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On-chain security analysis — is it a scam or legit?

Is Topaz Safe?

TOPAZBNB Chain
Not verified This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →
Last checked Sep 5, 2026 · 1 audit on record
Chart
High RiskHow is this score calculated?
How the score breaks downratings: 10 is safest
Technical6/10Governance2/10Upgrades4/10Checks passed5 of 7Findings1 High · 1 Medium · 1 Info3
SummaryAI Copilot

The Topaz token contract is a basic ERC20 implementation leveraging OpenZeppelin libraries for standard token functionality and gasless approvals.

Read the full analysis
What raised the score
  • Ownership status UNKNOWN
  • Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded
  • Top-10 concentration > 30%
  • LP top1 unlocked holder = 100.0%
  • LP top3 unlocked holders = 100.0%
  • LP claimed locked but only 0.0% actually locked
  • 1 High finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Medium finding(s) from audit
Exact factors
  • Ownership status UNKNOWN (owner could not be resolved)
  • Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded
  • Top-10 concentration > 30% (94.4% total → 38.7% effective; 1.5% in EOAs, 92.9% in contracts — moderate)
  • LP top1 unlocked holder = 100.0% (independent LP — depth risk, pool = 98% of DEX liquidity)
  • LP top3 unlocked holders = 100.0% (independent LP — depth risk, pool = 98% of DEX liquidity)
  • LP claimed locked but only 0.0% actually locked
  • 1 High finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Medium finding(s) from audit

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Security Checklist

as of audit · Sep 55 of 7 checks passed
Contract verifiedVerified
OwnershipUnknown
MintMintable
Liquidity lockLocked
UpgradeabilityFixed code
HoneypotNone found
Buy / sell tax0% / 0%

Holders

as of audit · Sep 5, 2026
92.9%Contracts5.6%
92.9%Contracts5.6%
ContractsWalletsEveryone elseBubble area = share of supply
94.4%of supply sits with the top 10 holders
  • Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking92.9%
  • Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell1.5%
  • Everyone elsethe rest of the supply5.6%
Effective concentrationwhat the score reads38.7%
How holder types affect the score

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Sep 5, 2026

Liquidity

as of audit · Sep 5$90.9K across 8 pairs
Show 2 more pairs

The risk score reads depth across every pair.

LP tokensLocked

The LP tokens of the analysed pool are locked or burned.

Analysed pool$89.5KShare of depth98.4%
Top-1 Unlocked Holder100.0%
Top-3 Unlocked100.0%
Unlocked LP held by
0xef66…987e0x0ed9…9706

No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.

Security Findings

1 High1 Medium1 Info
High

Centralized Control of Token Supply

The Topaz token contract grants the minter address exclusive and unlimited authority to mint new tokens. The minter can also transfer this powerful role to any other address without any checks or delays. This centralization poses a significant economic risk (7.4 Economic), as a compromised minter key or a malicious minter could lead to an arbitrary increase in token supply, severely devaluing existing tokens.H-01

Issue

The Topaz token contract grants the minter address exclusive and unlimited authority to mint new tokens. The minter can also transfer this powerful role to any other address without any checks or delays. This centralization poses a significant economic risk (7.4 Economic), as a compromised minter key or a malicious minter could lead to an arbitrary increase in token supply, severely devaluing existing tokens.

Fix

Implement a multi-signature wallet for the minter role or introduce a time-locked delay for setMinter and mint operations, especially for large amounts. Consider a cap on total supply or a mechanism for community governance over minting (7.5 Governance).

Status

Unresolved

Medium

Unused State Variable owner

The owner state variable is declared and initialized in the constructor to msg.sender, but it is never used in any function within the Topaz contract. This makes the variable redundant and potentially misleading (7.1 Architecture), as it suggests a role that does not exist or function, which could lead to confusion or future errors if someone assumes it has a purpose.M-01

Issue

The owner state variable is declared and initialized in the constructor to msg.sender, but it is never used in any function within the Topaz contract. This makes the variable redundant and potentially misleading (7.1 Architecture), as it suggests a role that does not exist or function, which could lead to confusion or future errors if someone assumes it has a purpose.

Fix

Remove the owner variable if it serves no purpose. If an owner role is intended, implement functions that utilize this role for specific administrative tasks (e.g., pausing, emergency actions) and ensure proper access control mechanisms are in place for its management (7.3 Access Control).

Status

Unresolved

Info

Lack of Role Renouncement Mechanism

The minter role can be transferred to a new address via setMinter, but there is no explicit function allowing the current minter to renounce or revoke their own role. While the minter can transfer the role to address(0) to effectively renounce it, an explicit renounceMinter function would improve clarity and reduce potential errors (7.3 Access Control).I-01

Issue

The minter role can be transferred to a new address via setMinter, but there is no explicit function allowing the current minter to renounce or revoke their own role. While the minter can transfer the role to address(0) to effectively renounce it, an explicit renounceMinter function would improve clarity and reduce potential errors (7.3 Access Control).

Fix

Consider adding a renounceMinter() function that allows the current minter to voluntarily give up their role, potentially transferring it to address(0) or a designated null address, improving operational clarity (7.8 Operations).

Status

Unresolved

Analysis

AI Copilotas of audit · Sep 5
Executive SummaryWhat the contract is and what the review found

The Topaz token contract is a basic ERC20 implementation leveraging OpenZeppelin libraries for standard token functionality and gasless approvals. The contract introduces a minter role with exclusive control over token supply and the ability to transfer this role. The primary security concern is the high centralization of minting authority, which poses significant economic risks. An owner state variable is present but unused, indicating a potential design oversight. The contract is not upgradeable.

Technical6/10Medium risk

The contract utilizes well-audited OpenZeppelin ERC20 and ERC20Permit implementations, contributing to a solid technical foundation (7.2 Code Security). The custom logic for minter role management and token minting is straightforward. However, a notable technical issue is the presence of an unused owner state variable, which adds unnecessary complexity and could be misleading (7.1 Architecture). The custom error NotMinter() is used, but its definition is not provided in the given source, which could lead to compilation issues if not defined elsewhere.

Governance2/10High risk

The economic model of the Topaz token is highly centralized, with the minter address having absolute control over the token supply (7.4 Economic). This single point of failure introduces a significant risk of inflation and devaluation if the minter key is compromised or misused. There is no decentralized governance mechanism (7.5 Governance) to oversee minting operations or role transfers, placing full trust in a single entity. The minter can transfer its role without any time lock or multi-signature requirement, further exacerbating this centralization.

Upgrades4/10Medium risk

The Topaz contract is not designed to be upgradeable (7.7 Upgrades), meaning its logic cannot be modified after deployment. This eliminates upgrade-specific risks such as proxy misconfigurations or storage collisions. Any changes to the contract's functionality would require a new deployment and migration of assets.

Final RecommendationWhat to do about this score

It is strongly recommended to address the high centralization of the minter role.

Consider implementing a multi-signature wallet for the minter address or introducing a time-locked delay for critical operations like setMinter and large mint calls to mitigate the risk of a single point of failure. Additionally, remove the unused owner state variable to improve code clarity and prevent potential confusion.

Contract & Record

1 audit on record
TypeToken
NetworkBNB Chain
Token age1y
Contract0xdf00…8abd
Deployer0xd7e8…4aea
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Audit History
  1. Sep 5, 202670High

Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is the TOPAZ contract address?

The Topaz contract on BNB Chain is 0xdf002282c1474c9592780618adda7eaa99998abd. Compare it with the address the project itself publishes before trading: other contracts can carry the same name and ticker.

Is Topaz a scam?

Quantum Audit's risk score for Topaz is 70/100 (High risk) as of Sep 5, 2026, computed by a deterministic function from on-chain facts — Contract verified: Verified; Mint: Mintable; Liquidity lock: Locked; Upgradeability: Fixed code; Honeypot: None found; Buy / sell tax: 0% / 0%. A score is a dated snapshot of those facts, not a guarantee; each one is listed on this page.

Is TOPAZ liquidity locked?

Liquidity lock: Locked (as of Sep 5, 2026). Total DEX liquidity: $90.9K.

Who holds TOPAZ?

As of Sep 5, 2026, the 10 largest holders own 94.4% of the supply. The Holders section on this page shows who they are by holder type.

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