VeltrionToken is a standard ERC-20 token with additional administrative controls allowing for minting, burning, and transfer restrictions. The contract relies on a centralized 'minter' role to manage supply and liquidity pool interactions. While the code follows standard patterns, the high level of centralization poses significant risks to token holders.
Early-stage security check — honeypot & rug-pull analysis
Is VELTRION ARC a Scam?
Not verified
This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →VeltrionToken is a standard ERC-20 token with additional administrative controls allowing for minting, burning, and transfer restrictions.
Read the full analysis- A privileged address controls a switch that decides whether transfers go through; held by minter: Other-Contract
- Owner can blacklist or freeze individual holders; held by minter: Other-Contract
- Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded; held by minter: Other-Contract
- Ownership status UNKNOWN
- Liquidity < $50k
Exact factors
- A privileged address controls a switch that decides whether transfers go through; held by minter: Other-Contract
- Owner can blacklist or freeze individual holders; held by minter: Other-Contract
- Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded; held by minter: Other-Contract
- Ownership status UNKNOWN (owner could not be resolved)
- Liquidity < $50k ($38,907 across 1 pairs — thin market)
Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed
Security Checklist
as of audit · Oct 30Holders
as of audit · Oct 30, 2026- Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking0.9%
- Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell8.8%
- Burnedout of circulation4.8%
- DEX poolsthe pools' own liquidity22.3%
- Everyone else2,030 holders63.2%
How holder types affect the score
Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.
Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Oct 30, 2026
Liquidity
as of audit · Oct 30The risk score reads depth across every pair.
The LP tokens of the analysed pool are locked or burned.
0x0ed9…9706No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.
Security Findings
MediumCentralized Minting Authority
The 'minter' address has the power to call the mint function, which increases the total supply of tokens. This allows the controller to dilute the holdings of all existing token holders at any time.CP-01
Issue
The 'minter' address has the power to call the mint function, which increases the total supply of tokens. This allows the controller to dilute the holdings of all existing token holders at any time.
Fix
Restrict the minting capability to a capped amount or transition the minter role to a decentralized governance mechanism.
Status
Unresolved
MediumCentralized Transfer Control
The 'minter' can call disableBlocks to toggle a global switch that impacts transfer functionality. This gives the controller the ability to halt trading or restrict token movement across the entire ecosystem.CP-05
Issue
The 'minter' can call disableBlocks to toggle a global switch that impacts transfer functionality. This gives the controller the ability to halt trading or restrict token movement across the entire ecosystem.
Fix
Remove the ability to globally disable transfers or implement a time-lock to ensure any such action is transparent and expected by the community.
Status
Unresolved
MediumArbitrary Address Blocking
The 'minter' can use setPoolBlocked to prevent specific addresses from interacting with the token. This allows the controller to censor individual users or liquidity pools, effectively freezing their assets.CP-06
Issue
The 'minter' can use setPoolBlocked to prevent specific addresses from interacting with the token. This allows the controller to censor individual users or liquidity pools, effectively freezing their assets.
Fix
Limit the use of address blocking to specific, well-defined scenarios (e.g., compliance) and ensure the logic is transparently documented.
Status
Unresolved
InfoWho holds the supply
The ten largest holders own 36.8% of supply. Of that, 4.8% burned, 22.3% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 8.8% in wallets, 0.9% in other contracts. 2,040 holders in total.QA-HOLDERS
Issue
The ten largest holders own 36.8% of supply. Of that, 4.8% burned, 22.3% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 8.8% in wallets, 0.9% in other contracts. 2,040 holders in total.
Fix
Watch the largest wallets that are not exchanges, pools or locks — those are the ones that can move the price.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoNot listed by any independent source
2,040 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.QA-IDENTITY
Issue
2,040 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.
Fix
Match the contract address against the project's official channels before trading.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoLiquidity burned — cannot be withdrawn
99.2% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 99.2% of the LP tokens were sent to a burn address — that liquidity can never be withdrawn by anyone. 0.7% is held, unlocked, by 1 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. No single one holds a majority: their exits thin the market rather than hand anyone the pool. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them.QA-LIQUIDITY
Issue
99.2% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 99.2% of the LP tokens were sent to a burn address — that liquidity can never be withdrawn by anyone. 0.7% is held, unlocked, by 1 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. No single one holds a majority: their exits thin the market rather than hand anyone the pool. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them.
Fix
Check the lock's end date and beneficiary on the locker's own page before relying on it.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoThe market for this token
Liquidity $39K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $355K (DexScreener, all pools).QA-MARKET
Issue
Liquidity $39K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $355K (DexScreener, all pools).
Fix
Size any position to the liquidity and daily volume shown — they set how much you can sell and at what price.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoAsset class: Project token
A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: mintable with no on-chain cap found. Control: an owner that could not be resolved. Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: 1% on buy, 2% on sell. Market: $39K of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: under a day of market history.QA-PROFILE
Issue
A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: mintable with no on-chain cap found. Control: an owner that could not be resolved. Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: 1% on buy, 2% on sell. Market: $39K of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: under a day of market history.
Fix
Check the project's own documentation for what the token is used for; this report covers what the contract allows.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoRecently launched — less than a day of market history
The token's oldest DEX pool is less than a day old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.QA-RECENT
Issue
The token's oldest DEX pool is less than a day old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.
Fix
Re-check ownership, liquidity and holder distribution as the token matures; those are the facts that move early.
Status
Acknowledged
Analysis
AI Copilotas of audit · Oct 30The contract implements standard ERC-20 functionality with clean, well-structured logic. 7.1 Architecture is straightforward, utilizing a single-contract design. 7.2 Code Security is high, with no evidence of reentrancy or overflow vulnerabilities. 7.3 Access Control is strictly enforced via the 'onlyMinter' modifier, ensuring only authorized addresses can execute sensitive functions.
7.4 Economic and 7.5 Governance aspects are highly centralized. The 'minter' role has unilateral control over supply inflation and the ability to freeze liquidity pools. This creates a single point of failure where the controller can significantly impact the token's market value. 7.6 External dependencies are minimal, but the reliance on the 'minter' address is absolute.
7.7 Upgrades are not supported as the contract is not a proxy. 7.8 Operations are limited to the initial setup and ongoing management by the minter. The lack of upgradeability ensures the logic remains immutable, which is a positive security trait.
The protocol should transition the 'minter' role to a multi-signature wallet or a decentralized governance contract to mitigate the risks associated with a single point of failure.
Implementing a time-lock mechanism for sensitive administrative actions would provide transparency and protection for token holders against sudden changes in transfer rules or supply.
Contract & Record
Free for any token on the record. It links to this page and always shows the current score and the date it was checked.
- Oct 30, 202655Medium
Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.
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