The RipeToken contract serves as the governance token for Ripe DAO, implementing the ERC-20 standard with additional administrative features. It heavily relies on an external RipeHq contract for critical access control over minting, blacklisting, pausing, and governance changes. While this design centralizes control, a time-locked mechanism is in place for changing the RipeHq controller, enhancing security for administrative updates. The contract also includes EIP-2612 permit functionality and robust checks for transfers and allowances. Key risks stem from the extensive power delegated to the RipeHq contract and the critical one-time initial setup process.
On-chain security analysis — is it a scam or legit?
Is Ripe DAO Governance Token Safe?
Not verified
This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →The RipeToken contract serves as the governance token for Ripe DAO, implementing the ERC-20 standard with additional administrative features.
Read the full analysis- Ownership status UNKNOWN
- Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded
- Top-10 concentration > 30%
- Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
- LP top1 unlocked holder = 100.0%
- LP top3 unlocked holders = 100.0%
- 1 High finding(s) from audit
- 1 Medium finding(s) from audit
- 1 Low finding(s) from audit
Exact factors
- Ownership status UNKNOWN (owner could not be resolved)
- Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded
- Top-10 concentration > 30% (99.9% total → 42.9% effective; 4.9% in EOAs, 95.0% in contracts — moderate)
- Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
- LP top1 unlocked holder = 100.0% (independent LP — depth risk)
- LP top3 unlocked holders = 100.0% (independent LP — depth risk)
- 1 High finding(s) from audit
- 1 Medium finding(s) from audit
- 1 Low finding(s) from audit
Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed
Security Checklist
as of audit · Sep 4Holders
as of audit · Sep 4, 2026- Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking95.0%
- Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell4.9%
- Everyone elsethe rest of the supply0.1%
How holder types affect the score
Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.
Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Sep 4, 2026
Liquidity
as of audit · Sep 4The risk score reads depth across every pair.
The LP tokens of the analysed pool are not locked or burned, so whoever holds them can withdraw that liquidity.
0x3a71…e022No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.
Security Findings
HighCentralized Control and High Privileges of RipeHq
The RipeToken contract delegates critical functions such as mint, setBlacklist, setTokenPause, and the ability to change the RipeHq controller itself to the RipeHq contract. This centralizes significant power, making the token highly dependent on the security and governance of the RipeHq contract. A compromise of RipeHq or its governance could lead to arbitrary minting, freezing of user funds, or halting all token transfers. This represents a single point of failure for core token functionality (7.1 Architecture, 7.3 Access Control, 7.4 Economic, 7.5 Governance).H-01
Issue
The RipeToken contract delegates critical functions such as mint, setBlacklist, setTokenPause, and the ability to change the RipeHq controller itself to the RipeHq contract. This centralizes significant power, making the token highly dependent on the security and governance of the RipeHq contract. A compromise of RipeHq or its governance could lead to arbitrary minting, freezing of user funds, or halting all token transfers. This represents a single point of failure for core token functionality (7.1 Architecture, 7.3 Access Control, 7.4 Economic, 7.5 Governance).
Fix
Conduct a thorough security audit of the RipeHq contract, focusing on its access control, governance mechanisms, and overall resilience. Implement robust multi-signature or decentralized governance for the RipeHq contract to mitigate single points of failure. Clearly document the powers of the RipeHq and its governance to users.
Status
Unresolved
MediumCritical Initial Setup Dependency
The setInitialRipeHq function is a one-time call by the _initialGov (stored in tempGov) to establish the ripeHq address and hqChangeTimeLock. If this function is not called correctly, or if the _initialGov address is compromised before this call, the contract could be left in an unmanaged state or controlled by an attacker. The _isValidNewRipeHq check during this initial setup relies on the RipeHq contract's governance() view function, which must be correctly implemented (7.8 Operations).M-01
Issue
The setInitialRipeHq function is a one-time call by the _initialGov (stored in tempGov) to establish the ripeHq address and hqChangeTimeLock. If this function is not called correctly, or if the _initialGov address is compromised before this call, the contract could be left in an unmanaged state or controlled by an attacker. The _isValidNewRipeHq check during this initial setup relies on the RipeHq contract's governance() view function, which must be correctly implemented (7.8 Operations).
Fix
Ensure the _initialGov address is a highly secured multi-signature wallet or a trusted governance mechanism. Implement a meticulous deployment and initialization checklist. Consider adding an emergency 'lock' or 'pause' mechanism that can be triggered by a pre-defined trusted address if the initial setup fails or is compromised before setInitialRipeHq is called.
Status
Unresolved
LowStandard ERC-20 Front-Running Risks
Functions like approve and permit are susceptible to front-running attacks. An attacker can observe a pending transaction, and by submitting a transaction with a higher gas price, can either consume the allowance or set a different allowance before the legitimate transaction is confirmed. This is a common characteristic of ERC-20 tokens and not specific to this implementation (7.2 Code Security).L-01
Issue
Functions like approve and permit are susceptible to front-running attacks. An attacker can observe a pending transaction, and by submitting a transaction with a higher gas price, can either consume the allowance or set a different allowance before the legitimate transaction is confirmed. This is a common characteristic of ERC-20 tokens and not specific to this implementation (7.2 Code Security).
Fix
Educate users about the risks of front-running for approve and permit functions. Advise users to be cautious when approving large allowances and to use increaseAllowance/decreaseAllowance where possible, although these also have front-running risks. For permit, users should be aware of the nonce mechanism preventing replay attacks.
Status
Unresolved
InfoExtensive Administrative Capabilities
The contract includes robust administrative features such as blacklisting addresses, pausing transfers, and a time-locked mechanism for changing the RipeHq controller. While these features provide flexibility and control for managing the token, they also introduce a higher degree of centralization and potential for misuse if the controlling entities are compromised or act maliciously (7.3 Access Control, 7.5 Governance).I-01
Issue
The contract includes robust administrative features such as blacklisting addresses, pausing transfers, and a time-locked mechanism for changing the RipeHq controller. While these features provide flexibility and control for managing the token, they also introduce a higher degree of centralization and potential for misuse if the controlling entities are compromised or act maliciously (7.3 Access Control, 7.5 Governance).
Fix
Clearly document the administrative powers and the entities authorized to exercise them. Implement transparent reporting and monitoring of all administrative actions. Ensure that the governance process for these actions is robust and well-communicated to the community.
Status
Unresolved
InfoVyper Version
The contract uses Vyper version 0.4.3. While Vyper is generally considered secure, using a relatively new version might imply less battle-testing compared to older, more established versions. It's important to ensure the compiler version is stable and free from known bugs (7.2 Code Security).I-02
Issue
The contract uses Vyper version 0.4.3. While Vyper is generally considered secure, using a relatively new version might imply less battle-testing compared to older, more established versions. It's important to ensure the compiler version is stable and free from known bugs (7.2 Code Security).
Fix
Monitor Vyper's official releases and security advisories for version 0.4.3 and any subsequent updates. Ensure that the development environment uses a stable and recommended compiler version. Consider running additional fuzzing or formal verification if not already performed.
Status
Unresolved
Analysis
AI Copilotas of audit · Sep 4The RipeToken contract is a Vyper-based ERC-20 implementation with additional features. It demonstrates robust internal checks for transfers, including non-zero amounts, valid recipients, and blacklist status (7.2 Code Security). The contract also incorporates EIP-2612 permit functionality with nonce management and ERC-1271 support for contract wallets. However, a significant technical risk lies in the extensive delegation of critical functions (minting, blacklisting, pausing) to the external RipeHq contract, making the token's security highly dependent on the RipeHq's implementation and governance (7.1 Architecture, 7.3 Access Control).
The RipeToken contract exhibits a highly centralized governance and economic model, with the RipeHq contract holding extensive power (7.5 Governance). This includes the ability to mint new tokens, blacklist addresses (freezing funds), and pause all token transfers (7.4 Economic). While a time-locked mechanism for changing the RipeHq controller provides some safeguard, the overall security and economic stability of the RipeToken are directly tied to the integrity and security of the RipeHq contract and its controlling entities. The initial setup of the RipeHq address is a critical one-time operation that requires careful execution.
The RipeToken contract itself is not designed as an upgradeable proxy. However, the critical ripeHq controller address can be changed through a multi-step, time-locked process (initiateHqChange, confirmHqChange, cancelHqChange) (7.7 Upgrades). This mechanism provides a controlled way to 'upgrade' the administrative control over the token, including the ability to set a new hqChangeTimeLock within defined minimum and maximum bounds. This design introduces a delay for critical administrative changes, allowing time for scrutiny and intervention if necessary.
Prioritize a comprehensive security audit of the RipeHq contract, as its security directly dictates the security of the RipeToken.
Ensure the initial deployment and setInitialRipeHq call are executed with extreme care, verifying all parameters and the integrity of the _initialGov address. Implement robust monitoring for RipeHq related events, especially those concerning HqChangeInitiated and HqChangeConfirmed, to detect any unauthorized or suspicious activity promptly.
Contract & Record
Free for any token on the record. It links to this page and always shows the current score and the date it was checked.
- Sep 4, 202663Medium
- Sep 1, 202662Medium
Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the RIPE contract address?
The Ripe DAO Governance Token (RIPE) contract on Base is 0x2a0a59d6b975828e781ecac125dba40d7ee5ddc0. Compare it with the address the project itself publishes before trading: other contracts can carry the same name and ticker.
Is Ripe DAO Governance Token a scam?
Quantum Audit's risk score for Ripe DAO Governance Token is 63/100 (Medium risk) as of Sep 4, 2026, computed by a deterministic function from on-chain facts — Contract verified: Verified; Mint: Mintable; Liquidity lock: Not locked; Upgradeability: Fixed code; Honeypot: None found; Buy / sell tax: 0% / 0%. A score is a dated snapshot of those facts, not a guarantee; each one is listed on this page.
Is RIPE liquidity locked?
Liquidity lock: Not locked (as of Sep 4, 2026). Total DEX liquidity: $59.2K.
Who holds RIPE?
As of Sep 4, 2026, the 10 largest holders own 99.9% of the supply. The Holders section on this page shows who they are by holder type.
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