On-chain security analysis — is it a scam or legit?
PolygonThe UChildERC20Proxy contract serves as a transparent proxy for an ERC-20 implementation on the Polygon network.
Read the full analysisEach factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed
Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.
Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Oct 20, 2026
The 20 remaining pairs hold $120.9K between them and are not listed. The risk score reads depth across every pair.
The LP tokens of the analysed pool are not locked or burned, so whoever holds them can withdraw that liquidity.
0x21a6…db710x440b…fefe0x35a5…d19f0xfc1b…00c60xe03c…aa580x2e92…073d0xcb93…bbf30x0641…631e0x2027…6b930xec0b…2ce3No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.
0.0% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 42.4% is held, unlocked, by 10 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. No single one holds a majority: their exits thin the market rather than hand anyone the pool. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them. This assessment covers the main pool, which holds 32% of the token's DEX liquidity; the other pools were not assessed.
Check the lock's end date and beneficiary on the locker's own page before relying on it.
Acknowledged
The verified source code was reviewed and no issue rising to Informational severity or above was identified. This is a statement about the code that was read, not a guarantee: the review covers the published source only. Fact-layer checks (holder concentration) were applied separately and feed the risk score.
Re-check after any contract upgrade or ownership change, both of which can alter behaviour without changing this page.
Acknowledged
The ten largest holders own 51.6% of supply. Of that, 7.5% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 5.5% in wallets, 38.6% in other contracts. 268,609 holders in total.
Watch the largest wallets that are not exchanges, pools or locks — those are the ones that can move the price.
Acknowledged
Listed on CoinGecko as Aave (AAVE), market cap $2.3B, rank #46. On GoPlus's list of trusted tokens. Traded on Binance. 268,609 holders. Verified by: CoinGecko, GoPlus, exchange listings.
Match the contract address against the project's official channels before trading.
Acknowledged
Liquidity $1.6M (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $220.7M (CoinGecko, all markets, daily snapshot). 24h trading volume $453K (DexScreener, all pools).
Size any position to the liquidity and daily volume shown — they set how much you can sell and at what price.
Acknowledged
A token whose main use is voting on a protocol's decisions (delegation and vote checkpoints in its code). The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: CoinGecko category: Governance. Tokenomics — Supply: mint capability could not be read. Control: an owner that could not be resolved. Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: no buy or sell tax. Market: $1.6M of DEX liquidity across 30 pools. Launch: 2031 days of market history.
Check how much of the voting supply insiders hold and what governance can change.
Acknowledged
The UChildERC20Proxy contract serves as a transparent proxy for an ERC-20 implementation on the Polygon network. The architecture follows standard upgradeable patterns, allowing the proxy owner to update the logic contract. No vulnerabilities were identified in the provided code map, though the centralization of administrative power remains a standard operational risk.
The contract utilizes a standard proxy pattern to delegate calls to an implementation contract. 7.1 Architecture is sound, relying on established delegatecall patterns. 7.2 Code Security is high as the logic is minimal and focused on administrative delegation. 7.6 External interactions are limited to the implementation contract, ensuring predictable behavior.
7.4 Economic and 7.5 Governance risks are centered on the proxy owner. The owner has full control over the implementation address, which effectively grants control over the entire contract state. This is a common design choice for upgradeable proxies but represents a single point of failure.
7.7 Upgrades are handled via updateImplementation and updateAndCall. These functions are restricted to the proxy owner, ensuring controlled transitions. 7.8 Operations are simplified by these functions, allowing for seamless logic updates without migrating user balances.
The contract is well-structured for its intended purpose as a proxy.
To further enhance security, it is recommended to transition the proxy ownership to a multi-signature wallet or a decentralized governance contract to mitigate the risk of a single compromised private key. Ensure that any future implementation contracts are thoroughly audited before being linked via updateImplementation. Maintain a clear documentation trail for all administrative actions taken on the proxy to ensure transparency for token holders.
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