Is Abuwtiyuw (ABU) Safe? Smart Contract Security Analysis

Security Findings

1 Med1 Low1 Info

Medium

Unchecked Arithmetic in `_mint` Function

M-01The `_mint` function, responsible for increasing the total supply and an account's balance, uses `unchecked` blocks for `_totalSupply += amount;` and `_balances[account] += amount;`. While `unchecked` is common in Solidity 0.8.x for gas optimization, these specific operations lack explicit overflow checks. If a sufficiently large `amount` is minted when `_totalSupply` or `_balances[account]` are near `type(uint256).max`, an integer overflow could occur. This would lead to an incorrect total supply or an incorrect balance for the recipient, potentially enabling supply manipulation if `_mint` is exposed in a derived contract.

IssueThe `_mint` function, responsible for increasing the total supply and an account's balance, uses `unchecked` blocks for `_totalSupply += amount;` and `_balances[account] += amount;`. While `unchecked` is common in Solidity 0.8.x for gas optimization, these specific operations lack explicit overflow checks. If a sufficiently large `amount` is minted when `_totalSupply` or `_balances[account]` are near `type(uint256).max`, an integer overflow could occur. This would lead to an incorrect total supply or an incorrect balance for the recipient, potentially enabling supply manipulation if `_mint` is exposed in a derived contract.

FixImplement explicit overflow checks for `_totalSupply += amount;` and `_balances[account] += amount;` within the `_mint` function, or ensure that the `amount` parameter is constrained to prevent overflows. For example, add `require(_totalSupply + amount >= _totalSupply, 'ERC20: total supply overflow');` and `require(_balances[account] + amount >= _balances[account], 'ERC20: balance overflow');` before the `unchecked` block, or remove the `unchecked` block entirely for these specific additions, a…

StatusUnresolved

Low

ERC20 `approve` Race Condition Vulnerability

L-01The standard ERC20 `approve` function is susceptible to a known front-running vulnerability. If a user attempts to change an existing allowance from `X` to `Y` by calling `approve(spender, Y)`, an attacker can front-run this transaction. The attacker can observe the pending transaction, spend the original allowance `X`, and then allow the user's `approve(spender, Y)` transaction to proceed. This results in the attacker spending `X` and the user's allowance becoming `Y`, which might not be the intended outcome if `Y` was meant to replace `X` entirely. While `increaseAllowance` and `decreaseAllowance` mitigate this for allowance adjustments, the base `approve` function remains vulnerable.

IssueThe standard ERC20 `approve` function is susceptible to a known front-running vulnerability. If a user attempts to change an existing allowance from `X` to `Y` by calling `approve(spender, Y)`, an attacker can front-run this transaction. The attacker can observe the pending transaction, spend the original allowance `X`, and then allow the user's `approve(spender, Y)` transaction to proceed. This results in the attacker spending `X` and the user's allowance becoming `Y`, which might not be the intended outcome if `Y` was meant to replace `X` entirely. While `increaseAllowance` and `decreaseAllowance` mitigate this for allowance adjustments, the base `approve` function remains vulnerable.

FixEducate users about the `approve` race condition and recommend using `increaseAllowance` and `decreaseAllowance` functions when adjusting allowances, rather than directly calling `approve` with a new value. If `approve` must be used to set a new allowance, users should first set the allowance to zero (`approve(spender, 0)`) and wait for that transaction to confirm before setting the new desired allowance (`approve(spender, newAmount)`).

StatusUnresolved

Info

Unused SafeMath Library

I-01The `SafeMath` library is included in the contract code but is not utilized by the `ERC20` contract. The `ERC20` contract instead relies on native arithmetic operations within `unchecked` blocks, combined with `require` statements for overflow/underflow prevention, which is a common pattern in Solidity 0.8.x. The presence of the `SafeMath` library, while not harmful, adds unnecessary code and bytecode size.

IssueThe `SafeMath` library is included in the contract code but is not utilized by the `ERC20` contract. The `ERC20` contract instead relies on native arithmetic operations within `unchecked` blocks, combined with `require` statements for overflow/underflow prevention, which is a common pattern in Solidity 0.8.x. The presence of the `SafeMath` library, while not harmful, adds unnecessary code and bytecode size.

FixConsider removing the `SafeMath` library if it is not used by any part of the deployed contract or its dependencies. This can slightly reduce contract size and improve code clarity by removing redundant components.

StatusUnresolved

Category Ratings

TechnicalLow10/10

The technical architecture (7.1 Architecture) is a standard ERC20 token, which is well-understood and robust. The code security (7.2 Code Security) generally follows best practices for Solidity 0.8.x, utilizing `unchecked` blocks for gas optimization while relying on `require` statements for safety in most arithmetic operations. However, the `_mint` function contains unchecked arithmetic for `_totalSupply` and `_balances` updates, posing a potential overflow risk (M-01). Access control (7.3 Access Control) is managed by the Ownable pattern, with the prefill indicating renounced ownership, which is a strong security posture.

GovernanceLow8/10

The economic model (7.4 Economic) is that of a basic ERC20 token, without complex tokenomics or external dependencies that could introduce economic exploits. Governance (7.5 Governance) is decentralized due to the renounced ownership, as indicated by the provided metadata, which removes a single point of control for privileged functions like minting or burning if they were exposed. There are no apparent external dependencies (7.6 External) that could introduce oracle manipulation or flash loan risks for this standalone token.

UpgradesLow10/10

The contract is not designed as an upgradeable proxy (7.7 Upgrades), meaning its logic cannot be changed after deployment. This eliminates upgrade-related risks such as proxy implementation mismatches or insecure upgrade paths. Any future changes would require a new contract deployment and migration.

Security Checklist

5/5 checks passed

Contract VerifiedPass

Ownership RenouncedPass

No Mint FunctionPass

Liquidity LockedPass

Not a ProxyPass

HoneypotNoneBuy Tax0.0%Sell Tax0.0%

Holder Composition

59.0% in top 10

22.9% in wallets36.1% in contracts

Effective Concentration37.3%

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Liquidity Depth

$46.4K

The risk score reads depth across every pair. The volume figure and the volume-to-liquidity ratio elsewhere on this page describe only the pair this audit analysed, so the two are not directly comparable.

LP Distribution

LP Burned100.0% · ≈ permanent lock

LP Locked100.0% · Null Address

Key Addresses

1 addresses

Deployer

0x4ec2…eb0f

What Raised This Score

4 factors

Top-10 concentration > 30% (59.0% total → 37.3% effective; 22.9% in EOAs, 36.1% in contracts — moderate)
Liquidity < $50k ($46,352 across 1 pairs — thin market)
1 Medium finding(s) from audit
1 Low finding(s) from audit

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Not Signed In

Is Abuwtiyuw Safe?

Security Findings

Unchecked Arithmetic in `_mint` Function

ERC20 `approve` Race Condition Vulnerability

Unused SafeMath Library

Category Ratings

Security Checklist

Holder Composition

Liquidity Depth

LP Distribution

Key Addresses

What Raised This Score

Related Audits

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