On-chain security analysis — is it a scam or legit?
PolygonThe UChildERC20 contract functions as a bridge-compatible token on Polygon.
Read the full analysisEach factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed
Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.
Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Oct 20, 2026
The 20 remaining pairs hold $4.1K between them and are not listed. The risk score reads depth across every pair.
The LP tokens of the analysed pool are not locked or burned, so whoever holds them can withdraw that liquidity.
0xb09b…51eb0x2bf2…8ca60xe298…4ef30x440b…fefe0xe119…babb0x252d…49b30xf1c4…f9520x4d74…479f0x7b56…f8800x7ecc…e07fNo privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.
The contract accepts native ETH through meta-transactions but lacks a function to withdraw or transfer these funds out of the contract. Any ETH sent to the contract address will be permanently locked.
Add an administrative function to withdraw native ETH from the contract balance to a designated treasury address.
Unresolved
The deposit function allows addresses with the DEPOSITOR_ROLE to mint new tokens at will. This centralizes control over the total supply and allows the controller to dilute existing token holders.
Implement a multi-signature requirement for the DEPOSITOR_ROLE and maintain transparency regarding the minting process via public event logs.
Unresolved
0.0% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 70.6% is held, unlocked, by 10 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. No single one holds a majority: their exits thin the market rather than hand anyone the pool. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them. This assessment covers the main pool, which holds 48% of the token's DEX liquidity; the other pools were not assessed.
Check the lock's end date and beneficiary on the locker's own page before relying on it.
Acknowledged
The ten largest holders own 16.8% of supply. Of that, 6.6% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 4.2% in wallets, 5.9% in other contracts. 69,439 holders in total.
Watch the largest wallets that are not exchanges, pools or locks — those are the ones that can move the price.
Acknowledged
Listed on CoinGecko as Uniswap (UNI), market cap $4.5B, rank #26. On GoPlus's list of trusted tokens. Traded on Binance. 69,439 holders. Verified by: CoinGecko, GoPlus, exchange listings.
Match the contract address against the project's official channels before trading.
Acknowledged
Liquidity $349K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $301.6M (CoinGecko, all markets, daily snapshot). 24h trading volume $72K (DexScreener, all pools).
Size any position to the liquidity and daily volume shown — they set how much you can sell and at what price.
Acknowledged
A token whose main use is voting on a protocol's decisions (delegation and vote checkpoints in its code). The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: CoinGecko category: Governance. Tokenomics — Supply: mintable with no on-chain cap found. Control: an owner that could not be resolved. Code: upgradeable proxy. Fees: no buy or sell tax. Market: $349K of DEX liquidity across 30 pools. Launch: 2200 days of market history.
Check how much of the voting supply insiders hold and what governance can change.
Acknowledged
The UChildERC20 contract functions as a bridge-compatible token on Polygon. It utilizes a standard OpenZeppelin-based access control and proxy pattern. While the core ERC-20 logic is standard, the contract includes privileged minting capabilities and a lack of mechanisms to recover accidentally sent ETH, which are common in bridge-related implementations.
The architecture follows standard proxy patterns (7.1 Architecture) and utilizes well-vetted OpenZeppelin libraries for ERC-20 and AccessControl (7.2 Code Security). The implementation is clean and adheres to standard interface requirements for bridge tokens. However, the contract lacks a mechanism to withdraw native ETH sent to the contract (7.8 Operations), leading to permanent loss of such funds.
The economic model relies on the DEPOSITOR_ROLE to manage supply (7.4 Economic). This centralizes control over token inflation, which is expected for bridge tokens but represents a significant trust requirement (7.3 Access Control). Governance is currently limited to role-based administration (7.5 Governance).
The contract utilizes a proxy pattern (7.7 Upgrades) allowing for logic updates. The implementation is verified and consistent with standard UUPS/Transparent proxy patterns. No immediate upgrade risks were identified in the current implementation.
The protocol should implement a 'sweep' function restricted to an admin role to allow the recovery of accidentally sent native ETH.
Additionally, ensure that the keys associated with the DEPOSITOR_ROLE are managed via a multi-signature wallet to mitigate the risk of unauthorized supply inflation.
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Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.
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