BworryFreeToken is an ERC-20 token with centralized administrative controls. The contract allows a designated 'minter' address to mint new tokens, block specific addresses, and toggle transfer restrictions. While the code implements standard ERC-20 functionality correctly, the high degree of centralization poses significant risks to token holders, as the minter can unilaterally alter token economics and restrict liquidity.
Early-stage security check — honeypot & rug-pull analysis
Is 币安无忧 a Scam?
Not verified
This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →BworryFreeToken is an ERC-20 token with centralized administrative controls.
Read the full analysis- Hidden owner — control survives an apparent renounce; held by minter: Other-Contract
- Owner can pause all transfers; held by minter: Other-Contract
- A privileged address controls a switch that decides whether transfers go through; held by minter: Other-Contract
- Owner can blacklist or freeze individual holders; held by minter: Other-Contract
- Owner can change the buy/sell tax; held by minter: Other-Contract
- Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded; held by minter: Other-Contract
- Ownership status UNKNOWN
- LP lock status UNKNOWN — the pool's LP could not be read
Exact factors
- Hidden owner — control survives an apparent renounce; held by minter: Other-Contract
- Owner can pause all transfers; held by minter: Other-Contract
- A privileged address controls a switch that decides whether transfers go through; held by minter: Other-Contract
- Owner can blacklist or freeze individual holders; held by minter: Other-Contract
- Owner can change the buy/sell tax; held by minter: Other-Contract
- Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded; held by minter: Other-Contract
- Ownership status UNKNOWN (owner could not be resolved)
- LP lock status UNKNOWN — the pool's LP could not be read
Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed
Security Checklist
as of audit · Oct 31Holders
as of audit · Oct 31, 2026- Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking19.3%
- Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell7.1%
- Burnedout of circulation2.2%
- Everyone else3,180 holders71.4%
How holder types affect the score
Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.
Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Oct 31, 2026
Liquidity
as of audit · Oct 31The risk score reads depth across every pair.
Whether the LP tokens are locked could not be determined.
Security Findings
MediumCentralized Minting Authority
The minter address has the power to create new tokens at will, which can dilute the value of existing holdings. This function is restricted only to the minter, providing no protection for current token holders against supply inflation.CP-01
Issue
The minter address has the power to create new tokens at will, which can dilute the value of existing holdings. This function is restricted only to the minter, providing no protection for current token holders against supply inflation.
Fix
Implement a hard cap on total supply or transition minting authority to a decentralized governance contract with a timelock.
Status
Unresolved
MediumCentralized Control Over Transfer Functionality
The minter can toggle the 'protocolOperating' switch or disable blocks, which directly controls whether users are allowed to transfer their tokens. This creates a risk where the minter can freeze all trading activity.CP-05
Issue
The minter can toggle the 'protocolOperating' switch or disable blocks, which directly controls whether users are allowed to transfer their tokens. This creates a risk where the minter can freeze all trading activity.
Fix
Remove the ability to pause or disable transfers, or move this control to a decentralized multi-signature wallet.
Status
Unresolved
MediumAbility to Blacklist Specific Holders
The minter can add any address to a 'blockedPool' list, effectively preventing those users from moving or selling their tokens. This is a significant centralization risk that can be used to censor specific users.CP-06
Issue
The minter can add any address to a 'blockedPool' list, effectively preventing those users from moving or selling their tokens. This is a significant centralization risk that can be used to censor specific users.
Fix
Remove the blacklist functionality or require a community vote to add addresses to the blocklist.
Status
Unresolved
MediumArbitrary Fee Manipulation
The minter can change the transfer fees and consume tax inventory, allowing them to extract value from the protocol at their discretion. This lack of transparency in fee management can negatively impact user trust.CP-07
Issue
The minter can change the transfer fees and consume tax inventory, allowing them to extract value from the protocol at their discretion. This lack of transparency in fee management can negatively impact user trust.
Fix
Hardcode the fee structure or implement a governance-based mechanism for any future fee adjustments.
Status
Unresolved
InfoWho holds the supply
The ten largest holders own 28.6% of supply. Of that, 2.2% burned — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 7.1% in wallets, 19.3% in other contracts. 3,190 holders in total.QA-HOLDERS
Issue
The ten largest holders own 28.6% of supply. Of that, 2.2% burned — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 7.1% in wallets, 19.3% in other contracts. 3,190 holders in total.
Fix
Watch the largest wallets that are not exchanges, pools or locks — those are the ones that can move the price.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoNot listed by any independent source
3,190 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.QA-IDENTITY
Issue
3,190 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.
Fix
Match the contract address against the project's official channels before trading.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoThe market for this token
Liquidity $61K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $517K (DexScreener, all pools).QA-MARKET
Issue
Liquidity $61K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $517K (DexScreener, all pools).
Fix
Size any position to the liquidity and daily volume shown — they set how much you can sell and at what price.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoAsset class: Project token
A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: mintable with no on-chain cap found. Control: an owner that could not be resolved. Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: no buy or sell tax. Market: $61K of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: 1 days of market history.QA-PROFILE
Issue
A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: mintable with no on-chain cap found. Control: an owner that could not be resolved. Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: no buy or sell tax. Market: $61K of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: 1 days of market history.
Fix
Check the project's own documentation for what the token is used for; this report covers what the contract allows.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoRecently launched — 1 day of market history
The token's oldest DEX pool is 1 day old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.QA-RECENT
Issue
The token's oldest DEX pool is 1 day old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.
Fix
Re-check ownership, liquidity and holder distribution as the token matures; those are the facts that move early.
Status
Acknowledged
Analysis
AI Copilotas of audit · Oct 31The contract utilizes standard OpenZeppelin-style ERC-20 logic, ensuring reliable token transfers and balance tracking. 7.1 Architecture follows a monolithic design, while 7.2 Code Security is maintained through modern Solidity 0.8.x features preventing overflows. 7.6 External interactions are minimal, reducing attack surfaces. However, 7.3 Access Control is overly permissive for the minter role.
The economic model is entirely controlled by a single address, creating a single point of failure for 7.4 Economic stability. 7.5 Governance is non-existent, as the minter has absolute authority over supply and transfer rules. This centralization allows for potential rug-pull vectors or arbitrary fee adjustments. Holders have no recourse if the minter acts maliciously.
The contract is not upgradeable, which provides 7.7 Upgrades security by ensuring the code cannot be changed post-deployment. 7.8 Operations are fixed, meaning the current logic is immutable. This prevents future logic injections but also prevents fixing the current centralization issues without a full migration.
To improve security, the project should transition from a single 'minter' address to a multi-signature wallet or a decentralized governance contract (e.g., Governor Bravo or OpenZeppelin Governor).
This would distribute the power to mint tokens or block addresses, preventing a single compromised key from impacting the entire ecosystem. Additionally, consider implementing a timelock for all privileged functions. A delay of 24-48 hours on administrative actions would provide transparency and allow the community to react to significant changes in token economics or transfer rules.
Contract & Record
Free for any token on the record. It links to this page and always shows the current score and the date it was checked.
- Oct 31, 202655Medium
Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the 币安无忧 contract address?
The 币安无忧 contract on BNB Chain is 0xfa44a3a1e00220ca47acbd3f2ab52b9252662503. Compare it with the address the project itself publishes before trading: other contracts can carry the same name and ticker.
Is 币安无忧 a scam?
Quantum Audit's risk score for 币安无忧 is 55/100 (Medium risk) as of Oct 31, 2026, computed by a deterministic function from on-chain facts — Contract verified: Verified; Mint: Mintable; Upgradeability: Fixed code; Honeypot: None found; Buy / sell tax: 0% / 0%. A score is a dated snapshot of those facts, not a guarantee; each one is listed on this page.
Who holds 币安无忧?
As of Oct 31, 2026, the 10 largest holders own 28.6% of the supply across 3,190 holders. The Holders section on this page shows who they are by holder type.
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