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Is Mirex a Scam?

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Mirex MRX
0xa605…d89e
BNB Chain Not verifiedLast checked 3d ago 1 audit on record New Launch · 20h old
DexScreener ↗
How is this score calculated? → Critical Risk
Executive SummaryAI Copilot

The MRXToken contract implements an ERC-20 token with custom tokenomics features including transaction fees, maximum transaction/holding limits, cooldowns, and a swap-back mechanism for collected fees. The contract utilizes OpenZeppelin's AccessControl for role-based permissions and SafeMath for arithmetic safety. While core ERC-20 functionality appears sound, the audit identified a high degree of centralization in the admin role, inconsistencies in the fee swap mechanism, and a lack of slippage protection, leading to a Medium overall risk level.

1 High3 Medium1 Low1 Informational
! Early-stage analysis. This token has limited on-chain history (20h old). New tokens carry elevated risk — data may change rapidly. Always verify independently before investing.
Volume 24h
$9.1K
Liquidity
$104.8K
Price
$1.4500
Token Age
20h
Top 10 Holders
11.2%

Security Findings

1 High3 Med1 Low1 Info
High

High Centralization of Control in Admin Role

H-01The `admin` role, controlled by a single address, possesses extensive authority over critical contract parameters and functionalities. This includes the ability to set buy/sell fees, max transaction/holding limits, cooldown timers, enable/disable trading, enable/disable the swap-back mechanism, and exempt any address from these rules. This high degree of centralization introduces a single point of failure and potential for malicious action or compromise.
IssueThe `admin` role, controlled by a single address, possesses extensive authority over critical contract parameters and functionalities. This includes the ability to set buy/sell fees, max transaction/holding limits, cooldown timers, enable/disable trading, enable/disable the swap-back mechanism, and exempt any address from these rules. This high degree of centralization introduces a single point of failure and potential for malicious action or compromise.
FixImplement a multi-signature wallet for the `admin` role to distribute control and reduce the risk of a single point of compromise or malicious action. Consider a time-lock for critical parameter changes to allow for community review and reaction time.
StatusUnresolved
Medium

Inconsistent Use of USDT in Swap-Back Mechanism

M-01The constructor takes a `_usdt` address, which is used in the `calculateFee` function's `getAmountsOut` path for fee valuation. However, the actual swap-back mechanism in `_swapTokensForEth` uses `router.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens` with a path of `[address(this), router.WETH()]`, effectively swapping MRX for WETH, not USDT. This inconsistency could lead to discrepancies between the calculated fee value (based on USDT) and the actual value obtained from the swap (based on WETH), impacting project treasury if price ratios diverge.
IssueThe constructor takes a `_usdt` address, which is used in the `calculateFee` function's `getAmountsOut` path for fee valuation. However, the actual swap-back mechanism in `_swapTokensForEth` uses `router.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens` with a path of `[address(this), router.WETH()]`, effectively swapping MRX for WETH, not USDT. This inconsistency could lead to discrepancies between the calculated fee value (based on USDT) and the actual value obtained from the swap (based on WETH), impacting project treasury if price ratios diverge.
FixClarify the intended stablecoin for fee conversion. If USDT is intended, modify `_swapTokensForEth` to swap for USDT. If WETH is intended, ensure `calculateFee` accurately reflects WETH-based valuation or remove the `_usdt` parameter if it's not used for actual swaps.
StatusUnresolved
Medium

Lack of Slippage Protection in Swap-Back

M-02The `_swapTokensForEth` function calls `router.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens` without specifying an `amountOutMin` parameter. This means the swap operation has no slippage protection. In scenarios of low liquidity, high market volatility, or large swap amounts, the transaction could suffer from significant slippage, resulting in fewer ETH being received than expected for the collected fees, directly impacting the project's treasury.
IssueThe `_swapTokensForEth` function calls `router.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens` without specifying an `amountOutMin` parameter. This means the swap operation has no slippage protection. In scenarios of low liquidity, high market volatility, or large swap amounts, the transaction could suffer from significant slippage, resulting in fewer ETH being received than expected for the collected fees, directly impacting the project's treasury.
FixImplement slippage protection by calculating a reasonable `amountOutMin` based on current market conditions and a predefined acceptable slippage tolerance. This can be achieved by querying `getAmountsOut` with the desired path and applying a slippage factor.
StatusUnresolved
Medium

Potential for Abuse of Exclusion Lists

M-03The `admin` role has the ability to add or remove any address from `isFeeExempt`, `_isExcludedFromMaxTxn`, `_isExcludedMaxHolding`, and `isExcludedFromCooldown` lists. While intended for legitimate operational purposes, this power could be abused to grant unfair advantages to specific users or wallets, bypassing tokenomics rules and potentially leading to market manipulation or a perception of unfairness.
IssueThe `admin` role has the ability to add or remove any address from `isFeeExempt`, `_isExcludedFromMaxTxn`, `_isExcludedMaxHolding`, and `isExcludedFromCooldown` lists. While intended for legitimate operational purposes, this power could be abused to grant unfair advantages to specific users or wallets, bypassing tokenomics rules and potentially leading to market manipulation or a perception of unfairness.
FixClearly document the intended use cases for these exclusion lists. Consider implementing a governance mechanism or a multi-signature approval process for adding/removing addresses from these critical lists, especially for non-protocol-owned addresses.
StatusUnresolved
Low

Fixed `feeDenominator`

L-01The `feeDenominator` is hardcoded to `100_00` (10000), implying fees are calculated in basis points. While this is a common practice, the contract does not provide a mechanism to change this denominator. If future tokenomics require a different fee granularity (e.g., per mille), this would necessitate a new contract deployment.
IssueThe `feeDenominator` is hardcoded to `100_00` (10000), implying fees are calculated in basis points. While this is a common practice, the contract does not provide a mechanism to change this denominator. If future tokenomics require a different fee granularity (e.g., per mille), this would necessitate a new contract deployment.
FixIf flexibility in fee granularity is desired, consider making `feeDenominator` a configurable parameter by the admin, similar to other fee-related settings. Otherwise, ensure the current basis point system is sufficient for all foreseeable tokenomics.
StatusUnresolved
Info

Unused `usdt` parameter in `_swapTokensForEth` context

I-01The `usdt` address is passed in the constructor and used in `calculateFee` for `getAmountsOut` path. However, the `_swapTokensForEth` function, which performs the actual swap, hardcodes the path to `[address(this), router.WETH()]`, effectively ignoring the `usdt` address for the swap. This creates a discrepancy where the fee calculation might be based on a USDT path, but the actual swap is for WETH.
IssueThe `usdt` address is passed in the constructor and used in `calculateFee` for `getAmountsOut` path. However, the `_swapTokensForEth` function, which performs the actual swap, hardcodes the path to `[address(this), router.WETH()]`, effectively ignoring the `usdt` address for the swap. This creates a discrepancy where the fee calculation might be based on a USDT path, but the actual swap is for WETH.
FixReview the intended functionality. If the goal is to swap for USDT, the `_swapTokensForEth` function should use `usdt` in its path and call the appropriate router function. If the goal is to swap for WETH, the `usdt` parameter's role in `calculateFee` should be re-evaluated for consistency.
StatusUnresolved

Category Ratings

TechnicalMedium6/10

The contract demonstrates good practices such as using SafeMath for arithmetic operations and implementing a reentrancy guard for external swap calls (7.2 Code Security). However, the swap-back mechanism exhibits an inconsistency where fee calculation uses a USDT path, but the actual swap is for WETH, potentially leading to unexpected economic outcomes (7.2 Code Security, 7.4 Economic). Additionally, the swap-back lacks explicit slippage protection, which could result in value loss during volatile market conditions (7.2 Code Security). The overall architecture is a standard ERC-20 with added tokenomics features (7.1 Architecture).

GovernanceHigh1/10

The contract design grants significant power to a single `admin` address, which can unilaterally modify critical tokenomics parameters such as fees, transaction/holding limits, cooldowns, and trading status (7.3 Access Control, 7.4 Economic). This high centralization introduces a single point of failure and potential for manipulation or abuse. The ability to exempt specific addresses from fees, limits, and cooldowns further exacerbates this centralization risk (7.3 Access Control, 7.4 Economic). While initial token allocations are clearly defined, the control over these wallets by the admin also contributes to the centralized governance model (7.5 Governance).

UpgradesMedium6/10

The MRXToken contract is implemented as a standard, non-upgradeable contract. Therefore, there are no specific upgrade-related risks or complexities to consider (7.7 Upgrades). Any future changes to the contract logic would require a new deployment and migration of assets.

Security Checklist

4/5 checks passed
Contract VerifiedPass
Ownership RenouncedFail
No Mint FunctionPass
Liquidity LockedPass
Not a ProxyPass
HoneypotNoneBuy Tax0.0%Sell Tax0.0%

Holder Composition

11.2% in top 10
11.0% in wallets0.2% in contracts
Effective Concentration11.0%

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Liquidity Depth

$104.8K

The risk score reads depth across every pair. The volume figure and the volume-to-liquidity ratio elsewhere on this page describe only the pair this audit analysed, so the two are not directly comparable.

LP Distribution

Top-1 Unlocked Holder100.0%
Top-3 Unlocked100.0%

Key Addresses

2 addresses
Deployer
0xf0d1…e5f0
Unlocked LP Held By
0xe755…df04

No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.

What Raised This Score

8 factors
  • Ownership NOT renounced (admin/mint authority retained)
  • LP top1 unlocked holder = 100.0% (independent LP — depth risk)
  • LP top3 unlocked holders = 100.0% (independent LP — depth risk)
  • LP claimed locked but only 0.0% actually locked
  • Token age < 24h (brand new — bot activity, unproven)
  • 1 High finding(s) from audit
  • 3 Medium finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Low finding(s) from audit

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

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