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Is Infinity Ground AI Safe?

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Infinity Ground AI AIN
0x9558…f4a3
BNB Chain Not verifiedLast checked 3d ago 1 audit on record
DexScreener ↗
How is this score calculated? → High Risk
Executive SummaryAI Copilot

The AIN token contract is an ERC20 implementation with a controlled minting mechanism. It utilizes OpenZeppelin's Ownable and ERC20 contracts, along with EnumerableSet for managing a minter whitelist. The contract's code quality is high, and it demonstrates robust technical security practices, including protection against common vulnerabilities like reentrancy and integer overflows. Key risks identified relate to the centralized nature of minting power and the potential for irreversible access control decisions if ownership is renounced. The contract is not upgradeable, ensuring immutability post-deployment.

1 High1 Medium2 Low1 Informational
Volume 24h
$51.0K
Liquidity
$1.54M
Price
$0.07014
Token Age
1y
Top 10 Holders
88.9%

Security Findings

1 High1 Med2 Low1 Info
High

Centralized Minting Power with High Individual Limits

H-01The contract design grants significant power to the owner (a multisig) to control the minter whitelist, and each whitelisted minter can mint up to 40% of the `TOTAL_SUPPLY`. With a maximum of 6 minters, this concentrates a substantial portion of the token's potential supply in the hands of a few entities. While the owner is a multisig, mitigating single point of failure for owner control, the inherent design means that if multiple minters' keys are compromised or if minters act maliciously, a large amount of tokens could be minted rapidly, potentially impacting token value and distribution. (7.3 Access Control, 7.4 Economic)
IssueThe contract design grants significant power to the owner (a multisig) to control the minter whitelist, and each whitelisted minter can mint up to 40% of the `TOTAL_SUPPLY`. With a maximum of 6 minters, this concentrates a substantial portion of the token's potential supply in the hands of a few entities. While the owner is a multisig, mitigating single point of failure for owner control, the inherent design means that if multiple minters' keys are compromised or if minters act maliciously, a large amount of tokens could be minted rapidly, potentially impacting token value and distribution. (7.3 Access Control, 7.4 Economic)
FixReview the `MAX_MINT_PER_ADDRESS_PERCENTAGE` to determine if 40% is an appropriate limit for individual minters, especially given the `MAX_MINTERS` count. Consider implementing a timelock for adding/removing minters or for large minting operations to provide a window for community oversight or emergency response. Ensure robust security practices for all minter keys and the multisig owner.
StatusUnresolved
Medium

Irreversible Minter Management upon Ownership Renunciation

M-01The `Ownable` contract allows the owner to renounce ownership via `renounceOwnership()`. If the owner renounces ownership, the `addMinter` and `removeMinter` functions, which are `onlyOwner`, would become permanently inaccessible. This would lock the minter whitelist in its current state, preventing any future adjustments, such as removing a compromised minter or adding new ones for distribution phases. While `ownership_renounced` is currently false, this remains a potential risk. (7.3 Access Control, 7.8 Operations)
IssueThe `Ownable` contract allows the owner to renounce ownership via `renounceOwnership()`. If the owner renounces ownership, the `addMinter` and `removeMinter` functions, which are `onlyOwner`, would become permanently inaccessible. This would lock the minter whitelist in its current state, preventing any future adjustments, such as removing a compromised minter or adding new ones for distribution phases. While `ownership_renounced` is currently false, this remains a potential risk. (7.3 Access Control, 7.8 Operations)
FixIf there's a long-term need to manage minters, the owner should not renounce ownership. If ownership is intended to be renounced, ensure that the minter whitelist is finalized and will not require future modifications. Alternatively, consider implementing a separate role-based access control (RBAC) system for minter management that is not tied directly to the `Ownable` pattern, allowing for more granular control and potentially a separate 'minter manager' role that can be transferred or managed…
StatusUnresolved
Low

Lack of Emergency Pause Mechanism

L-01The contract lacks a mechanism to pause minting operations or token transfers in an emergency. In scenarios such as a critical vulnerability discovery (even if none are currently identified), a major exploit affecting a minter's key, or unforeseen market manipulation, the inability to temporarily halt contract functionality could lead to uncontrolled token issuance or other adverse effects. (7.8 Operations)
IssueThe contract lacks a mechanism to pause minting operations or token transfers in an emergency. In scenarios such as a critical vulnerability discovery (even if none are currently identified), a major exploit affecting a minter's key, or unforeseen market manipulation, the inability to temporarily halt contract functionality could lead to uncontrolled token issuance or other adverse effects. (7.8 Operations)
FixConsider integrating OpenZeppelin's `Pausable` contract or implementing a custom pause mechanism. This would allow the owner (multisig) to temporarily halt minting and potentially transfers in critical situations, providing a safety net for the protocol. Define clear criteria and procedures for activating and deactivating the pause.
StatusUnresolved
Low

No Token Burn Functionality

L-02The contract does not include a function to burn tokens. While not a direct vulnerability, the absence of a burn mechanism limits the ability to manage token supply post-minting. This could include reducing circulating supply, recovering tokens sent to a blackhole address, or implementing deflationary tokenomics. (7.4 Economic)
IssueThe contract does not include a function to burn tokens. While not a direct vulnerability, the absence of a burn mechanism limits the ability to manage token supply post-minting. This could include reducing circulating supply, recovering tokens sent to a blackhole address, or implementing deflationary tokenomics. (7.4 Economic)
FixEvaluate if a token burn mechanism is desirable for the project's long-term tokenomics. If so, consider adding a function (e.g., `burn(uint256 amount)`) that allows token holders or the owner to burn tokens, reducing the total supply. This would provide greater flexibility in supply management.
StatusUnresolved
Info

Fixed Total Supply After Initial Distribution

I-01The token has a predefined `TOTAL_SUPPLY` constant (1,000,000,000 tokens). Once the cumulative amount minted by all minters reaches this limit, no further tokens can be created. This design ensures a capped supply, transitioning the token from an inflationary phase during initial distribution to a fixed-supply asset thereafter. This is a fundamental characteristic of the token's economic model. (7.1 Architecture, 7.4 Economic)
IssueThe token has a predefined `TOTAL_SUPPLY` constant (1,000,000,000 tokens). Once the cumulative amount minted by all minters reaches this limit, no further tokens can be created. This design ensures a capped supply, transitioning the token from an inflationary phase during initial distribution to a fixed-supply asset thereafter. This is a fundamental characteristic of the token's economic model. (7.1 Architecture, 7.4 Economic)
FixEnsure that the implications of a fixed total supply after the minting phase are clearly communicated to token holders and the community. This design choice impacts long-term tokenomics and should be well-understood by all stakeholders.
StatusUnresolved

Category Ratings

TechnicalMedium6/10

The contract exhibits high technical quality, leveraging battle-tested OpenZeppelin libraries for ERC20 and Ownable functionalities. Solidity 0.8.20 mitigates integer overflow/underflow risks. The minting logic is straightforward, and the use of EnumerableSet for minter management is efficient. No reentrancy vulnerabilities or critical code security flaws were identified (7.2 Code Security). The architecture is simple and well-defined (7.1 Architecture). However, the absence of a pause mechanism could limit emergency response capabilities (7.8 Operations).

GovernanceHigh1/10

The contract's economic model centers around a fixed `TOTAL_SUPPLY` with a controlled minting phase. The owner, a multisig, has significant power to add and remove minters (7.3 Access Control). Each minter can mint up to 40% of the total supply, which is a high individual limit, concentrating minting power among a few addresses (7.4 Economic). While the multisig owner mitigates some centralization risks, the design inherently relies on the trustworthiness of the owner and whitelisted minters. The lack of a token burn function limits post-minting supply management options (7.4 Economic).

UpgradesMedium4/10

The AIN contract is a standard implementation and is not designed to be upgradeable (7.7 Upgrades). This means there are no upgrade-related risks such as proxy misconfigurations or storage collisions. However, it also implies that any future changes or bug fixes would require a new contract deployment and token migration.

Security Checklist

2/5 checks passed
Contract VerifiedPass
Ownership RenouncedFail
No Mint FunctionFail
Liquidity LockedFail
Not a ProxyPass

Holder Composition

88.9% in top 10
83.5% in wallets5.3% in contracts
Effective Concentration85.7%

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Liquidity Depth

$1.54M across 5 pairs
Pancakeswap v3USDTanalysed$1.54M100.0%Pancakeswap v2WBNB$130.0%Pancakeswap v2SMSS$00.0%Pancakeswap v2USDT$00.0%

The risk score reads depth across every pair. The volume figure and the volume-to-liquidity ratio elsewhere on this page describe only the pair this audit analysed, so the two are not directly comparable.

LP Distribution

Top-1 Unlocked Holder100.0%
Top-3 Unlocked100.0%

Key Addresses

3 addresses
Deployer
0x3465…3c7d
Unlocked LP Held By
0xf9e5…974b0xe90d…1e95

No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.

What Raised This Score

9 factors
  • Ownership NOT renounced — Multisig (2-of-3)
  • Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded
  • Top-10 concentration > 70% (88.9% total → 85.7% effective; 83.5% in EOAs, 5.3% in contracts — extreme)
  • Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
  • LP top1 unlocked holder = 100.0% (independent LP — depth risk)
  • LP top3 unlocked holders = 100.0% (independent LP — depth risk)
  • 1 High finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Medium finding(s) from audit
  • 2 Low finding(s) from audit

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

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