The contract is a standard ERC-20 token with custom fee-exclusion logic. Ownership has been renounced, meaning the privileged functions setTrailblazers, transferOwnership, and renounceOwnership are now dormant and cannot be invoked. The contract contains critical logic flaws regarding token transfers and fund management that persist despite the renounced ownership.
Early-stage security check — honeypot & rug-pull analysis
Is Trump a Scam?
Not verified
This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →The contract is a standard ERC-20 token with custom fee-exclusion logic.
Read the full analysis- LP lock ends in 9d
- Volume/Liquidity > 15×
- Code: Unauthorized Token Movement
- Code: Rounding Errors via Division Before Multiplication
- Code: Trapped ETH Funds
- Code: Unchecked Token Transfer Result
Exact factors
- LP lock ends in 9d (short-term protection)
- Volume/Liquidity > 15× (77.6× — wash-trading signal)
- Code: Unauthorized Token Movement (Critical, static analysis)
- Code: Rounding Errors via Division Before Multiplication (Low, static analysis)
- Code: Trapped ETH Funds (Medium, static analysis)
- Code: Unchecked Token Transfer Result (High, static analysis)
Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed
Security Checklist
as of audit · Oct 26Holders
as of audit · Oct 26, 2026- Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell0.5%
- Burnedout of circulation90.0%
- DEX poolsthe pools' own liquidity0.3%
- Everyone else17,762 holders9.2%
How holder types affect the score
Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.
Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Oct 26, 2026
Liquidity
as of audit · Oct 26The risk score reads depth across every pair.
The LP tokens of the analysed pool are locked or burned.
0x0ed9…97060x9078…dd10No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.
Security Findings
CriticalUnauthorized Token Movement
The _executeSwapAndLiquify function allows for the movement of tokens from arbitrary addresses using transferFrom, potentially allowing unauthorized parties to drain tokens if approvals are present.CD-01
Issue
The _executeSwapAndLiquify function allows for the movement of tokens from arbitrary addresses using transferFrom, potentially allowing unauthorized parties to drain tokens if approvals are present.
Fix
Restrict the caller of the swap function to authorized internal logic or ensure the swap mechanism only interacts with contract-owned tokens.
Status
Unresolved
HighUnchecked Token Transfer Result
The _executeSwapAndLiquify function performs token transfers without verifying the boolean return value, which can lead to silent failures in the liquidity swap process.CD-04
Issue
The _executeSwapAndLiquify function performs token transfers without verifying the boolean return value, which can lead to silent failures in the liquidity swap process.
Fix
Always check the return value of transfer and transferFrom calls or use OpenZeppelin's SafeERC20 library.
Status
Unresolved
MediumTrapped ETH Funds
The contract accepts ETH via the receive function but lacks any mechanism to withdraw or utilize these funds, causing them to be permanently locked.CD-03
Issue
The contract accepts ETH via the receive function but lacks any mechanism to withdraw or utilize these funds, causing them to be permanently locked.
Fix
Implement a withdrawal function restricted to an owner or a governance contract to recover trapped ETH.
Status
Unresolved
LowRounding Errors via Division Before Multiplication
In _executeSwapAndLiquify and _transfer, division is performed before multiplication, which leads to precision loss and incorrect fee calculations.CD-02
Issue
In _executeSwapAndLiquify and _transfer, division is performed before multiplication, which leads to precision loss and incorrect fee calculations.
Fix
Reorder operations to perform multiplication before division to maintain precision.
Status
Unresolved
InfoWho holds the supply
The ten largest holders own 90.8% of supply. Of that, 90.0% burned, 0.3% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 0.5% in wallets, 0.0% in other contracts. 17,772 holders in total.QA-HOLDERS
Issue
The ten largest holders own 90.8% of supply. Of that, 90.0% burned, 0.3% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 0.5% in wallets, 0.0% in other contracts. 17,772 holders in total.
Fix
Watch the largest wallets that are not exchanges, pools or locks — those are the ones that can move the price.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoNot listed by any independent source
17,772 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.QA-IDENTITY
Issue
17,772 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.
Fix
Match the contract address against the project's official channels before trading.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoLiquidity time-locked
97.3% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 97.3% is locked in PinkLock02 until 05 Nov 2026 (9 days). Until then nobody — the project included — can withdraw it unless the locker contract itself is flawed; after that date the lock's owner can. That date is close: treat it as short-term protection. 2.7% is held, unlocked, by 1 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. No single one holds a majority: their exits thin the market rather than hand anyone the pool. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them.QA-LIQUIDITY
Issue
97.3% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 97.3% is locked in PinkLock02 until 05 Nov 2026 (9 days). Until then nobody — the project included — can withdraw it unless the locker contract itself is flawed; after that date the lock's owner can. That date is close: treat it as short-term protection. 2.7% is held, unlocked, by 1 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. No single one holds a majority: their exits thin the market rather than hand anyone the pool. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them.
Fix
Check the lock's end date and beneficiary on the locker's own page before relying on it.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoThe market for this token
Liquidity $62K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $4.8M (DexScreener, all pools).QA-MARKET
Issue
Liquidity $62K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $4.8M (DexScreener, all pools).
Fix
Size any position to the liquidity and daily volume shown — they set how much you can sell and at what price.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoAsset class: Project token
A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: fixed — the contract has no mint function. Control: nobody (ownership renounced). Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: 4% on buy, 4.02% on sell. Market: $62K of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: under a day of market history.QA-PROFILE
Issue
A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: fixed — the contract has no mint function. Control: nobody (ownership renounced). Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: 4% on buy, 4.02% on sell. Market: $62K of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: under a day of market history.
Fix
Check the project's own documentation for what the token is used for; this report covers what the contract allows.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoRecently launched — less than a day of market history
The token's oldest DEX pool is less than a day old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.QA-RECENT
Issue
The token's oldest DEX pool is less than a day old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.
Fix
Re-check ownership, liquidity and holder distribution as the token matures; those are the facts that move early.
Status
Acknowledged
Analysis
AI Copilotas of audit · Oct 26The architecture follows standard ERC-20 patterns but introduces custom logic in _executeSwapAndLiquify. 7.1 Architecture is standard, while 7.2 Code Security reveals critical flaws in transfer handling. 7.3 Access Control is currently locked due to renounced ownership. 7.6 External interactions are limited but improperly implemented regarding return value checks.
7.4 Economic and 7.5 Governance risks are currently neutralized because ownership is renounced. No further changes to fee-exclusion lists or ownership can be made. The economic model is static and immutable.
7.7 Upgrades are not supported as the contract is not a proxy. 7.8 Operations are limited to standard token transfers. The contract is immutable.
The contract is currently in a state where critical vulnerabilities cannot be patched due to renounced ownership.
Users should be aware that the contract contains logic that can lead to loss of funds during swap operations and that any ETH sent to the contract is permanently locked. Future deployments should implement robust return value checking for all ERC-20 interactions and ensure that any contract designed to receive ETH includes a withdrawal mechanism. Given the current state, the contract should be considered high-risk for any integration involving automated liquidity swaps.
Contract & Record
Free for any token on the record. It links to this page and always shows the current score and the date it was checked.
- Oct 26, 202684High
Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the TRUMP contract address?
The Trump contract on BNB Chain is 0x2120b160887c60801da2361d445847d6f9ec20ff. Compare it with the address the project itself publishes before trading: other contracts can carry the same name and ticker.
Is Trump a scam?
Quantum Audit's risk score for Trump is 84/100 (High risk) as of Oct 26, 2026, computed by a deterministic function from on-chain facts — Contract verified: Verified; Ownership: Renounced; Mint: No mint; Liquidity lock: Locked; Upgradeability: Fixed code; Honeypot: None found; Buy / sell tax: 4% / 4%. A score is a dated snapshot of those facts, not a guarantee; each one is listed on this page.
Is TRUMP liquidity locked?
Liquidity lock: Locked (as of Oct 26, 2026). Total DEX liquidity: $62.1K.
Who holds TRUMP?
As of Oct 26, 2026, the 10 largest holders own 90.8% of the supply across 17,772 holders. The Holders section on this page shows who they are by holder type.
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