The Token contract implements standard ERC-20 functionality with custom fee exclusion logic. Ownership has been renounced, meaning privileged functions are now dormant. However, critical flaws in the internal swap logic and ETH handling pose significant risks to token integrity and fund accessibility.

Early-stage security check — honeypot & rug-pull analysis
Is VRQQ a Scam?
Not verified
This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →The Token contract implements standard ERC-20 functionality with custom fee exclusion logic.
Read the full analysis- LP lock ends in 19d
- Volume/Liquidity > 15×
- Code: Unauthorized Token Movement
- Code: Rounding Loss via Division Before Multiplication
- Code: Trapped ETH in Contract
- Code: Unchecked ERC-20 Transfer Result
Exact factors
- LP lock ends in 19d (short-term protection)
- Volume/Liquidity > 15× (179.1× — wash-trading signal)
- Code: Unauthorized Token Movement (Critical, static analysis)
- Code: Rounding Loss via Division Before Multiplication (Low, static analysis)
- Code: Trapped ETH in Contract (Medium, static analysis)
- Code: Unchecked ERC-20 Transfer Result (High, static analysis)
Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed
Security Checklist
as of audit · Oct 31Holders
as of audit · Oct 31, 2026- Burnedout of circulation95.2%
- DEX poolsthe pools' own liquidity0.5%
- Everyone else39,367 holders4.2%
How holder types affect the score
Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.
Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Oct 31, 2026
Liquidity
as of audit · Oct 31The risk score reads depth across every pair.
The LP tokens of the analysed pool are locked or burned.
0x0ed9…97060x03d0…57e8No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.
Security Findings
CriticalUnauthorized Token Movement
The _executeSwapAndLiquify function uses transferFrom to move tokens from arbitrary addresses, potentially allowing the contract to drain tokens from any user who has approved the contract.CD-01
Issue
The _executeSwapAndLiquify function uses transferFrom to move tokens from arbitrary addresses, potentially allowing the contract to drain tokens from any user who has approved the contract.
Fix
Restrict the source address in transferFrom to only the contract's own balance or authorized liquidity pools.
Status
Unresolved
HighUnchecked ERC-20 Transfer Result
The _executeSwapAndLiquify function ignores the boolean return value of ERC-20 transfers, which can lead to silent failures where tokens are not moved as expected.CD-04
Issue
The _executeSwapAndLiquify function ignores the boolean return value of ERC-20 transfers, which can lead to silent failures where tokens are not moved as expected.
Fix
Always check the return value of transfer and transferFrom calls, or use OpenZeppelin's SafeERC20 library.
Status
Unresolved
MediumTrapped ETH in Contract
The contract includes a receive function that accepts ETH, but there is no mechanism to withdraw or transfer these funds out, causing them to be permanently locked.CD-03
Issue
The contract includes a receive function that accepts ETH, but there is no mechanism to withdraw or transfer these funds out, causing them to be permanently locked.
Fix
Implement an owner-restricted withdrawal function to recover accidentally sent ETH.
Status
Unresolved
LowRounding Loss via Division Before Multiplication
The _executeSwapAndLiquify and _transfer functions perform division before multiplication, which leads to precision loss and incorrect fee calculations.CD-02
Issue
The _executeSwapAndLiquify and _transfer functions perform division before multiplication, which leads to precision loss and incorrect fee calculations.
Fix
Perform all multiplications before divisions to maintain precision.
Status
Unresolved
InfoWho holds the supply
The ten largest holders own 95.8% of supply. Of that, 95.2% burned, 0.5% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 0.0% in wallets, 0.0% in other contracts. 39,377 holders in total.QA-HOLDERS
Issue
The ten largest holders own 95.8% of supply. Of that, 95.2% burned, 0.5% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 0.0% in wallets, 0.0% in other contracts. 39,377 holders in total.
Fix
Watch the largest wallets that are not exchanges, pools or locks — those are the ones that can move the price.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoNot listed by any independent source
39,377 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.QA-IDENTITY
Issue
39,377 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.
Fix
Match the contract address against the project's official channels before trading.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoLiquidity time-locked
96.0% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 96.0% is locked in PinkLock02 until 20 Nov 2026 (19 days). Until then nobody — the project included — can withdraw it unless the locker contract itself is flawed; after that date the lock's owner can. That date is close: treat it as short-term protection. 4.0% is held, unlocked, by 2 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. No single one holds a majority: their exits thin the market rather than hand anyone the pool. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them.QA-LIQUIDITY
Issue
96.0% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 96.0% is locked in PinkLock02 until 20 Nov 2026 (19 days). Until then nobody — the project included — can withdraw it unless the locker contract itself is flawed; after that date the lock's owner can. That date is close: treat it as short-term protection. 4.0% is held, unlocked, by 2 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. No single one holds a majority: their exits thin the market rather than hand anyone the pool. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them.
Fix
Check the lock's end date and beneficiary on the locker's own page before relying on it.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoThe market for this token
Liquidity $73K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $13.1M (DexScreener, all pools).QA-MARKET
Issue
Liquidity $73K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $13.1M (DexScreener, all pools).
Fix
Size any position to the liquidity and daily volume shown — they set how much you can sell and at what price.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoAsset class: Project token
A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: fixed — the contract has no mint function. Control: nobody (ownership renounced). Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: 3.9% on buy, 3.91% on sell. Market: $73K of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: under a day of market history.QA-PROFILE
Issue
A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: fixed — the contract has no mint function. Control: nobody (ownership renounced). Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: 3.9% on buy, 3.91% on sell. Market: $73K of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: under a day of market history.
Fix
Check the project's own documentation for what the token is used for; this report covers what the contract allows.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoRecently launched — less than a day of market history
The token's oldest DEX pool is less than a day old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.QA-RECENT
Issue
The token's oldest DEX pool is less than a day old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.
Fix
Re-check ownership, liquidity and holder distribution as the token matures; those are the facts that move early.
Status
Acknowledged
Analysis
AI Copilotas of audit · Oct 31The architecture follows standard ERC-20 patterns but contains flawed internal logic in the swap mechanism. 7.1 Architecture is standard, but 7.2 Code Security is compromised by unchecked return values and improper arithmetic. 7.3 Access Control is currently locked due to renounced ownership, preventing further configuration changes. 7.6 External interactions are risky due to the lack of withdrawal mechanisms for trapped ETH.
7.4 Economic and 7.5 Governance are currently static as ownership is renounced. No further changes to fee exclusions or economic parameters can be made by the deployer. The protocol relies entirely on the immutable code deployed on-chain.
7.7 Upgrades are not supported as the contract is not a proxy. The code is immutable, which provides security against malicious upgrades but prevents patching the identified critical vulnerabilities.
The contract should be considered high-risk due to the critical vulnerability in the swap logic that allows unauthorized token movement.
Since ownership is renounced, the current code cannot be patched or updated to fix these issues. Users and liquidity providers should exercise extreme caution. The trapped ETH in the contract is permanently inaccessible, and the token transfer mechanism is unreliable due to the ignored return values in the swap function.
Contract & Record
Free for any token on the record. It links to this page and always shows the current score and the date it was checked.
- Oct 31, 202682High
Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.
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