On-chain security analysis — is it a scam or legit?
BNB ChainThe OrderOFT contract implements a cross-chain token bridge using the LayerZero OFT standard.
Read the full analysisEach factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed
Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.
Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Oct 25, 2026
The risk score reads depth across every pair.
The LP tokens of the analysed pool are not locked or burned, so whoever holds them can withdraw that liquidity.
0x46d4…b0f60x9e90…a1710xd2b6…e5750x3361…e9680xd876…92c60x9803…aad90xb116…c2d20x9c87…19da0x69b9…e7340x6844…fa6cNo privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.
The contract lets its controller — a 2-of-3 multisig — pause all transfers. Nothing independent vouches for whoever holds them, so each is a live risk to holders.
Check who holds these powers and whether a timelock or multisig stands between them and holders.
Acknowledged
0.0% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 97.8% is held, unlocked, by 10 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. No single one holds a majority: their exits thin the market rather than hand anyone the pool. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them.
Check the lock's end date and beneficiary on the locker's own page before relying on it.
Acknowledged
The _removeDust function performs division before multiplication, which can lead to minor precision loss when calculating token amounts.
Reorder operations to perform multiplication before division to maintain maximum precision.
Unresolved
The ten largest holders own 93.5% of supply. Of that, 39.5% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 16.7% in wallets, 37.2% in other contracts. 3,289 holders in total.
Watch the largest wallets that are not exchanges, pools or locks — those are the ones that can move the price.
Acknowledged
Listed on CoinGecko as Orderly (ORDER), market cap $24M, rank #756. 3,289 holders.
Match the contract address against the project's official channels before trading.
Acknowledged
Liquidity $378K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $314.6M (CoinGecko, all markets, daily snapshot). 24h trading volume $3.3M (DexScreener, all pools).
Size any position to the liquidity and daily volume shown — they set how much you can sell and at what price.
Acknowledged
A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: fixed — the contract has no mint function. Control: a 2-of-3 multisig. Code: upgradeable proxy. Fees: no buy or sell tax. Market: $378K of DEX liquidity across 3 pools. Launch: 570 days of market history.
Check the project's own documentation for what the token is used for; this report covers what the contract allows.
Acknowledged
The OrderOFT contract implements a cross-chain token bridge using the LayerZero OFT standard. The architecture relies on a UUPS proxy pattern and is managed by a 2-of-3 multisig. The code follows standard library implementations with minimal custom logic, resulting in a robust security posture. One minor rounding issue was identified in the dust removal logic.
The architecture utilizes established LayerZero OFT patterns for cross-chain messaging. 7.1 Architecture is modular, separating core logic from proxy storage. 7.2 Code Security is high, leveraging audited OpenZeppelin and LayerZero contracts. 7.3 Access Control is strictly enforced via OwnableUpgradeable, ensuring only authorized multisig signers can modify bridge parameters.
7.4 Economic and 7.5 Governance risks are mitigated by the use of a 2-of-3 multisig wallet. The bridge parameters, such as peers and enforced options, are controlled by this multisig. 7.6 External dependencies are limited to the LayerZero endpoint, which is a trusted industry standard.
7.7 Upgrades are handled via the UUPS pattern, which is the current industry standard for gas-efficient and secure proxy upgrades. 7.8 Operations are supported by pause/unpause functionality, allowing the multisig to halt transfers in the event of a detected vulnerability. The implementation is correctly initialized and protected against unauthorized re-initialization.
The protocol demonstrates a high level of security maturity.
We recommend maintaining the current multisig configuration and ensuring that any future upgrades undergo rigorous testing in a staging environment before deployment to mainnet. For the identified rounding issue, ensure that the dust removal logic is consistent across all chains to prevent minor discrepancies in token balances during cross-chain transfers.
Free for any token on the record. It links to this page and always shows the current score and the date it was checked.
Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.
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