Early-stage security check — honeypot & rug-pull analysis
BNB ChainThe audit reviewed the provided Solidity code for the CaiToken, which implements the ERC20 standard.
Read the full analysisEach factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed
Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.
Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Sep 4, 2026
The risk score reads depth across every pair.
Whether the LP tokens are locked could not be determined.
unchecked Blocks_update function utilizes unchecked blocks for arithmetic operations such as _balances[from] = fromBalance - value; and _balances[to] += value;. Similar unchecked blocks are used for _totalSupply adjustments during minting and burning. This pattern is observed in the _update function for both balance and total supply modifications.I-01The _update function utilizes unchecked blocks for arithmetic operations such as _balances[from] = fromBalance - value; and _balances[to] += value;. Similar unchecked blocks are used for _totalSupply adjustments during minting and burning. This pattern is observed in the _update function for both balance and total supply modifications.
This is a standard and safe practice in Solidity 0.8+ for gas optimization. The necessary checks (e.g., if (fromBalance < value)) are performed prior to entering the unchecked block, ensuring that underflow conditions are reverted before the unchecked operation. No action is required as this implementation is secure.
Resolved
approve Race Conditionapprove function is susceptible to a known race condition. If a user approves an amount for a spender, and then attempts to change that approved amount, a malicious spender could front-run the second approve transaction. This allows the spender to spend the original allowance before the new allowance is set, potentially leading to the spender having access to the sum of both allowances.I-02The standard ERC20 approve function is susceptible to a known race condition. If a user approves an amount for a spender, and then attempts to change that approved amount, a malicious spender could front-run the second approve transaction. This allows the spender to spend the original allowance before the new allowance is set, potentially leading to the spender having access to the sum of both allowances.
While not a vulnerability in the contract's code itself, it's an inherent risk of the ERC20 standard. Users should be advised to set their allowance to zero before setting a new non-zero allowance. Alternatively, consider implementing increaseAllowance and decreaseAllowance functions, which are safer alternatives for modifying allowances, to mitigate this risk.
Unresolved
_mint and _burn Functions Require External Exposure and Access Control_mint and _burn functions are declared as internal within the abstract ERC20 contract. This means they cannot be called directly from external accounts. For the CaiToken to have minting or burning capabilities, the concrete CaiToken contract must implement external functions that wrap these internal calls.I-03The _mint and _burn functions are declared as internal within the abstract ERC20 contract. This means they cannot be called directly from external accounts. For the CaiToken to have minting or burning capabilities, the concrete CaiToken contract must implement external functions that wrap these internal calls.
If CaiToken is intended to be a fixed-supply token, no action is needed. However, if minting or burning is desired, ensure that any external functions exposing _mint or _burn are protected by robust access control mechanisms (e.g., onlyOwner, onlyMinter roles) to prevent unauthorized supply manipulation. The prefill indicates a multisig owner, which would be an appropriate entity to control such functions.
Unresolved
The audit reviewed the provided Solidity code for the CaiToken, which implements the ERC20 standard. The contract largely adheres to well-established patterns, leveraging robust OpenZeppelin-like structures. No critical or high-severity vulnerabilities were identified in the provided abstract ERC20 implementation.
The technical architecture (7.1) is based on the widely adopted ERC20 standard, utilizing OpenZeppelin-like patterns for core functionalities like transfer and approve. Code security (7.2) is strong, with appropriate use of unchecked blocks for gas optimization, preceded by necessary checks to prevent underflows. The ECDSA library is included, indicating potential future use for permit functionality, enhancing user experience.
The economic model (7.4) is that of a standard ERC20 token, providing basic transfer and approval functionalities. Governance (7.5) is implied to be robust, with the prefill indicating a multisig owner () with a 2/3 threshold, which enhances security for administrative actions. The internal _mint and _burn functions require careful external exposure and access control in the concrete token implementation.
The contract is not deployed as a proxy (7.7) and is not designed for upgradeability. This eliminates upgrade-related risks, ensuring immutability post-deployment. Operations (7.8) are straightforward for a standard token.
It is recommended to ensure that any external functions built upon the internal _mint and _burn methods in the concrete CaiToken contract are protected by robust access control mechanisms, ideally leveraging the identified multisig owner.
Developers should also consider implementing increaseAllowance and decreaseAllowance functions to mitigate the known ERC20 approve race condition, enhancing user safety.
Free for any token on the record. It links to this page and always shows the current score and the date it was checked.
Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.
This token is brand new. Run a deeper AI-powered analysis of the contract code — free and instant.
Get Detailed Audit Is this your token? Publish your own audit on this page
