Quantum Audit Logo
Launch App

Early-stage security check — honeypot & rug-pull analysis

Is The House Wick a Scam?

WICKBNB Chain
Not verified This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →
Last checked Oct 20, 2026 · 1 audit on recordNew Launch · 13h old
SummaryAI Copilot

The Wick protocol is an ERC-20 token with integrated rebase and swapback mechanisms.

Read the full analysis
What raised the score
  • Owner can change any holder's balance
  • Hidden owner — control survives an apparent renounce; held by keeper: EOA
  • Owner can pause all transfers; held by keeper: EOA
  • A privileged address controls a switch that decides whether transfers go through; held by keeper: EOA
  • Owner can change the buy/sell tax; held by keeper: EOA
  • A privileged address can change transfer or wallet limits; held by keeper: EOA
  • Liquidity < $50k
  • Code: Arbitrary ETH Transfer Vulnerability
Exact factors
  • Owner can change any holder's balance (seize or credit tokens); held by keeper: EOA
  • Hidden owner — control survives an apparent renounce; held by keeper: EOA
  • Owner can pause all transfers; held by keeper: EOA
  • A privileged address controls a switch that decides whether transfers go through; held by keeper: EOA
  • Owner can change the buy/sell tax; held by keeper: EOA
  • A privileged address can change transfer or wallet limits; held by keeper: EOA
  • Liquidity < $50k ($36,970 across 1 pairs — thin market)
  • Code: Arbitrary ETH Transfer Vulnerability (High, static analysis)

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Early-stage analysis. This token has limited on-chain history (13h old). New tokens carry elevated risk — data may change rapidly. Always verify independently before investing.

Security Checklist

as of audit · Oct 206 of 7 checks passed
Contract verifiedVerified
OwnershipRenounced
MintNo mint
Liquidity lockLocked
UpgradeabilityFixed code
HoneypotNone found
Buy / sell tax5% / 5%

Holders

as of audit · Oct 20, 2026101 holders
15.3%Contracts8.8%Wallets56.4%DEX pools19.5%Everyone else
15.3%8.8%56.4%DEX pools19.5%Everyone else
ContractsWalletsDEX poolsEveryone elseBubble area = share of supply
80.5%of supply sits with the top 10 holders
  • Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking15.3%
  • Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell8.8%
  • DEX poolsthe pools' own liquidity56.4%
  • Everyone else91 holders19.5%
Effective concentrationwhat the score reads14.9%
How holder types affect the score

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Oct 20, 2026

Liquidity

as of audit · Oct 20$37.0K

The risk score reads depth across every pair.

LP tokensLocked

The LP tokens of the analysed pool are locked or burned.

Analysed pool$37.0KShare of depth100.0%
LP Locked100.0% · Null Address, PinkLock02

Security Findings

1 High2 Medium1 Low6 Info
High

Arbitrary ETH Transfer Vulnerability

The _payout function allows for the transfer of ETH to addresses that can be influenced by the caller. This could potentially allow a malicious actor to drain contract funds if the payout logic is triggered under specific conditions.CD-01

Issue

The _payout function allows for the transfer of ETH to addresses that can be influenced by the caller. This could potentially allow a malicious actor to drain contract funds if the payout logic is triggered under specific conditions.

Fix

Implement strict validation on the recipient address and ensure that the payout logic is protected against reentrancy and unauthorized access.

Status

Unresolved

Medium

Centralized Control Over Transfer Functionality

The keeper address has the power to toggle switches that determine whether transfers or sales are permitted. This allows the keeper to effectively freeze user funds or halt trading at will.CP-05

Issue

The keeper address has the power to toggle switches that determine whether transfers or sales are permitted. This allows the keeper to effectively freeze user funds or halt trading at will.

Fix

Consider implementing a time-lock or a decentralized voting mechanism for actions that can halt protocol functionality.

Status

Unresolved

Medium

Keeper Control Over Transfer Fees

The keeper can modify the transfer fees applied to transactions. This grants the keeper the ability to unilaterally change the economic cost of using the token.CP-07

Issue

The keeper can modify the transfer fees applied to transactions. This grants the keeper the ability to unilaterally change the economic cost of using the token.

Fix

Define a maximum fee cap in the contract code to prevent the keeper from setting exorbitant fees.

Status

Unresolved

Low

Keeper Control Over Transaction Limits

The keeper can change transaction or wallet size limits, which directly impacts the liquidity and accessibility of the token for users.CP-08

Issue

The keeper can change transaction or wallet size limits, which directly impacts the liquidity and accessibility of the token for users.

Fix

Document these limits clearly and consider setting hard-coded boundaries that the keeper cannot exceed.

Status

Unresolved

Info

Who holds the supply

The ten largest holders own 80.5% of supply. Of that, 56.4% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 8.8% in wallets, 15.3% in other contracts. 101 holders in total.QA-HOLDERS

Issue

The ten largest holders own 80.5% of supply. Of that, 56.4% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 8.8% in wallets, 15.3% in other contracts. 101 holders in total.

Fix

Watch the largest wallets that are not exchanges, pools or locks — those are the ones that can move the price.

Status

Acknowledged

Info

Not listed by any independent source

101 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.QA-IDENTITY

Issue

101 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.

Fix

Match the contract address against the project's official channels before trading.

Status

Acknowledged

Info

Liquidity time-locked

100.0% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 100.0% is locked in PinkLock02 until 20 Oct 2027 (364 days). Until then nobody — the project included — can withdraw it unless the locker contract itself is flawed; after that date the lock's owner can. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them.QA-LIQUIDITY

Issue

100.0% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 100.0% is locked in PinkLock02 until 20 Oct 2027 (364 days). Until then nobody — the project included — can withdraw it unless the locker contract itself is flawed; after that date the lock's owner can. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them.

Fix

Check the lock's end date and beneficiary on the locker's own page before relying on it.

Status

Acknowledged

Info

The market for this token

Liquidity $37K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $100K (DexScreener, all pools).QA-MARKET

Issue

Liquidity $37K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $100K (DexScreener, all pools).

Fix

Size any position to the liquidity and daily volume shown — they set how much you can sell and at what price.

Status

Acknowledged

Info

Asset class: Project token

A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: fixed — the contract has no mint function. Control: nobody (ownership renounced). Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: 5% on buy, 5% on sell. Market: $37K of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: under a day of market history.QA-PROFILE

Issue

A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: fixed — the contract has no mint function. Control: nobody (ownership renounced). Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: 5% on buy, 5% on sell. Market: $37K of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: under a day of market history.

Fix

Check the project's own documentation for what the token is used for; this report covers what the contract allows.

Status

Acknowledged

Info

Recently launched — less than a day of market history

The token's oldest DEX pool is less than a day old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.QA-RECENT

Issue

The token's oldest DEX pool is less than a day old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.

Fix

Re-check ownership, liquidity and holder distribution as the token matures; those are the facts that move early.

Status

Acknowledged

Analysis

AI Copilotas of audit · Oct 20
Executive SummaryWhat the contract is and what the review found

The Wick protocol is an ERC-20 token with integrated rebase and swapback mechanisms. While ownership of the contract has been renounced, the protocol relies on a 'KEEPER' address that maintains significant control over transfer rules, fees, and oracle-based state transitions. The audit identified a critical vulnerability regarding arbitrary ETH transfers and medium-risk concerns regarding centralized control over token economics.

Technical6/10Medium risk

The architecture utilizes standard OpenZeppelin libraries for reentrancy protection and ERC-20 compliance. 7.1 Architecture: The contract implements a custom rebase and swapback logic triggered by a keeper. 7.2 Code Security: The logic is generally sound, but the _payout function exposes the contract to potential reentrancy or fund drainage. 7.3 Access Control: While ownership is renounced, the KEEPER role remains a central point of failure for protocol operations.

Governance6/10Medium risk

7.4 Economic: The protocol relies on a keeper to trigger rebases and fee distributions, creating a dependency on an external actor. 7.5 Governance: There is no decentralized governance mechanism; the keeper holds unilateral power over economic parameters. 7.8 Operations: The reliance on a single keeper address for critical state updates poses a significant operational risk to token holders.

Upgrades6/10Medium risk

7.7 Upgrades: The contract is not upgradeable, which provides security against malicious logic changes post-deployment. The lack of proxy patterns ensures that the code deployed is the code that remains, though it prevents fixing the identified vulnerabilities without a migration.

Final RecommendationWhat to do about this score

The protocol should immediately address the critical ETH payout vulnerability by implementing strict access controls or reentrancy guards on all external-facing payout functions.

It is recommended to transition the KEEPER role to a multi-signature wallet or a decentralized DAO to mitigate the risks associated with centralized control over economic parameters. Furthermore, ensure that all state-changing functions are thoroughly tested against edge cases in the oracle feed, as the current implementation relies heavily on the accuracy and availability of the external price data to prevent unexpected rebase behavior.

Contract & Record

1 audit on record
TypeStaking, Router, Token
NetworkBNB Chain
Token age13h
Contract0xbc47…70bc
Deployer0x5d1d…0dc3
Badge for your website
The House Wick security record badge

Free for any token on the record. It links to this page and always shows the current score and the date it was checked.

Audit History
  1. Oct 20, 202684High

Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is the WICK contract address?

The The House Wick (WICK) contract on BNB Chain is 0xbc4721b16eec6197496524ea0d8082ab08a470bc. Compare it with the address the project itself publishes before trading: other contracts can carry the same name and ticker.

Is The House Wick a scam?

Quantum Audit's risk score for The House Wick is 84/100 (High risk) as of Oct 20, 2026, computed by a deterministic function from on-chain facts — Contract verified: Verified; Ownership: Renounced; Mint: No mint; Liquidity lock: Locked; Upgradeability: Fixed code; Honeypot: None found; Buy / sell tax: 5% / 5%. A score is a dated snapshot of those facts, not a guarantee; each one is listed on this page.

Is WICK liquidity locked?

Liquidity lock: Locked (as of Oct 20, 2026). Total DEX liquidity: $37.0K.

Who holds WICK?

As of Oct 20, 2026, the 10 largest holders own 80.5% of the supply across 101 holders. The Holders section on this page shows who they are by holder type.

Would You Like a More Detailed Audit of The House Wick?

This token is brand new. Run a deeper AI-powered analysis of the contract code — free and instant.

Get Detailed Audit Is this your token? Publish your own audit on this page