The StoxWrappedTokenVault contract, serving as an ERC-4626 implementation behind a BeaconProxy, has been audited. The contract is minimal, primarily relying on well-vetted OpenZeppelin upgradeable libraries. No critical or high-severity vulnerabilities were identified. Minor issues include potential compatibility challenges with non-standard ERC-20 assets and an unused initialization function. The upgradeability mechanism is correctly implemented.
Early-stage security check — honeypot & rug-pull analysis
Is Wrapped State Street SPDR Portfolio S&P 500 ETF ST0x a Scam?
Not verified
This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →The StoxWrappedTokenVault contract, serving as an ERC-4626 implementation behind a BeaconProxy, has been audited.
Read the full analysis- Ownership status UNKNOWN
- Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded
- Proxy contract
- Complex proxy pattern
- Top-10 concentration > 30%
- Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
- LP top1 unlocked holder = 100.0%
- LP top3 unlocked holders = 100.0%
- Token age < 7 days
- 1 Low finding(s) from audit
Exact factors
- Ownership status UNKNOWN (owner could not be resolved)
- Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded
- Proxy contract (upgradeable — admin can replace logic)
- Complex proxy pattern (BEACON)
- Top-10 concentration > 30% (98.2% total → 41.1% effective; 3.0% in EOAs, 95.2% in contracts — moderate)
- Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
- LP top1 unlocked holder = 100.0% (independent LP — depth risk, pool = 92% of DEX liquidity)
- LP top3 unlocked holders = 100.0% (independent LP — depth risk, pool = 92% of DEX liquidity)
- Token age < 7 days (early, volatile)
- 1 Low finding(s) from audit
Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed
Security Checklist
as of audit · Sep 6Holders
as of audit · Sep 6, 2026- Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking95.2%
- Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell3.0%
- Everyone elsethe rest of the supply1.8%
How holder types affect the score
Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.
Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Sep 6, 2026
Liquidity
as of audit · Sep 6- Uniswap v4STONXAnalysed$744.7K91.8%
- Hydrex CLAMMUSDC$64.1K7.9%
- Uniswap v4USDC$1.1K0.1%
- Uniswap v4USDC$6330.1%
- Uniswap v4USDC$6060.1%
- Uniswap v4USDC$990.0%
The risk score reads depth across every pair.
The LP tokens of the analysed pool are not locked or burned, so whoever holds them can withdraw that liquidity.
0x1791…e359No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.
Security Findings
LowPotential for Non-Standard ERC-20 Asset Issues
The StoxWrappedTokenVault is an ERC-4626 vault that wraps an underlying ERC-20 asset. While OpenZeppelin's ERC-4626 implementation is robust, certain non-standard ERC-20 tokens (e.g., rebase tokens, tokens with transfer fees, tokens that revert on zero-value transfers, tokens with non-boolean return values for transfer/transferFrom) can cause unexpected behavior, accounting discrepancies, or loss of funds within an ERC-4626 vault. The current contract does not implement specific safeguards or checks for such tokens, relying solely on the standard ERC-20 interface.L-01
Issue
The StoxWrappedTokenVault is an ERC-4626 vault that wraps an underlying ERC-20 asset. While OpenZeppelin's ERC-4626 implementation is robust, certain non-standard ERC-20 tokens (e.g., rebase tokens, tokens with transfer fees, tokens that revert on zero-value transfers, tokens with non-boolean return values for transfer/transferFrom) can cause unexpected behavior, accounting discrepancies, or loss of funds within an ERC-4626 vault. The current contract does not implement specific safeguards or checks for such tokens, relying solely on the standard ERC-20 interface.
Fix
Before deploying with a specific asset, thoroughly review the underlying ERC-20 token's contract for any non-standard behaviors. If such behaviors are identified, consider implementing custom logic within the vault (e.g., by overriding _deposit, _withdraw, _mint, _redeem functions) to handle them gracefully, or restrict the vault to only support standard ERC-20 tokens. Comprehensive testing with the chosen asset is crucial.
Status
Unresolved
InfoUnused/Decoy initialize(address) Function
The contract includes an initialize(address asset) external pure returns (bytes32) function that immediately reverts with InitializeSignatureFn(). This function is marked pure, meaning it cannot modify state, and its immediate revert makes it harmless. However, its presence alongside the actual initialize(bytes calldata data) function could be confusing or misleading for developers or auditors.I-01
initialize(address) FunctionIssue
The contract includes an initialize(address asset) external pure returns (bytes32) function that immediately reverts with InitializeSignatureFn(). This function is marked pure, meaning it cannot modify state, and its immediate revert makes it harmless. However, its presence alongside the actual initialize(bytes calldata data) function could be confusing or misleading for developers or auditors.
Fix
Consider removing the unused initialize(address asset) function to improve code clarity and reduce potential confusion. If it serves a specific, non-obvious purpose (e.g., preventing a specific signature collision), add a comment explaining its intent.
Status
Unresolved
InfoReliance on External ICloneableV2 Interface
The contract implements the ICloneableV2 interface and returns ICLONEABLE_V2_SUCCESS from its initialize function. This indicates that the contract is designed to be deployed via a factory that expects this specific interface and return value. While not a vulnerability in the vault itself, this is an important architectural dependency that should be understood for proper deployment, management, and interaction with the vault instances.I-02
ICloneableV2 InterfaceIssue
The contract implements the ICloneableV2 interface and returns ICLONEABLE_V2_SUCCESS from its initialize function. This indicates that the contract is designed to be deployed via a factory that expects this specific interface and return value. While not a vulnerability in the vault itself, this is an important architectural dependency that should be understood for proper deployment, management, and interaction with the vault instances.
Fix
Ensure that the factory deploying instances of this vault is correctly configured to interact with the ICloneableV2 interface and handles the expected return value. Document this architectural dependency clearly for future development and operational teams.
Status
Unresolved
Analysis
AI Copilotas of audit · Sep 6The contract (7.1 Architecture) is a straightforward ERC-4626 vault implementation, inheriting extensively from OpenZeppelin's battle-tested upgradeable contracts. This significantly reduces the attack surface and enhances (7.2 Code Security) robustness against common vulnerabilities like reentrancy and integer overflows. The initialization logic (7.3 Access Control) correctly uses the initializer modifier and _disableInitializers() in the constructor, preventing re-initialization on the implementation contract itself. A minor concern is the potential for unexpected behavior with non-standard ERC-20 assets (7.6 External), which is a common caveat for ERC-4626 vaults.
The contract implements a standard ERC-4626 vault (7.4 Economic) without introducing complex economic models, fees, or governance mechanisms (7.5 Governance). Its economic behavior is primarily dictated by the underlying asset and the ERC-4626 standard's share-to-asset conversion logic. The primary economic risk stems from the chosen underlying asset's properties, rather than the vault's internal mechanics.
The contract is designed as an upgradeable implementation for a BeaconProxy (7.7 Upgrades), correctly utilizing OpenZeppelin's Upgradeable pattern. The _disableInitializers() function in the constructor prevents direct initialization of the implementation contract, safeguarding against storage collisions. The initialize function, protected by the initializer modifier, ensures secure, one-time initialization for each proxy instance.
It is recommended to thoroughly test the vault with the specific underlying ERC-20 asset intended for deployment, paying close attention to any non-standard behaviors of the asset.
Implement robust monitoring for the vault's operations and the underlying asset's health. Consider adding explicit checks or warnings if non-standard ERC-20 tokens are to be supported in the future.
Contract & Record
Free for any token on the record. It links to this page and always shows the current score and the date it was checked.
- Sep 6, 202664Medium
Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.
Would You Like a More Detailed Audit of Wrapped State Street SPDR Portfolio S&P 500 ETF ST0x?
This token is brand new. Run a deeper AI-powered analysis of the contract code — free and instant.
Get Detailed Audit Is this your token? Publish your own audit on this page