The AGIToken contract implements a standard ERC-20 token with significant centralized control mechanisms. The 'minter' role holds extensive power to manipulate supply, freeze user assets, and restrict transferability. While the code follows standard patterns for minting and burning, the lack of timelocks or multi-signature requirements for these privileged functions introduces substantial counterparty risk for token holders.

Early-stage security check — honeypot & rug-pull analysis
Is AgentID a Scam?
Not verified
This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →The AGIToken contract implements a standard ERC-20 token with significant centralized control mechanisms.
Read the full analysis- Owner can change any holder's balance
- A privileged address controls a switch that decides whether transfers go through; held by minter: Other-Contract
- Owner can blacklist or freeze individual holders; held by minter: Other-Contract
- Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded; held by minter: Other-Contract
- Ownership status UNKNOWN
- Liquidity < $50k
- Code: Stuck ETH in Contract
Exact factors
- Owner can change any holder's balance (seize or credit tokens); held by minter: Other-Contract
- A privileged address controls a switch that decides whether transfers go through; held by minter: Other-Contract
- Owner can blacklist or freeze individual holders; held by minter: Other-Contract
- Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded; held by minter: Other-Contract
- Ownership status UNKNOWN (owner could not be resolved)
- Liquidity < $50k ($36,409 across 1 pairs — thin market)
- Code: Stuck ETH in Contract (Medium, static analysis)
Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed
Security Checklist
as of audit · Nov 5Holders
as of audit · Nov 5, 2026- Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking2.0%
- Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell7.6%
- DEX poolsthe pools' own liquidity31.9%
- Everyone else1,262 holders58.6%
How holder types affect the score
Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.
Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Nov 5, 2026
Liquidity
as of audit · Nov 5The risk score reads depth across every pair.
The LP tokens of the analysed pool are locked or burned.
0xf385…5f85No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.
Security Findings
HighUnauthorized Asset Seizure
The minter role has the ability to burn tokens directly from any user's wallet using the burnFromHolder function, effectively allowing for the seizure of user assets.CP-02
Issue
The minter role has the ability to burn tokens directly from any user's wallet using the burnFromHolder function, effectively allowing for the seizure of user assets.
Fix
Remove the ability for the minter to burn tokens from arbitrary user addresses, or restrict this function to only operate on tokens explicitly approved by the user.
Status
Unresolved
MediumStuck ETH in Contract
The contract includes a receive function that accepts ETH, but there is no mechanism to withdraw or recover these funds, leading to permanent loss of any sent ETH.CD-01
Issue
The contract includes a receive function that accepts ETH, but there is no mechanism to withdraw or recover these funds, leading to permanent loss of any sent ETH.
Fix
Remove the receive function if the contract is not intended to hold ETH, or add a function to allow the owner to withdraw accidentally sent funds.
Status
Unresolved
MediumCentralized Minting Capability
The minter role can increase the total supply of tokens at any time, which dilutes the value of existing holdings for all token holders.CP-01
Issue
The minter role can increase the total supply of tokens at any time, which dilutes the value of existing holdings for all token holders.
Fix
Restrict minting to a capped schedule or require a multi-signature approval process for any new supply issuance.
Status
Unresolved
MediumTransferability Control Switch
The minter can toggle a global switch that prevents all token transfers, effectively locking all liquidity in the ecosystem.CP-05
Issue
The minter can toggle a global switch that prevents all token transfers, effectively locking all liquidity in the ecosystem.
Fix
Remove the global transfer lock or implement a community-governed voting mechanism to trigger such a state change.
Status
Unresolved
MediumBlacklisting Capability
The minter can add specific addresses to a blacklist, preventing those users from moving or selling their tokens.CP-06
Issue
The minter can add specific addresses to a blacklist, preventing those users from moving or selling their tokens.
Fix
Limit the blacklist functionality to only be used for regulatory compliance and ensure there is a transparent process for appeals.
Status
Unresolved
InfoWho holds the supply
The ten largest holders own 41.4% of supply. Of that, 31.9% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 7.6% in wallets, 2.0% in other contracts. 1,272 holders in total.QA-HOLDERS
Issue
The ten largest holders own 41.4% of supply. Of that, 31.9% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 7.6% in wallets, 2.0% in other contracts. 1,272 holders in total.
Fix
Watch the largest wallets that are not exchanges, pools or locks — those are the ones that can move the price.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoNot listed by any independent source
1,272 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.QA-IDENTITY
Issue
1,272 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.
Fix
Match the contract address against the project's official channels before trading.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoLiquidity burned — cannot be withdrawn
99.8% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 99.8% of the LP tokens were sent to a burn address — that liquidity can never be withdrawn by anyone. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them.QA-LIQUIDITY
Issue
99.8% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 99.8% of the LP tokens were sent to a burn address — that liquidity can never be withdrawn by anyone. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them.
Fix
Check the lock's end date and beneficiary on the locker's own page before relying on it.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoThe market for this token
Liquidity $36K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $86K (DexScreener, all pools).QA-MARKET
Issue
Liquidity $36K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $86K (DexScreener, all pools).
Fix
Size any position to the liquidity and daily volume shown — they set how much you can sell and at what price.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoAsset class: Project token
A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: mintable with no on-chain cap found. Control: an owner that could not be resolved. Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: 1% on buy, 1% on sell. Market: $36K of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: 2 days of market history.QA-PROFILE
Issue
A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: mintable with no on-chain cap found. Control: an owner that could not be resolved. Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: 1% on buy, 1% on sell. Market: $36K of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: 2 days of market history.
Fix
Check the project's own documentation for what the token is used for; this report covers what the contract allows.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoRecently launched — 2 days of market history
The token's oldest DEX pool is 2 days old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.QA-RECENT
Issue
The token's oldest DEX pool is 2 days old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.
Fix
Re-check ownership, liquidity and holder distribution as the token matures; those are the facts that move early.
Status
Acknowledged
Analysis
AI Copilotas of audit · Nov 5The contract utilizes standard OpenZeppelin-like ERC-20 logic with robust implementation of core token standards. 7.1 Architecture is straightforward, though 7.2 Code Security is hampered by the presence of an unwithdrawable ETH balance in the receive function. 7.3 Access Control is strictly enforced via the 'onlyMinter' modifier, but the scope of these privileges is overly broad. 7.6 External interactions are minimal, reducing the attack surface for flash loan or oracle manipulation.
7.4 Economic and 7.5 Governance risks are high due to the centralized 'minter' role. This entity can unilaterally dilute supply via minting or seize assets via burnFromHolder. There are no decentralized governance mechanisms or community oversight for these actions. 7.8 Operations are entirely dependent on the integrity of the minter address.
7.7 Upgrades are not applicable as the contract is not a proxy. The logic is immutable once deployed, which provides certainty but prevents patching of the identified centralized control issues. Future changes would require a full migration to a new contract address.
It is strongly recommended to transition the 'minter' role to a multi-signature wallet or a decentralized DAO contract to mitigate the risk of a single point of failure.
Additionally, implement a timelock for sensitive administrative actions to provide transparency and allow the community to react to significant changes in tokenomics or access rules.
Contract & Record
Free for any token on the record. It links to this page and always shows the current score and the date it was checked.
- Nov 5, 202667High
Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the AGI contract address?
The AgentID (AGI) contract on Ethereum is 0xbf01c3ef1bc368288067d4ac49ba9b147de3a461. Compare it with the address the project itself publishes before trading: other contracts can carry the same name and ticker.
Is AgentID a scam?
Quantum Audit's risk score for AgentID is 67/100 (High risk) as of Nov 5, 2026, computed by a deterministic function from on-chain facts — Contract verified: Verified; Mint: Mintable; Liquidity lock: Locked; Upgradeability: Fixed code; Honeypot: None found; Buy / sell tax: 1% / 1%. A score is a dated snapshot of those facts, not a guarantee; each one is listed on this page.
Is AGI liquidity locked?
Liquidity lock: Locked (as of Nov 5, 2026). Total DEX liquidity: $36.4K.
Who holds AGI?
As of Nov 5, 2026, the 10 largest holders own 41.4% of the supply across 1,272 holders. The Holders section on this page shows who they are by holder type.
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