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On-chain security analysis — is it a scam or legit?

Is Andy Safe?

ANDYEthereum
Not verified This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →
Last checked Sep 4, 2026 · 1 audit on record
SummaryAI Copilot

The audited contract implements a standard ERC20 token with renounced ownership.

Read the full analysis
What raised the score
  • 1 Low finding(s) from audit
Exact factors
  • 1 Low finding(s) from audit

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Security Checklist

as of audit · Sep 47 of 7 checks passed
Contract verifiedVerified
OwnershipRenounced
MintNo mint
Liquidity lockLocked
UpgradeabilityFixed code
HoneypotNone found
Buy / sell tax0% / 0%

Holders

as of audit · Sep 4, 2026
8.3%Contracts13.7%Wallets77.9%Everyone else
8.3%13.7%77.9%Everyone else
ContractsWalletsEveryone elseBubble area = share of supply
22.1%of supply sits with the top 10 holders
  • Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking8.3%
  • Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell13.7%
  • Everyone elsethe rest of the supply77.9%
Effective concentrationwhat the score reads17.1%
How holder types affect the score

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Sep 4, 2026

Liquidity

as of audit · Sep 4$1.33M across 5 pairs
LP tokensLocked

The LP tokens of the analysed pool are locked or burned.

Analysed pool$1.31MShare of depth98.8%
LP Burned100.0% · ≈ permanent lock
LP Locked100.0% · Null Address
Unlocked LP held by
0xb3ac…68a00x6bf1…da0c0x3b72…d61f0x0000…8a900x1f2f…f3870x17bb…7e37

No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.

Security Findings

1 Low2 Info
Low

Redundant SafeMath Library and Unchecked Blocks

The contract includes a SafeMath library. However, Solidity version 0.8.19, used in this contract, provides native overflow and underflow protection by default. The try* functions within the SafeMath library explicitly use unchecked blocks, which bypass these native checks, although they implement their own checks. The add, sub, mul, div, mod functions without try or errorMessage parameters do not use unchecked and thus rely on the native compiler checks, making the library largely redundant and potentially confusing for maintainers.L-01

Issue

The contract includes a SafeMath library. However, Solidity version 0.8.19, used in this contract, provides native overflow and underflow protection by default. The try* functions within the SafeMath library explicitly use unchecked blocks, which bypass these native checks, although they implement their own checks. The add, sub, mul, div, mod functions without try or errorMessage parameters do not use unchecked and thus rely on the native compiler checks, making the library largely redundant and potentially confusing for maintainers.

Fix

Consider removing the SafeMath library entirely and relying on Solidity's built-in overflow/underflow protection for arithmetic operations. If specific unchecked blocks are desired for gas optimization, ensure they are carefully placed and preceded by robust require statements, as is done in some parts of the ERC20 contract itself.

Status

Unresolved

Info

ERC20 Allowance Race Condition (Known Issue)

The standard approve() function is susceptible to a front-running attack. If a token holder first approves an amount for a spender, and then decides to change that approved amount, an attacker can front-run the second approve transaction. This allows the attacker to execute the original approve with the initial amount, then immediately use transferFrom to drain that amount, and finally allow the second approve transaction to proceed, granting the spender the new amount as well.I-01

Issue

The standard approve() function is susceptible to a front-running attack. If a token holder first approves an amount for a spender, and then decides to change that approved amount, an attacker can front-run the second approve transaction. This allows the attacker to execute the original approve with the initial amount, then immediately use transferFrom to drain that amount, and finally allow the second approve transaction to proceed, granting the spender the new amount as well.

Fix

While increaseAllowance() and decreaseAllowance() functions are provided, which mitigate this issue, users should be educated to use these functions instead of directly calling approve() when modifying an existing allowance.

Status

Unresolved

Info

Implications of Renounced Ownership

The provided prefill data indicates that the contract's ownership has been renounced (ownership_renounced: true). This means the _owner address in the Ownable contract is set to address(0). Consequently, any functions protected by the onlyOwner modifier are permanently inaccessible and cannot be executed by any external account.I-02

Issue

The provided prefill data indicates that the contract's ownership has been renounced (ownership_renounced: true). This means the _owner address in the Ownable contract is set to address(0). Consequently, any functions protected by the onlyOwner modifier are permanently inaccessible and cannot be executed by any external account.

Fix

Confirm that renouncing ownership was an intentional and well-considered decision. Ensure that no critical administrative functions or emergency controls are required post-renunciation, as they cannot be recovered or executed. This design choice enhances decentralization but removes any central control.

Status

Unresolved

Analysis

AI Copilotas of audit · Sep 4
Executive SummaryWhat the contract is and what the review found

The audited contract implements a standard ERC20 token with renounced ownership. The code is generally well-structured and adheres to common patterns. Minor code quality concerns exist regarding the redundant use of a SafeMath library in Solidity 0.8.19. Overall, the contract presents a low security risk.

Technical10/10Low risk

The contract implements a standard ERC20 token, inheriting from Context, IERC20, and IERC20Metadata. It includes a SafeMath library, though its utility is diminished in Solidity 0.8.19 due to built-in overflow checks (7.2 Code Security). The _transfer and _burn functions correctly use unchecked blocks after validating conditions with require statements, ensuring arithmetic safety. Access control is handled by the Ownable pattern, which is noted as renounced (7.3 Access Control), enhancing decentralization.

Governance10/10Low risk

The economic model is a standard ERC20 token, with no complex mechanisms or external dependencies that introduce inherent economic risk (7.4 Economic). Governance is based on the Ownable pattern, but the ownership has been renounced (7.5 Governance). This means no single entity controls administrative functions, which significantly reduces governance risk and enhances decentralization.

Upgrades10/10Low risk

The contract is not designed with an upgradeability pattern (e.g., proxy). Therefore, it is immutable once deployed, eliminating upgrade-related risks such as proxy misconfigurations or logic contract vulnerabilities introduced during upgrades (7.7 Upgrades). Any changes to the contract's logic would require a new deployment.

Final RecommendationWhat to do about this score

It is recommended to review the necessity of the custom SafeMath library, as Solidity 0.8.19 provides native overflow/underflow protection, making it largely redundant.

Confirm that the renounced ownership state is an intentional and permanent design choice, as it removes any central administrative control. Educate users on the benefits of increaseAllowance and decreaseAllowance to mitigate known ERC20 allowance race conditions.

Contract & Record

1 audit on record
TypeToken
NetworkEthereum
Token age2y
Contract0x68bb…c91e
Deployer0x2c02…bb08
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Audit History
  1. Aug 30, 20260Low

Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is the ANDY contract address?

The Andy contract on Ethereum is 0x68bbed6a47194eff1cf514b50ea91895597fc91e. Compare it with the address the project itself publishes before trading: other contracts can carry the same name and ticker.

Is Andy a scam?

Quantum Audit's risk score for Andy is 0/100 (Low risk) as of Sep 4, 2026, computed by a deterministic function from on-chain facts — Contract verified: Verified; Ownership: Renounced; Mint: No mint; Liquidity lock: Locked; Upgradeability: Fixed code; Honeypot: None found; Buy / sell tax: 0% / 0%. A score is a dated snapshot of those facts, not a guarantee; each one is listed on this page.

Is ANDY liquidity locked?

Liquidity lock: Locked (as of Sep 4, 2026). Total DEX liquidity: $1.33M.

Who holds ANDY?

As of Sep 4, 2026, the 10 largest holders own 22.1% of the supply. The Holders section on this page shows who they are by holder type.

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