The LiabilityVortex contract is a standard ERC20 token implementation, inheriting from OpenZeppelin's battle-tested ERC20 and Ownable libraries. It features a fixed total supply, all of which is minted to a specified treasury address during deployment. The contract's simplicity and reliance on audited libraries contribute to a low technical risk profile. However, the centralized initial distribution of the entire token supply to a single treasury address introduces a medium economic risk.
Early-stage security check — honeypot & rug-pull analysis
Is Liability Vortex a Scam?
Not verified
This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →The LiabilityVortex contract is a standard ERC20 token implementation, inheriting from OpenZeppelin's battle-tested ERC20 and Ownable libraries.
Read the full analysis- Top-10 concentration > 20%
- Liquidity < $50k
- Token age < 7 days
- 1 Medium finding(s) from audit
Exact factors
- Top-10 concentration > 20% (67.2% total → 29.4% effective; 4.1% in EOAs, 63.0% in contracts — mild)
- Liquidity < $50k ($24,402 across 3 pairs — thin market)
- Token age < 7 days (early, volatile)
- 1 Medium finding(s) from audit
Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed
Security Checklist
as of audit · Sep 4Holders
as of audit · Sep 4, 2026- Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking63.0%
- Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell4.1%
- Everyone elsethe rest of the supply32.8%
How holder types affect the score
Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.
Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Sep 4, 2026
Liquidity
as of audit · Sep 4The risk score reads depth across every pair.
The LP tokens of the analysed pool are locked or burned.
0x03a6…a0c10x0ed9…9706No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.
Security Findings
MediumCentralized Initial Token Distribution
The entire TOTAL_SUPPLY of 400,000e18 tokens is minted to a single treasury address during contract deployment. This means 100% of the token supply is controlled by this single address (7.4 Economic).M-01
Issue
The entire TOTAL_SUPPLY of 400,000e18 tokens is minted to a single treasury address during contract deployment. This means 100% of the token supply is controlled by this single address (7.4 Economic).
Fix
Ensure the treasury address is a highly secure entity, such as a robust multi-signature wallet with a well-defined operational policy and geographically distributed signers. Consider distributing the initial supply across multiple addresses or vesting contracts if a single point of control is not desired long-term.
Status
Unresolved
InfoImmutability of Contract Logic
The LiabilityVortex contract is deployed as a standard, non-upgradeable contract. Its logic cannot be modified after deployment (7.7 Upgrades).I-01
Issue
The LiabilityVortex contract is deployed as a standard, non-upgradeable contract. Its logic cannot be modified after deployment (7.7 Upgrades).
Fix
Acknowledge the immutability. If future flexibility is desired, consider an upgradeable proxy pattern for future contracts. For this specific contract, ensure thorough testing before deployment, as its logic is fixed.
Status
Unresolved
InfoLimited Owner Privileges
The Ownable role, assigned to msg.sender during deployment, only controls the ability to transfer or renounce ownership of the contract itself. It does not grant any special privileges over the token supply (e.g., minting, burning, pausing, blacklisting) beyond the initial mint to the treasury (7.3 Access Control, 7.5 Governance).I-02
Issue
The Ownable role, assigned to msg.sender during deployment, only controls the ability to transfer or renounce ownership of the contract itself. It does not grant any special privileges over the token supply (e.g., minting, burning, pausing, blacklisting) beyond the initial mint to the treasury (7.3 Access Control, 7.5 Governance).
Fix
This is a design choice. If emergency control or future administrative functions are desired, they must be explicitly added and carefully secured. For this contract, the limited scope of the owner role is a security strength against centralized control.
Status
Unresolved
InfoReliance on OpenZeppelin Libraries
The contract heavily relies on battle-tested OpenZeppelin contracts for ERC20 token functionality and access control (ERC20.sol, Ownable.sol). This significantly reduces the likelihood of common vulnerabilities (7.2 Code Security, 7.6 External).I-03
Issue
The contract heavily relies on battle-tested OpenZeppelin contracts for ERC20 token functionality and access control (ERC20.sol, Ownable.sol). This significantly reduces the likelihood of common vulnerabilities (7.2 Code Security, 7.6 External).
Fix
Regularly monitor OpenZeppelin security advisories for the specific versions used (0.8.20+ for imports, 0.8.36 for the main contract). Ensure the project's dependency management is robust.
Status
Unresolved
Analysis
AI Copilotas of audit · Sep 4The contract demonstrates strong technical security by utilizing battle-tested OpenZeppelin libraries for its ERC20 and Ownable functionalities (7.2 Code Security). There is no complex custom logic, which significantly reduces the attack surface and the likelihood of novel technical vulnerabilities. Standard ERC20 operations are robust, and the use of Solidity 0.8.36 with OpenZeppelin's 0.8.20+ imports ensures overflow/underflow protection. No reentrancy or other common technical vulnerabilities were identified.
The primary economic risk stems from the initial token distribution: the entire fixed supply is minted to a single treasury address during deployment (7.4 Economic). This creates a single point of failure; compromise of this address would lead to the loss of all tokens. The contract owner, defined by the Ownable pattern, has no further control over the token supply (e.g., minting, burning, pausing) beyond the initial distribution (7.5 Governance). This limits potential for malicious owner actions but also restricts emergency response capabilities.
The LiabilityVortex contract is deployed as a standard, non-upgradeable implementation (7.7 Upgrades). This design choice eliminates the complexities and risks associated with upgrade mechanisms, such as proxy pattern vulnerabilities or upgrade path issues. However, it also means that the contract's logic is immutable post-deployment, preventing any future bug fixes, feature enhancements, or parameter adjustments without a full redeployment and migration process.
Prioritize the security of the designated treasury address, as it holds the entire token supply.
Implement robust security measures such as a multi-signature wallet with strong operational policies. Given the contract's immutability, ensure thorough testing and review of all parameters before deployment, as no post-deployment modifications are possible. Clearly communicate the fixed nature of the token supply and the limited administrative control to all stakeholders.
Contract & Record
Free for any token on the record. It links to this page and always shows the current score and the date it was checked.
- Sep 4, 202611Low
- Aug 16, 202616Low
Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.
Would You Like a More Detailed Audit of Liability Vortex?
This token is brand new. Run a deeper AI-powered analysis of the contract code — free and instant.
Get Detailed Audit Is this your token? Publish your own audit on this page