The contract is a standard ERC-20 token with additional fee-exclusion logic. Ownership has been renounced, meaning privileged functions are now dormant and cannot be modified. The protocol faces significant risks due to unhandled return values and locked ETH, though the core token transfer logic remains functional.
Early-stage security check — honeypot & rug-pull analysis
Is VRQQ a Scam?
Not verified
This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →The contract is a standard ERC-20 token with additional fee-exclusion logic.
Read the full analysis- LP lock ends in 19d
- Volume/Liquidity > 15×
- Code: Unauthorized Token Movement
- Code: Arithmetic Precision Loss
- Code: Trapped ETH in Contract
- Code: Ignored Transfer Return Values
Exact factors
- LP lock ends in 19d (short-term protection)
- Volume/Liquidity > 15× (18.6× — wash-trading signal)
- Code: Unauthorized Token Movement (Critical, static analysis)
- Code: Arithmetic Precision Loss (Low, static analysis)
- Code: Trapped ETH in Contract (Medium, static analysis)
- Code: Ignored Transfer Return Values (High, static analysis)
Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed
Security Checklist
as of audit · Nov 2Holders
as of audit · Nov 2, 2026- Burnedout of circulation95.2%
- DEX poolsthe pools' own liquidity0.1%
- Everyone else19,728 holders4.7%
How holder types affect the score
Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.
Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Nov 2, 2026
Liquidity
as of audit · Nov 2The risk score reads depth across every pair.
The LP tokens of the analysed pool are locked or burned.
0x0ed9…97060x3438…f1eaNo privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.
Security Findings
CriticalUnauthorized Token Movement
The _executeSwapAndLiquify function uses transferFrom to move tokens from arbitrary addresses, potentially allowing the contract to drain funds from users who have approved the contract.CD-01
Issue
The _executeSwapAndLiquify function uses transferFrom to move tokens from arbitrary addresses, potentially allowing the contract to drain funds from users who have approved the contract.
Fix
Restrict the source of tokens in transferFrom to only the contract's own balance or authorized liquidity pools.
Status
Unresolved
HighIgnored Transfer Return Values
The _executeSwapAndLiquify function performs token transfers without checking the boolean return value, which may lead to silent failures in liquidity operations.CD-04
Issue
The _executeSwapAndLiquify function performs token transfers without checking the boolean return value, which may lead to silent failures in liquidity operations.
Fix
Always check the return value of ERC-20 transfers or use SafeERC20 wrappers.
Status
Unresolved
MediumTrapped ETH in Contract
The contract includes a receive function that accepts ETH, but there are no functions implemented to withdraw or transfer this ETH out of the contract.CD-03
Issue
The contract includes a receive function that accepts ETH, but there are no functions implemented to withdraw or transfer this ETH out of the contract.
Fix
Implement an owner-restricted withdrawal function to recover accidentally sent ETH.
Status
Unresolved
LowArithmetic Precision Loss
The functions _executeSwapAndLiquify and _transfer perform division before multiplication, which can lead to rounding errors and loss of precision in fee calculations.CD-02
Issue
The functions _executeSwapAndLiquify and _transfer perform division before multiplication, which can lead to rounding errors and loss of precision in fee calculations.
Fix
Perform all multiplications before divisions to maintain maximum precision.
Status
Unresolved
InfoWho holds the supply
The ten largest holders own 95.3% of supply. Of that, 95.2% burned — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 0.0% in wallets, 0.0% in other contracts. 19,738 holders in total.QA-HOLDERS
Issue
The ten largest holders own 95.3% of supply. Of that, 95.2% burned — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 0.0% in wallets, 0.0% in other contracts. 19,738 holders in total.
Fix
Watch the largest wallets that are not exchanges, pools or locks — those are the ones that can move the price.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoNot listed by any independent source
19,738 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.QA-IDENTITY
Issue
19,738 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.
Fix
Match the contract address against the project's official channels before trading.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoLiquidity time-locked
98.2% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 98.2% is locked in PinkLock02 until 22 Nov 2026 (19 days). Until then nobody — the project included — can withdraw it unless the locker contract itself is flawed; after that date the lock's owner can. That date is close: treat it as short-term protection. 1.8% is held, unlocked, by 2 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. No single one holds a majority: their exits thin the market rather than hand anyone the pool.QA-LIQUIDITY
Issue
98.2% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 98.2% is locked in PinkLock02 until 22 Nov 2026 (19 days). Until then nobody — the project included — can withdraw it unless the locker contract itself is flawed; after that date the lock's owner can. That date is close: treat it as short-term protection. 1.8% is held, unlocked, by 2 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. No single one holds a majority: their exits thin the market rather than hand anyone the pool.
Fix
Check the lock's end date and beneficiary on the locker's own page before relying on it.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoThe market for this token
Liquidity $413K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $7.7M (DexScreener, all pools).QA-MARKET
Issue
Liquidity $413K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $7.7M (DexScreener, all pools).
Fix
Size any position to the liquidity and daily volume shown — they set how much you can sell and at what price.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoAsset class: Project token
A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: fixed — the contract has no mint function. Control: nobody (ownership renounced). Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: 3.9% on buy, 3.97% on sell. Market: $413K of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: under a day of market history.QA-PROFILE
Issue
A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: fixed — the contract has no mint function. Control: nobody (ownership renounced). Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: 3.9% on buy, 3.97% on sell. Market: $413K of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: under a day of market history.
Fix
Check the project's own documentation for what the token is used for; this report covers what the contract allows.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoRecently launched — less than a day of market history
The token's oldest DEX pool is less than a day old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.QA-RECENT
Issue
The token's oldest DEX pool is less than a day old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.
Fix
Re-check ownership, liquidity and holder distribution as the token matures; those are the facts that move early.
Status
Acknowledged
Analysis
AI Copilotas of audit · Nov 2The architecture follows standard ERC-20 patterns with integrated fee-exclusion mechanisms. 7.1 Architecture and 7.2 Code Security are generally sound, though 7.6 External interactions are flawed. The implementation of _executeSwapAndLiquify lacks necessary return value checks and proper arithmetic ordering, which could lead to unexpected state changes.
7.5 Governance is effectively neutralized as ownership has been renounced. 7.4 Economic parameters are fixed, preventing further manipulation of fee structures. The lack of an exit strategy for trapped ETH represents a permanent economic inefficiency.
7.7 Upgrades are not supported as the contract is not a proxy. The logic is immutable, ensuring consistency but preventing future security patches. 7.8 Operations are limited to standard token transfers.
The protocol should acknowledge the permanent loss of any ETH sent to the contract address, as there is no recovery mechanism.
Given that ownership is renounced, no further administrative changes can be made to fix the identified logic flaws; users should exercise caution regarding the token's liquidity mechanisms.
Contract & Record
Free for any token on the record. It links to this page and always shows the current score and the date it was checked.
- Nov 2, 202684High
Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the VRQQ contract address?
The VRQQ contract on BNB Chain is 0xbcad3fd02604408cb6444b501dd830638121d20c. Compare it with the address the project itself publishes before trading: other contracts can carry the same name and ticker.
Is VRQQ a scam?
Quantum Audit's risk score for VRQQ is 84/100 (High risk) as of Nov 2, 2026, computed by a deterministic function from on-chain facts — Contract verified: Verified; Ownership: Renounced; Mint: No mint; Liquidity lock: Locked; Upgradeability: Fixed code; Honeypot: None found; Buy / sell tax: 3.9% / 4%. A score is a dated snapshot of those facts, not a guarantee; each one is listed on this page.
Is VRQQ liquidity locked?
Liquidity lock: Locked (as of Nov 2, 2026). Total DEX liquidity: $413.0K.
Who holds VRQQ?
As of Nov 2, 2026, the 10 largest holders own 95.3% of the supply across 19,738 holders. The Holders section on this page shows who they are by holder type.
Would You Like a More Detailed Audit of VRQQ?
This token is brand new. Run a deeper AI-powered analysis of the contract code — free and instant.
Get Detailed Audit Is this your token? Add your links and get it Verified