Early-stage security check — honeypot & rug-pull analysis
BNB ChainThe contract is a standard ERC-20 token with custom fee logic.
Read the full analysisEach factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed
Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.
Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Oct 22, 2026
The risk score reads depth across every pair.
The LP tokens of the analysed pool are locked or burned.
0x0ed9…97060x9768…3e86No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.
The _executeSwapAndLiquify function allows the contract to move tokens from any address that has previously approved the contract, potentially leading to unauthorized drainage of user funds.
Restrict the _executeSwapAndLiquify function to only interact with tokens owned by the contract itself, rather than arbitrary user addresses.
Unresolved
The _executeSwapAndLiquify function performs token transfers without checking the boolean return value, which can lead to silent failures and inconsistent contract state.
Always verify the return value of ERC-20 transfer calls or use the SafeERC20 library to handle transfers safely.
Unresolved
The contract accepts ETH via its receive function but lacks any mechanism to withdraw or utilize these funds, causing them to be permanently locked in the contract.
Implement a withdrawal function restricted to a secure address or ensure the contract does not accept ETH if it cannot be utilized.
Unresolved
The contract performs division before multiplication in _executeSwapAndLiquify and _transfer, which leads to precision loss and potential inaccuracies in fee calculations.
Reorder mathematical operations to perform multiplication before division to maintain precision.
Unresolved
The ten largest holders own 90.3% of supply. Of that, 90.0% burned, 0.2% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 0.1% in wallets, 0.0% in other contracts. 16,297 holders in total.
Watch the largest wallets that are not exchanges, pools or locks — those are the ones that can move the price.
Acknowledged
16,297 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.
Match the contract address against the project's official channels before trading.
Acknowledged
97.4% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 97.4% is locked in PinkLock02 until 01 Nov 2026 (9 days). Until then nobody — the project included — can withdraw it unless the locker contract itself is flawed; after that date the lock's owner can. That date is close: treat it as short-term protection. 2.6% is held, unlocked, by 1 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. No single one holds a majority: their exits thin the market rather than hand anyone the pool. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them.
Check the lock's end date and beneficiary on the locker's own page before relying on it.
Acknowledged
Liquidity $160K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $4.5M (DexScreener, all pools).
Size any position to the liquidity and daily volume shown — they set how much you can sell and at what price.
Acknowledged
A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: fixed — the contract has no mint function. Control: nobody (ownership renounced). Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: 4% on buy, 4.03% on sell. Market: $160K of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: under a day of market history.
Check the project's own documentation for what the token is used for; this report covers what the contract allows.
Acknowledged
The token's oldest DEX pool is less than a day old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.
Re-check ownership, liquidity and holder distribution as the token matures; those are the facts that move early.
Acknowledged
The contract is a standard ERC-20 token with custom fee logic. While ownership has been renounced, preventing further administrative changes, the contract contains critical logic flaws in its internal swap and liquidity management functions that could lead to unauthorized token movement and trapped funds.
The architecture follows standard ERC-20 patterns but introduces custom logic for fee handling and liquidity management. 7.1 Architecture is standard, though 7.2 Code Security reveals significant flaws in the _executeSwapAndLiquify function. 7.3 Access Control is currently locked due to ownership renouncement, which mitigates future administrative risk. 7.6 External interactions are limited, but the failure to handle return values correctly poses a risk to internal state consistency.
7.4 Economic and 7.5 Governance are effectively static as the contract ownership is renounced. No further changes can be made to the fee structure or tokenomics via the setTrailblazers function. The economic risk is limited to the existing logic flaws within the contract's internal swap mechanisms.
7.7 Upgrades are not applicable as the contract is not a proxy. 7.8 Operations are limited to standard token transfers. The contract is immutable, which provides certainty but prevents patching the identified critical vulnerabilities.
The contract should be considered high-risk due to the identified critical and high-severity vulnerabilities.
Since ownership is renounced, the current code cannot be updated to fix these issues. Users should exercise extreme caution as the contract's internal liquidity management logic is fundamentally flawed. It is recommended to migrate to a new, audited contract implementation that follows standard OpenZeppelin patterns for liquidity management and fee handling. The current contract should be deprecated to prevent further interaction with the faulty swap logic.
Free for any token on the record. It links to this page and always shows the current score and the date it was checked.
Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.
This token is brand new. Run a deeper AI-powered analysis of the contract code — free and instant.
Get Detailed Audit Is this your token? Publish your own audit on this page
