Early-stage security check — honeypot & rug-pull analysis
BNB ChainThe contract is a standard ERC-20 token with custom fee-exclusion logic.
Read the full analysisEach factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed
Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.
Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Oct 20, 2026
The risk score reads depth across every pair.
The LP tokens of the analysed pool are locked or burned.
0x0ed9…97060xda42…6bf5No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.
The _executeSwapAndLiquify function allows the contract to move tokens from any address that has previously approved the contract, potentially leading to unauthorized drainage of user funds.
Restrict the _executeSwapAndLiquify function to only move tokens owned by the contract itself rather than arbitrary addresses.
Unresolved
The _executeSwapAndLiquify function fails to check the boolean return value of ERC-20 transfers, which can lead to silent failures where tokens are not moved but the contract state assumes success.
Always verify the return value of transfer calls or use OpenZeppelin's SafeERC20 library.
Unresolved
The contract accepts ETH via the receive function but lacks any mechanism to withdraw or utilize these funds, effectively locking any ETH sent to the contract address permanently.
Implement a withdrawal function restricted to a secure multi-sig or governance contract to recover trapped ETH.
Unresolved
The contract performs division before multiplication in _executeSwapAndLiquify and _transfer, which causes precision loss and potential rounding errors in fee calculations.
Reorder mathematical operations to perform multiplication before division to maintain precision.
Unresolved
The ten largest holders own 90.4% of supply. Of that, 90.0% burned, 0.3% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 0.1% in wallets, 0.0% in other contracts. 17,044 holders in total.
Watch the largest wallets that are not exchanges, pools or locks — those are the ones that can move the price.
Acknowledged
17,044 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.
Match the contract address against the project's official channels before trading.
Acknowledged
97.3% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 97.3% is locked in PinkLock02 until 01 Nov 2026 (11 days). Until then nobody — the project included — can withdraw it unless the locker contract itself is flawed; after that date the lock's owner can. That date is close: treat it as short-term protection. 2.7% is held, unlocked, by 1 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. No single one holds a majority: their exits thin the market rather than hand anyone the pool.
Check the lock's end date and beneficiary on the locker's own page before relying on it.
Acknowledged
Liquidity $113K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $4.3M (DexScreener, all pools).
Size any position to the liquidity and daily volume shown — they set how much you can sell and at what price.
Acknowledged
A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: fixed — the contract has no mint function. Control: nobody (ownership renounced). Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: 4% on buy, 4.02% on sell. Market: $113K of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: under a day of market history.
Check the project's own documentation for what the token is used for; this report covers what the contract allows.
Acknowledged
The token's oldest DEX pool is less than a day old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.
Re-check ownership, liquidity and holder distribution as the token matures; those are the facts that move early.
Acknowledged
The contract is a standard ERC-20 token with custom fee-exclusion logic. Ownership has been renounced, meaning privileged functions like setTrailblazers are now permanently disabled. The audit identified critical vulnerabilities regarding token movement and ETH handling that pose significant risks to users.
The architecture follows standard ERC-20 patterns with an added fee-exclusion mechanism. 7.1 Architecture is standard, 7.2 Code Security is compromised by unchecked return values, and 7.3 Access Control is currently locked due to renounced ownership. 7.6 External interactions are flawed, specifically in the _executeSwapAndLiquify function which lacks proper validation.
7.4 Economic and 7.5 Governance are currently static as ownership is renounced. No further changes to fee structures or tokenomics can be made by the original deployer. The economic model relies on the contract's ability to handle liquidity, which is currently impaired.
7.7 Upgrades are not supported as this is a non-proxy contract. The logic is immutable, ensuring no future backdoors can be introduced via upgrade patterns. 7.8 Operations are limited to standard token transfers.
The contract is currently in a high-risk state due to the critical vulnerability in the liquidity execution logic.
Since ownership is renounced, these issues cannot be patched by the original developers. Users should exercise extreme caution. The inability to recover ETH sent to the contract and the potential for unauthorized token movement via the swap function represent significant security hazards that cannot be mitigated without a migration to a new, audited contract.
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