On-chain security analysis — is it a scam or legit?
BNB ChainThe MGO token is a standard ERC-20 implementation with added administrative controls.
Read the full analysisEach factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed
Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.
Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Oct 20, 2026
The risk score reads depth across every pair.
The LP tokens of the analysed pool are not locked or burned, so whoever holds them can withdraw that liquidity.
0x6eaa…5dbb0x2bc9…c7300x966d…e41aNo privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.
The 'destroyFreezeFunds' function allows the contract owner to burn the entire balance of any address that has been flagged with a specific role. This gives the owner the power to unilaterally remove tokens from any user's wallet.
Remove the ability for the owner to burn user balances, or implement a multi-signature requirement and a time-lock delay to ensure that such actions are transparent and subject to community oversight.
Unresolved
0.0% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 100.0% is held, unlocked, by 2 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. One of them — a wallet, 0x6eaa…5dbb — holds 80.8% and can remove that share at once; who controls it is not visible on-chain, so it is not treated as an independent provider. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them.
Check the lock's end date and beneficiary on the locker's own page before relying on it.
Acknowledged
The ten largest holders own 99.7% of supply. Of that, 78.9% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 10.9% in wallets, 9.9% in other contracts. 155,693 holders in total.
Watch the largest wallets that are not exchanges, pools or locks — those are the ones that can move the price.
Acknowledged
Listed on CoinGecko as Mango Network (MGO), market cap $9M, rank #1283. 155,693 holders.
Match the contract address against the project's official channels before trading.
Acknowledged
Liquidity $391K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $641K (CoinGecko, all markets, daily snapshot). 24h trading volume $110K (DexScreener, all pools).
Size any position to the liquidity and daily volume shown — they set how much you can sell and at what price.
Acknowledged
A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: mintable with no on-chain cap found. Control: a 3-of-5 multisig. Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: no buy or sell tax. Market: $391K of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: 483 days of market history.
Check the project's own documentation for what the token is used for; this report covers what the contract allows.
Acknowledged
The MGO token is a standard ERC-20 implementation with added administrative controls. While the core token logic follows standard patterns, the contract includes highly privileged functions that allow the owner to unilaterally burn user balances. This creates a significant centralization risk for token holders.
The contract utilizes standard OpenZeppelin libraries for ERC-20 functionality, ensuring 7.1 Architecture and 7.2 Code Security standards are met. 7.3 Access Control is implemented via Ownable, though it is used to grant excessive power. 7.6 External interactions are minimal, reducing the attack surface for flash loan or reentrancy exploits.
7.4 Economic and 7.5 Governance aspects are heavily centralized. The owner has the ability to modify user balances and freeze accounts via the 'destroyFreezeFunds' function. This represents a significant risk to token holders as the owner can effectively seize assets.
The contract is not upgradeable, which provides 7.7 Upgrades stability. 7.8 Operations are straightforward as there are no complex vault or staking mechanisms. The lack of proxy patterns prevents potential storage collision issues.
The protocol should consider implementing a multi-signature wallet or a time-lock mechanism for the privileged 'destroyFreezeFunds' function to mitigate the risk of unilateral asset seizure.
Transparency regarding the intended use of these administrative powers is recommended to maintain user trust. Furthermore, consider renouncing ownership if the administrative features are no longer required after the initial deployment phase. This would permanently remove the centralization risk and align the contract with decentralized standards.
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