Is America Pac (PAC) Safe? Smart Contract Security Analysis

Security Findings

3 Low3 Info

Low

Lack of Emergency Stop or Pause Mechanism

L-01The provided contract snippet does not include an emergency stop or pause mechanism. In complex DeFi protocols or token contracts, such a mechanism can be crucial to mitigate unforeseen vulnerabilities, external attacks, or critical errors by temporarily halting sensitive operations. Without it, the contract remains fully operational even during a crisis. (7.8 Operations)

IssueThe provided contract snippet does not include an emergency stop or pause mechanism. In complex DeFi protocols or token contracts, such a mechanism can be crucial to mitigate unforeseen vulnerabilities, external attacks, or critical errors by temporarily halting sensitive operations. Without it, the contract remains fully operational even during a crisis. (7.8 Operations)

FixConsider implementing a pause functionality, potentially controlled by a multi-signature wallet or a time-locked governance, to allow for emergency responses. This should be balanced with decentralization goals and clearly communicated to users.

StatusUnresolved

Low

No Reentrancy Guard for External Calls

L-02While no direct reentrancy vector is visible in the provided code snippet, any contract that interacts with external contracts (e.g., `IERC20` `transfer`/`transferFrom`, `IUniswapV2Router02` swaps) and handles ETH or token transfers in a complex way should implement reentrancy guards. The absence of such guards is a general best practice deviation that could lead to vulnerabilities if the full contract logic involves state changes after external calls. (7.2 Code Security)

IssueWhile no direct reentrancy vector is visible in the provided code snippet, any contract that interacts with external contracts (e.g., `IERC20` `transfer`/`transferFrom`, `IUniswapV2Router02` swaps) and handles ETH or token transfers in a complex way should implement reentrancy guards. The absence of such guards is a general best practice deviation that could lead to vulnerabilities if the full contract logic involves state changes after external calls. (7.2 Code Security)

FixApply the 'Checks-Effects-Interactions' pattern and use reentrancy guards (e.g., OpenZeppelin's `ReentrancyGuard` or a custom mutex) for any functions that make external calls to untrusted contracts, especially when state changes occur after the call.

StatusUnresolved

Low

Irreversible Ownership Renunciation

L-03The contract utilizes the `Ownable` pattern, and according to deployment data, ownership has been renounced. While this decentralizes control and removes the risk of a malicious owner, it also means that no single entity can perform administrative actions, such as pausing the contract in an emergency, upgrading it, or fixing potential bugs. This introduces a risk of immutability if a critical vulnerability is discovered post-deployment. (7.5 Governance, 7.8 Operations)

IssueThe contract utilizes the `Ownable` pattern, and according to deployment data, ownership has been renounced. While this decentralizes control and removes the risk of a malicious owner, it also means that no single entity can perform administrative actions, such as pausing the contract in an emergency, upgrading it, or fixing potential bugs. This introduces a risk of immutability if a critical vulnerability is discovered post-deployment. (7.5 Governance, 7.8 Operations)

FixAcknowledge the implications of renounced ownership. For future projects, consider implementing a multi-signature wallet for critical administrative functions or a time-locked governance mechanism if some level of post-deployment flexibility is desired, balancing decentralization with operational safety.

StatusUnresolved

Info

Redundant SafeMath Usage in Solidity 0.8.x

I-01The contract includes the `SafeMath` library. In Solidity versions 0.8.0 and higher, arithmetic operations automatically revert on overflow/underflow by default. Therefore, explicit `SafeMath` usage for basic `add`, `sub`, `mul`, `div` functions is largely redundant and can slightly increase gas costs. The `try*` functions also offer limited additional benefit unless specific error handling is required beyond simple reversion. (7.2 Code Security)

IssueThe contract includes the `SafeMath` library. In Solidity versions 0.8.0 and higher, arithmetic operations automatically revert on overflow/underflow by default. Therefore, explicit `SafeMath` usage for basic `add`, `sub`, `mul`, `div` functions is largely redundant and can slightly increase gas costs. The `try*` functions also offer limited additional benefit unless specific error handling is required beyond simple reversion. (7.2 Code Security)

FixFor Solidity 0.8.x and above, consider removing redundant `SafeMath` calls for basic arithmetic operations to optimize gas usage and simplify code, relying on the compiler's default overflow/underflow checks. Keep `SafeMath` only for custom operations like `per` or if `unchecked` blocks are intentionally used for specific performance optimizations.

StatusUnresolved

Info

`per` function in SafeMath Requires Careful Usage

I-02The `SafeMath` library includes a custom `per` function defined as `a * b / 100`, with a `require(b <= 100)`. This function assumes `b` represents a percentage value between 0 and 100. If `b` is intended to be a basis point (e.g., 1/10000) or another scaling factor, its misuse could lead to incorrect calculations. (7.2 Code Security)

IssueThe `SafeMath` library includes a custom `per` function defined as `a * b / 100`, with a `require(b <= 100)`. This function assumes `b` represents a percentage value between 0 and 100. If `b` is intended to be a basis point (e.g., 1/10000) or another scaling factor, its misuse could lead to incorrect calculations. (7.2 Code Security)

FixEnsure that all usages of the `per` function consistently interpret `b` as a percentage between 0 and 100. If other scaling factors are needed, consider creating separate, clearly named functions (e.g., `basisPoints`, `permille`) to avoid ambiguity and potential calculation errors.

StatusUnresolved

Info

Incomplete Contract Code Provided

I-03The provided Solidity source code for the main 'PAC' contract is truncated, with only interfaces, libraries, and base contracts (`Context`, `Ownable`) being fully visible. The core logic and functionality of the 'PAC' token contract itself are missing. This significantly limits the scope and depth of the security audit. (7.1 Architecture)

IssueThe provided Solidity source code for the main 'PAC' contract is truncated, with only interfaces, libraries, and base contracts (`Context`, `Ownable`) being fully visible. The core logic and functionality of the 'PAC' token contract itself are missing. This significantly limits the scope and depth of the security audit. (7.1 Architecture)

FixProvide the complete and untruncated source code for all contracts intended for audit to enable a comprehensive security review. A full audit cannot be performed without access to the entire codebase.

StatusUnresolved

Category Ratings

TechnicalLow10/10

The contract utilizes standard OpenZeppelin `Ownable` and `Context` patterns, along with well-known Uniswap V2 interfaces (`IUniswapV2Factory`, `IUniswapV2Pair`, `IUniswapV2Router02`). The inclusion of `SafeMath` is largely redundant for basic arithmetic in Solidity 0.8.20+, which inherently checks for overflows/underflows (7.2 Code Security). Key security practices like reentrancy guards are not explicitly visible, which is a general concern for contracts interacting with external systems (7.2 Code Security). The `per` function in `SafeMath` provides a custom percentage calculation, which requires careful usage to avoid misinterpretation (7.2 Code Security).

GovernanceLow9/10

The contract employs the `Ownable` access control pattern (7.3 Access Control). According to deployment data, ownership has been renounced, which decentralizes control and removes the risk of a single point of failure or malicious owner actions (7.5 Governance). However, this also means that no single entity can perform administrative actions, such as pausing the contract in an emergency or upgrading it, which introduces a risk of immutability if a critical bug is discovered (7.8 Operations). There are no visible complex economic mechanisms or governance structures beyond basic ownership.

UpgradesLow10/10

The contract is not designed with an upgradeability pattern (e.g., proxy contracts) (7.7 Upgrades). This means the contract's logic is immutable once deployed. While this simplifies the architecture by removing upgrade-related risks, it also prevents any future bug fixes, feature enhancements, or parameter adjustments without a complete redeployment and migration of assets.

Security Checklist

5/5 checks passed

Contract VerifiedPass

Ownership RenouncedPass

No Mint FunctionPass

Liquidity LockedPass

Not a ProxyPass

Holder Composition

49.6% in top 10

17.6% in wallets32.1% in contracts

Effective Concentration30.4%

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Liquidity Depth

$90.9K

The risk score reads depth across every pair. The volume figure and the volume-to-liquidity ratio elsewhere on this page describe only the pair this audit analysed, so the two are not directly comparable.

LP Distribution

LP Burned100.0% · ≈ permanent lock

LP Locked100.0% · Null Address

Key Addresses

1 addresses

Deployer

0x8efa…b37c

What Raised This Score

2 factors

Top-10 concentration > 30% (49.6% total → 30.4% effective; 17.6% in EOAs, 32.1% in contracts — moderate)
3 Low finding(s) from audit

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Is America Pac Safe?

Security Findings

Lack of Emergency Stop or Pause Mechanism

No Reentrancy Guard for External Calls

Irreversible Ownership Renunciation

Redundant SafeMath Usage in Solidity 0.8.x

`per` function in SafeMath Requires Careful Usage

Incomplete Contract Code Provided

Category Ratings

Security Checklist

Holder Composition

Liquidity Depth

LP Distribution

Key Addresses

What Raised This Score

Related Audits

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