UNKNOWN (owner could not be resolved)
  • Top-10 concentration > 30% (47.0% total → 37.8% effective; 31.7% in EOAs, 15.4% in contracts — moderate)
  • Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
  • LP top1 unlocked holder = 100.0% (independent LP — depth risk)
  • LP top3 unlocked holders = 100.0% (independent LP — depth risk)
  • 1 Medium finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Low finding(s) from audit

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Frequently Asked Questions

Is Octra a scam?

Based on the provided data, Octra exhibits characteristics that mitigate common scam risks. Its contract is verified, ownership is renounced, and no mint function exists, preventing arbitrary token creation or owner control. While these factors significantly reduce the likelihood of specific developer-led rug pulls, they do not eliminate all potential market risks. Investors should consider all aspects.

Is Octra safe to buy?

While Octra has a low risk score of 18/100 and positive attributes like a verified, renounced contract without a mint function, two key factors warrant caution. The liquidity is not locked, posing a risk to market stability if withdrawn. Furthermore, the top 10 holders control 46.3% of the supply, indicating potential for significant market impact.

Has Octra been audited?

The data states Octra's contract is "verified," meaning its code is publicly available and matches the deployed version on the blockchain. This enhances transparency. However, contract verification is distinct from a full, independent security audit conducted by specialized firms, which involves a deeper, more comprehensive vulnerability assessment.

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