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Is Infinity Ground AI Safe?

AINBNB Chain
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Last checked Sep 4, 2026 · 1 audit on record
Chart
High RiskHow is this score calculated?
How the score breaks downratings: 10 is safest
Technical6/10Governance1/10Upgrades4/10Checks passed2 of 5Findings1 High · 1 Medium · 2 Low · 1 Info5
SummaryAI Copilot

The AIN token contract is an ERC20 implementation with a controlled minting mechanism.

Read the full analysis
What raised the score
  • Ownership not renounced — Multisig
  • Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded
  • Top-10 concentration > 70%
  • Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
  • LP top1 unlocked holder = 100.0%
  • LP top3 unlocked holders = 100.0%
  • 1 High finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Medium finding(s) from audit
  • 2 Low finding(s) from audit
Exact factors
  • Ownership NOT renounced — Multisig (2-of-3)
  • Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded
  • Top-10 concentration > 70% (88.9% total → 85.7% effective; 83.5% in EOAs, 5.3% in contracts — extreme)
  • Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
  • LP top1 unlocked holder = 100.0% (independent LP — depth risk)
  • LP top3 unlocked holders = 100.0% (independent LP — depth risk)
  • 1 High finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Medium finding(s) from audit
  • 2 Low finding(s) from audit

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Security Checklist

as of audit · Sep 42 of 5 checks passed
Contract verifiedVerified
OwnershipRetained
MintMintable
Liquidity lockNot locked
UpgradeabilityFixed code

Holders

as of audit · Sep 4, 2026
5.3%Contracts83.5%Wallets11.1%Everyone else
5.3%83.5%Wallets11.1%
ContractsWalletsEveryone elseBubble area = share of supply
88.9%of supply sits with the top 10 holders
  • Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking5.3%
  • Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell83.5%
  • Everyone elsethe rest of the supply11.1%
Effective concentrationwhat the score reads85.7%
How holder types affect the score

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Sep 4, 2026

Liquidity

as of audit · Sep 4$1.54M across 5 pairs

The risk score reads depth across every pair.

LP tokensNot locked

The LP tokens of the analysed pool are not locked or burned, so whoever holds them can withdraw that liquidity.

Analysed pool$1.54MShare of depth100.0%
Top-1 Unlocked Holder100.0%
Top-3 Unlocked100.0%
Unlocked LP held by
0xf9e5…974b0xe90d…1e95

No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.

Security Findings

1 High1 Medium2 Low1 Info
High

Centralized Minting Power with High Individual Limits

The contract design grants significant power to the owner (a multisig) to control the minter whitelist, and each whitelisted minter can mint up to 40% of the TOTAL_SUPPLY. With a maximum of 6 minters, this concentrates a substantial portion of the token's potential supply in the hands of a few entities. While the owner is a multisig, mitigating single point of failure for owner control, the inherent design means that if multiple minters' keys are compromised or if minters act maliciously, a large amount of tokens could be minted rapidly, potentially impacting token value and distribution. (7.3 Access Control, 7.4 Economic)H-01

Issue

The contract design grants significant power to the owner (a multisig) to control the minter whitelist, and each whitelisted minter can mint up to 40% of the TOTAL_SUPPLY. With a maximum of 6 minters, this concentrates a substantial portion of the token's potential supply in the hands of a few entities. While the owner is a multisig, mitigating single point of failure for owner control, the inherent design means that if multiple minters' keys are compromised or if minters act maliciously, a large amount of tokens could be minted rapidly, potentially impacting token value and distribution. (7.3 Access Control, 7.4 Economic)

Fix

Review the MAX_MINT_PER_ADDRESS_PERCENTAGE to determine if 40% is an appropriate limit for individual minters, especially given the MAX_MINTERS count. Consider implementing a timelock for adding/removing minters or for large minting operations to provide a window for community oversight or emergency response. Ensure robust security practices for all minter keys and the multisig owner.

Status

Unresolved

Medium

Irreversible Minter Management upon Ownership Renunciation

The Ownable contract allows the owner to renounce ownership via renounceOwnership(). If the owner renounces ownership, the addMinter and removeMinter functions, which are onlyOwner, would become permanently inaccessible. This would lock the minter whitelist in its current state, preventing any future adjustments, such as removing a compromised minter or adding new ones for distribution phases. While ownership_renounced is currently false, this remains a potential risk. (7.3 Access Control, 7.8 Operations)M-01

Issue

The Ownable contract allows the owner to renounce ownership via renounceOwnership(). If the owner renounces ownership, the addMinter and removeMinter functions, which are onlyOwner, would become permanently inaccessible. This would lock the minter whitelist in its current state, preventing any future adjustments, such as removing a compromised minter or adding new ones for distribution phases. While ownership_renounced is currently false, this remains a potential risk. (7.3 Access Control, 7.8 Operations)

Fix

If there's a long-term need to manage minters, the owner should not renounce ownership. If ownership is intended to be renounced, ensure that the minter whitelist is finalized and will not require future modifications. Alternatively, consider implementing a separate role-based access control (RBAC) system for minter management that is not tied directly to the Ownable pattern, allowing for more granular control and potentially a separate 'minter manager' role that can be transferred or managed…

Status

Unresolved

Low

Lack of Emergency Pause Mechanism

The contract lacks a mechanism to pause minting operations or token transfers in an emergency. In scenarios such as a critical vulnerability discovery (even if none are currently identified), a major exploit affecting a minter's key, or unforeseen market manipulation, the inability to temporarily halt contract functionality could lead to uncontrolled token issuance or other adverse effects. (7.8 Operations)L-01

Issue

The contract lacks a mechanism to pause minting operations or token transfers in an emergency. In scenarios such as a critical vulnerability discovery (even if none are currently identified), a major exploit affecting a minter's key, or unforeseen market manipulation, the inability to temporarily halt contract functionality could lead to uncontrolled token issuance or other adverse effects. (7.8 Operations)

Fix

Consider integrating OpenZeppelin's Pausable contract or implementing a custom pause mechanism. This would allow the owner (multisig) to temporarily halt minting and potentially transfers in critical situations, providing a safety net for the protocol. Define clear criteria and procedures for activating and deactivating the pause.

Status

Unresolved

Low

No Token Burn Functionality

The contract does not include a function to burn tokens. While not a direct vulnerability, the absence of a burn mechanism limits the ability to manage token supply post-minting. This could include reducing circulating supply, recovering tokens sent to a blackhole address, or implementing deflationary tokenomics. (7.4 Economic)L-02

Issue

The contract does not include a function to burn tokens. While not a direct vulnerability, the absence of a burn mechanism limits the ability to manage token supply post-minting. This could include reducing circulating supply, recovering tokens sent to a blackhole address, or implementing deflationary tokenomics. (7.4 Economic)

Fix

Evaluate if a token burn mechanism is desirable for the project's long-term tokenomics. If so, consider adding a function (e.g., burn(uint256 amount)) that allows token holders or the owner to burn tokens, reducing the total supply. This would provide greater flexibility in supply management.

Status

Unresolved

Info

Fixed Total Supply After Initial Distribution

The token has a predefined TOTAL_SUPPLY constant (1,000,000,000 tokens). Once the cumulative amount minted by all minters reaches this limit, no further tokens can be created. This design ensures a capped supply, transitioning the token from an inflationary phase during initial distribution to a fixed-supply asset thereafter. This is a fundamental characteristic of the token's economic model. (7.1 Architecture, 7.4 Economic)I-01

Issue

The token has a predefined TOTAL_SUPPLY constant (1,000,000,000 tokens). Once the cumulative amount minted by all minters reaches this limit, no further tokens can be created. This design ensures a capped supply, transitioning the token from an inflationary phase during initial distribution to a fixed-supply asset thereafter. This is a fundamental characteristic of the token's economic model. (7.1 Architecture, 7.4 Economic)

Fix

Ensure that the implications of a fixed total supply after the minting phase are clearly communicated to token holders and the community. This design choice impacts long-term tokenomics and should be well-understood by all stakeholders.

Status

Unresolved

Analysis

AI Copilotas of audit · Sep 4
Executive SummaryWhat the contract is and what the review found

The AIN token contract is an ERC20 implementation with a controlled minting mechanism. It utilizes OpenZeppelin's Ownable and ERC20 contracts, along with EnumerableSet for managing a minter whitelist. The contract's code quality is high, and it demonstrates robust technical security practices, including protection against common vulnerabilities like reentrancy and integer overflows. Key risks identified relate to the centralized nature of minting power and the potential for irreversible access control decisions if ownership is renounced. The contract is not upgradeable, ensuring immutability post-deployment.

Technical6/10Medium risk

The contract exhibits high technical quality, leveraging battle-tested OpenZeppelin libraries for ERC20 and Ownable functionalities. Solidity 0.8.20 mitigates integer overflow/underflow risks. The minting logic is straightforward, and the use of EnumerableSet for minter management is efficient. No reentrancy vulnerabilities or critical code security flaws were identified (7.2 Code Security). The architecture is simple and well-defined (7.1 Architecture). However, the absence of a pause mechanism could limit emergency response capabilities (7.8 Operations).

Governance1/10High risk

The contract's economic model centers around a fixed TOTAL_SUPPLY with a controlled minting phase. The owner, a multisig, has significant power to add and remove minters (7.3 Access Control). Each minter can mint up to 40% of the total supply, which is a high individual limit, concentrating minting power among a few addresses (7.4 Economic). While the multisig owner mitigates some centralization risks, the design inherently relies on the trustworthiness of the owner and whitelisted minters. The lack of a token burn function limits post-minting supply management options (7.4 Economic).

Upgrades4/10Medium risk

The AIN contract is a standard implementation and is not designed to be upgradeable (7.7 Upgrades). This means there are no upgrade-related risks such as proxy misconfigurations or storage collisions. However, it also implies that any future changes or bug fixes would require a new contract deployment and token migration.

Final RecommendationWhat to do about this score

It is recommended to carefully manage the multisig owner's keys and the whitelisted minter addresses due to the significant power they hold over token supply.

Consider implementing a pause mechanism to provide an emergency stop for minting operations. Additionally, evaluate the long-term implications of not having a token burn function for supply management. Ensure all operational procedures for minter management are clearly defined and followed.

Contract & Record

1 audit on record
TypeToken
NetworkBNB Chain
Token age1y
Contract0x9558…f4a3
Deployer0x3465…3c7d
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Audit History
  1. Sep 4, 202670High
  2. Aug 16, 202650Medium

Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.

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