The audited Token contract is a standard ERC-20 implementation inheriting from OpenZeppelin's battle-tested library. The primary design choice involves minting the entire token supply to a single vesting address during deployment, which introduces a significant point of centralization for token distribution and control. The contract is immutable and lacks administrative functions, which can be both a feature for decentralization and a limitation for emergency response.

On-chain security analysis — is it a scam or legit?
Is OLAXBT Safe?
Not verified
This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →The audited Token contract is a standard ERC-20 implementation inheriting from OpenZeppelin's battle-tested library.
- Ownership status UNKNOWN
- Top-10 concentration > 30%
- Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
- LP top1 unlocked holder = 57.2%
- 1 High finding(s) from audit
- 1 Medium finding(s) from audit
Exact factors
- Ownership status UNKNOWN (owner could not be resolved)
- Top-10 concentration > 30% (95.5% total → 49.2% effective; 18.4% in EOAs, 77.1% in contracts — moderate)
- Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
- LP top1 unlocked holder = 57.2% (independent LP — depth risk, pool = 62% of DEX liquidity)
- 1 High finding(s) from audit
- 1 Medium finding(s) from audit
Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed
Security Checklist
as of audit · Sep 4Holders
as of audit · Sep 4, 2026- Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking77.1%
- Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell18.4%
- Everyone elsethe rest of the supply4.5%
How holder types affect the score
Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.
Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Sep 4, 2026
Liquidity
as of audit · Sep 4The risk score reads depth across every pair.
The LP tokens of the analysed pool are not locked or burned, so whoever holds them can withdraw that liquidity.
0x3eff…ce450x575e…fe980xaf12…6f040x6fff…2d740xe43f…5e120xb16e…39f20x61d9…f2970xa37b…14730xd48d…9bd80x3262…f28aNo privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.
Security Findings
HighCentralized Control of Total Supply by Vesting Contract
The entire token supply (1,000,000,000 tokens with 18 decimals) is minted to a single vesting address during contract deployment. This design choice places the sole control and distribution responsibility of all tokens in the hands of the specified vesting contract. This creates a significant single point of failure; if the vesting contract is compromised or mismanaged, the entire token supply is at risk.H-01
Issue
The entire token supply (1,000,000,000 tokens with 18 decimals) is minted to a single vesting address during contract deployment. This design choice places the sole control and distribution responsibility of all tokens in the hands of the specified vesting contract. This creates a significant single point of failure; if the vesting contract is compromised or mismanaged, the entire token supply is at risk.
Fix
Ensure the vesting contract is robustly secured, thoroughly audited, and managed with the highest security standards. Consider implementing multi-signature wallets, time-locked contracts, or other decentralized control mechanisms for the vesting contract to distribute risk and enhance security.
Status
Unresolved
MediumAbsence of Emergency Admin Controls
The Token contract lacks any administrative functions such as pausing transfers, blacklisting malicious addresses, or upgrading the contract logic. While this promotes decentralization and immutability, it also means there is no mechanism for emergency response in case of critical vulnerabilities, exploits, or unforeseen market conditions affecting the token.M-01
Issue
The Token contract lacks any administrative functions such as pausing transfers, blacklisting malicious addresses, or upgrading the contract logic. While this promotes decentralization and immutability, it also means there is no mechanism for emergency response in case of critical vulnerabilities, exploits, or unforeseen market conditions affecting the token.
Fix
Evaluate the project's risk tolerance for immutability versus the need for emergency intervention. If emergency controls are deemed necessary, consider implementing a robust, multi-signature-controlled admin role with limited, well-defined capabilities (e.g., pause, unpause) in a future iteration or a separate governance contract.
Status
Unresolved
InfoImmutability and Non-Upgradeability
The Token contract is deployed as a standard, non-upgradeable ERC-20 implementation. This means its logic cannot be modified or updated after deployment. This is a common design choice for simple tokens, ensuring immutability.I-01
Issue
The Token contract is deployed as a standard, non-upgradeable ERC-20 implementation. This means its logic cannot be modified or updated after deployment. This is a common design choice for simple tokens, ensuring immutability.
Fix
This design choice ensures immutability and predictability. However, it implies that any discovered bugs or desired feature enhancements post-deployment would necessitate a new contract deployment and token migration. Ensure the current implementation is thoroughly tested and meets all long-term requirements.
Status
Unresolved
InfoRedundant Constructor Check
The constructor includes a require(totalSupply > 0, "Total supply cannot be zero"); check. Given that totalSupply is explicitly initialized to 1_000_000_000 ether, which is a large positive number, this check is always true and therefore redundant.I-02
Issue
The constructor includes a require(totalSupply > 0, "Total supply cannot be zero"); check. Given that totalSupply is explicitly initialized to 1_000_000_000 ether, which is a large positive number, this check is always true and therefore redundant.
Fix
Remove the redundant require(totalSupply > 0, ...) statement to slightly optimize gas usage and improve code clarity.
Status
Unresolved
Analysis
AI Copilotas of audit · Sep 4The Token contract (7.1 Architecture) is a straightforward ERC-20 implementation, leveraging the robust and audited OpenZeppelin Contracts library, which significantly reduces the risk of common vulnerabilities (7.2 Code Security). The use of Solidity ^0.8.28 ensures modern compiler features and safety checks. A minor informational finding includes a redundant require statement in the constructor, which does not pose a security risk.
The economic model (7.4 Economic) dictates that the entire token supply is minted to a single vesting address upon deployment. This design choice centralizes control over all tokens, making the security and operational integrity of the vesting contract paramount (7.8 Operations). Any compromise of this address would directly impact the entire token supply. The contract lacks any governance mechanisms (7.5 Governance) or administrative controls (7.3 Access Control) for post-deployment adjustments or emergency interventions.
The Token contract is deployed as a standard, non-upgradeable implementation (7.7 Upgrades). This means its logic cannot be modified or updated after deployment. While this ensures immutability, it also implies that any discovered bugs or desired feature enhancements post-deployment would necessitate a new contract deployment and token migration, which can be a complex and costly process.
Prioritize a comprehensive security audit and robust operational procedures for the designated vesting contract, as it holds the entire token supply and represents a single point of failure.
Consider implementing multi-signature controls or time-locks for the vesting contract to enhance security and mitigate risks associated with centralized control. Thoroughly evaluate the project's long-term needs regarding immutability versus the potential future requirement for emergency administrative controls, as the current design offers no such recourse.
Contract & Record
Free for any token on the record. It links to this page and always shows the current score and the date it was checked.
- Aug 16, 202638Medium
Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.
Would You Like a More Detailed Audit of OLAXBT?
Our AI-powered scanner gives you a deeper, real-time smart contract analysis — free, with every scoring factor shown.
Get Detailed Audit Is this your token? Publish your own audit on this page