Honeypot, rug-pull and ownership checks

Is pepeCoin a Scam?

PEPECOIN

Ethereum

Not verified

This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →

Last checked Sep 4, 2026 · 1 audit on record

Chart

0/ 100

Low RiskHow is this score calculated?

How the score breaks downratings: 10 is safest

Technical9/10 Governance9/10 Upgrades10/10 Checks passed7 of 7 Findings1 High · 1 Medium · 1 Low · 2 Info5

SummaryAI Copilot

The pepeCoin contract is an ERC20 token built upon battle-tested OpenZeppelin libraries.

Read the full analysis

What raised the score

Top-10 concentration > 30%
1 High finding(s) from audit
1 Medium finding(s) from audit
1 Low finding(s) from audit

Exact factors

Top-10 concentration > 30% (38.7% total → 31.7% effective; 27.1% in EOAs, 11.7% in contracts — moderate)
1 High finding(s) from audit
1 Medium finding(s) from audit
1 Low finding(s) from audit

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Our automated scanner reviewed pepeCoin (PEPECOIN) on Ethereum. 7 of 7 security checks passed — see the full breakdown below.

Security Checklist

as of audit · Sep 47 of 7 checks passed

Contract verifiedVerified

OwnershipRenounced

MintNo mint

Liquidity lockLocked

UpgradeabilityFixed code

HoneypotNone found

Buy / sell tax0% / 0%

Holders

as of audit · Sep 4, 2026

ContractsWalletsEveryone elseBubble area = share of supply

38.7%of supply sits with the top 10 holders

Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking11.7%
Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell27.1%
Everyone elsethe rest of the supply61.3%

Effective concentrationwhat the score reads31.7%

How holder types affect the score

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Sep 4, 2026

Liquidity

as of audit · Sep 4$1.92M across 4 pairs

The risk score reads depth across every pair.

LP tokensLocked

The LP tokens of the analysed pool are locked or burned.

Analysed pool$1.92MShare of depth99.7%

LP Locked99.2% · Null Address, UNCX

Top-1 Unlocked Holder0.6%

Lock Expiry2092 (verified ≥ 1 year) · UNCX V2

Unlocked LP held by

0x0ee7…051e0x16a7…67cc0xf558…2cf40xb3ac…68a00x0000…8a900x1f2f…f387

No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.

Security Findings

1 High1 Medium1 Low2 Info

High

Locked Ether Due to Renounced Ownership

The withdraw() function, which allows the contract owner to retrieve Ether, is protected by the onlyOwner modifier. According to the provided prefill data, the contract ownership has been renounced (ownership_renounced: true). This means the _owner address is set to address(0), making the onlyOwner modifier always revert. Consequently, any Ether accidentally or intentionally sent to the contract will be permanently locked and inaccessible.H-01

Issue

Fix

Ensure that no Ether is sent to this contract. If the contract was intended to hold or manage Ether, a redeployment with a revised withdrawal mechanism (e.g., a multi-signature wallet or a mechanism that allows anyone to trigger a withdrawal to a predefined address) would be necessary before renouncing ownership.

Status

Unresolved

Medium

Centralized Token Distribution

The entire _totalSupply of pepeCoin is minted to the contract deployer (msg.sender) in the constructor. This results in a highly centralized initial token distribution, where one address holds 100% of the token supply. Such centralization can lead to significant market manipulation risks, as the single holder has disproportionate control over the token's liquidity and price.M-01

Issue

Fix

For future projects, consider implementing a more decentralized initial token distribution strategy, such as a fair launch, liquidity bootstrapping pool, or a vesting schedule for team tokens, to promote broader ownership and reduce centralization risks.

Status

Unresolved

Low

Unused `_tokenPrice` Variable

The contract includes a state variable _tokenPrice along with setTokenPrice() and getTokenPrice() functions. However, this _tokenPrice variable is not integrated into any core token logic, such as calculating transfer fees, enabling token purchases, or influencing any other economic mechanism within the contract. It serves no functional purpose, and its value is immutable due to renounced ownership.L-01

Issue

Fix

Remove the _tokenPrice variable and its associated functions (setTokenPrice, getTokenPrice) if they are not intended to be used for any on-chain logic. This will reduce contract complexity, save gas, and prevent potential confusion for users or external systems that might misinterpret its purpose.

Status

Unresolved

Info

Missing Event for State Change

The setTokenPrice() function modifies the _tokenPrice state variable but does not emit an event to signal this change. While this function is currently unusable due to renounced ownership, if it were callable, the absence of an event would make it difficult for off-chain applications, block explorers, or monitoring tools to track changes to this parameter.I-01

Issue

Fix

For any function that modifies critical state variables, it is a best practice to emit an event. If setTokenPrice were to be functional, consider adding an event like TokenPriceUpdated(uint256 oldPrice, uint256 newPrice) to improve transparency and off-chain observability.

Status

Unresolved

Info

Lack of Emergency Pause Mechanism

The contract lacks a mechanism to pause critical operations, such as token transfers or burning, in case of an emergency (e.g., discovery of a critical vulnerability, major exploit, or market instability). While not strictly a vulnerability, a pause mechanism is a common security best practice for tokens to provide a temporary emergency stop.I-02

Issue

Fix

Consider implementing a pause mechanism (e.g., using OpenZeppelin's Pausable contract) that can be triggered by a trusted entity (e.g., a multi-signature wallet or a governance contract). This would allow for a temporary halt of operations to address unforeseen issues, although this would require a redeployment given the current contract's non-upgradeable nature and renounced ownership.

Status

Unresolved

Analysis

AI Copilotas of audit · Sep 4

Executive SummaryWhat the contract is and what the review found

The pepeCoin contract is an ERC20 token built upon battle-tested OpenZeppelin libraries. A key observation from the provided prefill data is that ownership of the contract has been renounced. This significantly impacts the functionality of owner-restricted functions, leading to a high-severity issue where any Ether sent to the contract will be permanently locked. Additionally, the initial token distribution is highly centralized, with the entire supply minted to the deployer. The contract also includes an unused _tokenPrice variable that can be misleading.

Technical9/10Low risk

The contract leverages battle-tested OpenZeppelin contracts for ERC20 and Ownable functionalities, ensuring standard compliance and robust implementation of core token operations (7.2 Code Security). Arithmetic operations are handled safely using unchecked blocks where appropriate, preventing overflow/underflow. However, a significant technical issue arises from the renounced ownership: the withdraw() function, being onlyOwner, becomes unusable, leading to any Ether sent to the contract being permanently locked (7.3 Access Control, 7.8 Operations). The _tokenPrice variable is also present but unused in any core logic.

Governance9/10Low risk

The token features a fixed total supply and a burn mechanism, providing some predictability and deflationary potential. However, the primary economic risk stems from the highly centralized initial token distribution, with 100% of the supply minted to the deployer, creating potential for market manipulation (7.4 Economic). The _tokenPrice variable is misleading as it has no functional impact on the token's economics within the contract, and its value is immutable due to renounced ownership (7.5 Governance).

Upgrades10/10Low risk

The contract is not designed with an upgrade mechanism (e.g., proxy pattern), which inherently eliminates risks associated with upgradeability, such as proxy misconfigurations or malicious upgrade paths (7.7 Upgrades). The trade-off is that any discovered critical bugs or desired feature enhancements cannot be implemented without a complete redeployment and migration, which can be costly and disruptive.

Final RecommendationWhat to do about this score

Given the renounced ownership, it is critical to ensure no Ether is sent to the contract, as it will be permanently locked.

For future projects, consider a more decentralized initial token distribution strategy to mitigate centralization risks. Evaluate the necessity of the _tokenPrice variable; if it serves no purpose, remove it to avoid confusion. Implement events for all critical state changes to enhance off-chain monitoring and transparency.

Contract & Record

1 audit on record

TypeToken

NetworkEthereum

Token age3y

Contract0xa9e8…489a

Deployer0xcfbe…264f

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Audit History

Aug 30, 20260Low

Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is the PEPECOIN contract address?

The pepeCoin contract on Ethereum is 0xa9e8acf069c58aec8825542845fd754e41a9489a. Compare it with the address the project itself publishes before trading: other contracts can carry the same name and ticker.