The JagentTokenV2 contract is a standard ERC-20 token with added administrative controls for minting, burning, and transfer restrictions. The protocol relies on a centralized 'minter' role that holds significant power over token supply and holder liquidity. While the code follows standard OpenZeppelin patterns, the centralization of power represents a notable risk to token holders.
Early-stage security check — honeypot & rug-pull analysis
Is JAGENT a Scam?
Not verified
This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →The JagentTokenV2 contract is a standard ERC-20 token with added administrative controls for minting, burning, and transfer restrictions.
Read the full analysis- A privileged address controls a switch that decides whether transfers go through; held by minter: Other-Contract
- Owner can blacklist or freeze individual holders; held by minter: Other-Contract
- Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded; held by minter: Other-Contract
- Ownership status UNKNOWN
Exact factors
- A privileged address controls a switch that decides whether transfers go through; held by minter: Other-Contract
- Owner can blacklist or freeze individual holders; held by minter: Other-Contract
- Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded; held by minter: Other-Contract
- Ownership status UNKNOWN (owner could not be resolved)
Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed
Security Checklist
as of audit · Oct 28Holders
as of audit · Oct 28, 2026- Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking0.6%
- Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell5.5%
- Burnedout of circulation4.4%
- DEX poolsthe pools' own liquidity6.8%
- Everyone else4,354 holders82.6%
How holder types affect the score
Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.
Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Oct 28, 2026
Liquidity
as of audit · Oct 28The risk score reads depth across every pair.
The LP tokens of the analysed pool are locked or burned.
0x0ed9…9706No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.
Security Findings
MediumCentralized Minting Authority
The 'minter' address has the authority to call the mint function, which increases the total supply of tokens. This allows the controller to dilute the value of existing holdings at any time.CP-01
Issue
The 'minter' address has the authority to call the mint function, which increases the total supply of tokens. This allows the controller to dilute the value of existing holdings at any time.
Fix
Implement a hard cap on total supply or transition the minting authority to a decentralized governance mechanism.
Status
Unresolved
MediumAdministrative Control Over Transfers
The 'minter' can trigger the 'disableBlocks' function, which modifies the transfer logic. This grants the controller the ability to halt all token transfers or sales globally.CP-05
Issue
The 'minter' can trigger the 'disableBlocks' function, which modifies the transfer logic. This grants the controller the ability to halt all token transfers or sales globally.
Fix
Remove the ability to globally disable transfers or implement a community-voted mechanism for such drastic actions.
Status
Unresolved
MediumArbitrary Address Blacklisting
The 'minter' can use 'setPoolBlocked' to prevent specific addresses from interacting with the token. This allows the controller to freeze individual user funds without due process.CP-06
Issue
The 'minter' can use 'setPoolBlocked' to prevent specific addresses from interacting with the token. This allows the controller to freeze individual user funds without due process.
Fix
Restrict the blacklisting functionality to only address malicious actors via a transparent, verifiable process, or remove the feature entirely.
Status
Unresolved
InfoWho holds the supply
The ten largest holders own 17.4% of supply. Of that, 4.4% burned, 6.8% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 5.5% in wallets, 0.6% in other contracts. 4,364 holders in total.QA-HOLDERS
Issue
The ten largest holders own 17.4% of supply. Of that, 4.4% burned, 6.8% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 5.5% in wallets, 0.6% in other contracts. 4,364 holders in total.
Fix
Watch the largest wallets that are not exchanges, pools or locks — those are the ones that can move the price.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoNot listed by any independent source
4,364 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.QA-IDENTITY
Issue
4,364 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.
Fix
Match the contract address against the project's official channels before trading.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoLiquidity burned — cannot be withdrawn
98.9% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 98.9% of the LP tokens were sent to a burn address — that liquidity can never be withdrawn by anyone. 1.1% is held, unlocked, by 1 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. No single one holds a majority: their exits thin the market rather than hand anyone the pool. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them.QA-LIQUIDITY
Issue
98.9% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 98.9% of the LP tokens were sent to a burn address — that liquidity can never be withdrawn by anyone. 1.1% is held, unlocked, by 1 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. No single one holds a majority: their exits thin the market rather than hand anyone the pool. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them.
Fix
Check the lock's end date and beneficiary on the locker's own page before relying on it.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoThe market for this token
Liquidity $197K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $1.8M (DexScreener, all pools).QA-MARKET
Issue
Liquidity $197K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $1.8M (DexScreener, all pools).
Fix
Size any position to the liquidity and daily volume shown — they set how much you can sell and at what price.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoAsset class: Project token
A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: mintable with no on-chain cap found. Control: an owner that could not be resolved. Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: 1% on buy, 2% on sell. Market: $197K of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: under a day of market history.QA-PROFILE
Issue
A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: mintable with no on-chain cap found. Control: an owner that could not be resolved. Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: 1% on buy, 2% on sell. Market: $197K of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: under a day of market history.
Fix
Check the project's own documentation for what the token is used for; this report covers what the contract allows.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoRecently launched — less than a day of market history
The token's oldest DEX pool is less than a day old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.QA-RECENT
Issue
The token's oldest DEX pool is less than a day old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.
Fix
Re-check ownership, liquidity and holder distribution as the token matures; those are the facts that move early.
Status
Acknowledged
Analysis
AI Copilotas of audit · Oct 28The contract utilizes standard OpenZeppelin libraries for ERC-20 functionality, ensuring 7.1 Architecture and 7.2 Code Security standards are met. The implementation is clean and follows 7.8 Operations best practices for state management. However, the logic includes custom transfer hooks that introduce 7.6 External dependencies on administrative state. These hooks are correctly implemented but grant the minter significant control over token flow.
The protocol exhibits high centralization, violating 7.5 Governance best practices by concentrating power in a single minter address. The 7.4 Economic model allows for arbitrary supply inflation and liquidity restriction. There are no timelocks or multi-signature requirements for these sensitive administrative actions.
The contract is not upgradeable, satisfying 7.7 Upgrades safety by design. The logic is immutable once deployed. No proxy patterns are utilized, eliminating risks associated with implementation updates.
It is recommended to transition the 'minter' role to a decentralized multi-signature wallet or a DAO-governed contract to mitigate the risks of single-point-of-failure.
Implementing a timelock on sensitive administrative functions like 'setPoolBlocked' would provide transparency and protection to token holders against sudden policy changes.
Contract & Record
Free for any token on the record. It links to this page and always shows the current score and the date it was checked.
- Oct 28, 202642Medium
Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the JAGENT contract address?
The JAGENT contract on BNB Chain is 0x8e6442663a4f8c50b6132c68d42a30e7dfe4ae15. Compare it with the address the project itself publishes before trading: other contracts can carry the same name and ticker.
Is JAGENT a scam?
Quantum Audit's risk score for JAGENT is 42/100 (Medium risk) as of Oct 28, 2026, computed by a deterministic function from on-chain facts — Contract verified: Verified; Mint: Mintable; Liquidity lock: Locked; Upgradeability: Fixed code; Honeypot: None found; Buy / sell tax: 1% / 2%. A score is a dated snapshot of those facts, not a guarantee; each one is listed on this page.
Is JAGENT liquidity locked?
Liquidity lock: Locked (as of Oct 28, 2026). Total DEX liquidity: $197.3K.
Who holds JAGENT?
As of Oct 28, 2026, the 10 largest holders own 17.4% of the supply across 4,364 holders. The Holders section on this page shows who they are by holder type.
Would You Like a More Detailed Audit of JAGENT?
This token is brand new. Run a deeper AI-powered analysis of the contract code — free and instant.
Get Detailed Audit Is this your token? Add your links and get it Verified