The BinanceHumanToken is a standard ERC-20 implementation with added administrative controls. The contract allows a designated 'minter' address to mint new tokens, block specific addresses from transferring, and toggle global transfer restrictions. While the core ERC-20 logic is standard, the centralization of power in the 'minter' role introduces significant trust requirements for token holders.
Early-stage security check — honeypot & rug-pull analysis
Is 币安人 a Scam?
Not verified
This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →The BinanceHumanToken is a standard ERC-20 implementation with added administrative controls.
Read the full analysis- A privileged address controls a switch that decides whether transfers go through; held by minter: Other-Contract
- Owner can blacklist or freeze individual holders; held by minter: Other-Contract
- Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded; held by minter: Other-Contract
- Ownership status UNKNOWN
- Volume/Liquidity > 15×
Exact factors
- A privileged address controls a switch that decides whether transfers go through; held by minter: Other-Contract
- Owner can blacklist or freeze individual holders; held by minter: Other-Contract
- Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded; held by minter: Other-Contract
- Ownership status UNKNOWN (owner could not be resolved)
- Volume/Liquidity > 15× (18.2× — wash-trading signal)
Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed
Security Checklist
as of audit · Oct 31Holders
as of audit · Oct 31, 2026- Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking1.3%
- Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell5.6%
- Burnedout of circulation22.0%
- DEX poolsthe pools' own liquidity7.0%
- Everyone else3,433 holders64.1%
How holder types affect the score
Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.
Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Oct 31, 2026
Liquidity
as of audit · Oct 31The risk score reads depth across every pair.
The LP tokens of the analysed pool are locked or burned.
0x0ed9…9706No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.
Security Findings
MediumCentralized Minting Authority
The 'minter' address has the authority to call the mint() function, which creates new tokens and increases the total supply. This action dilutes the value of existing tokens held by all users.CP-01
Issue
The 'minter' address has the authority to call the mint() function, which creates new tokens and increases the total supply. This action dilutes the value of existing tokens held by all users.
Fix
Restrict the minting capability to a multi-signature wallet or a governance-controlled contract to prevent unilateral supply inflation.
Status
Unresolved
MediumGlobal Transfer Control Switch
The 'minter' can call disableBlocks() to toggle a global switch that impacts transfer functionality. This allows the administrator to halt all token movements or sales at their discretion.CP-05
Issue
The 'minter' can call disableBlocks() to toggle a global switch that impacts transfer functionality. This allows the administrator to halt all token movements or sales at their discretion.
Fix
Remove the global transfer switch or implement a timelock to ensure that any decision to halt trading is transparent and community-approved.
Status
Unresolved
MediumAddress Blacklisting Capability
The 'minter' can use setPoolBlocked() to add specific addresses to a blacklist. Blacklisted addresses are prevented from transferring or selling their tokens, effectively freezing their assets.CP-06
Issue
The 'minter' can use setPoolBlocked() to add specific addresses to a blacklist. Blacklisted addresses are prevented from transferring or selling their tokens, effectively freezing their assets.
Fix
Limit the use of blacklisting to specific, well-defined regulatory requirements and ensure the process is transparent and auditable.
Status
Unresolved
InfoWho holds the supply
The ten largest holders own 35.9% of supply. Of that, 22.0% burned, 7.0% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 5.6% in wallets, 1.3% in other contracts. 3,443 holders in total.QA-HOLDERS
Issue
The ten largest holders own 35.9% of supply. Of that, 22.0% burned, 7.0% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 5.6% in wallets, 1.3% in other contracts. 3,443 holders in total.
Fix
Watch the largest wallets that are not exchanges, pools or locks — those are the ones that can move the price.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoNot listed by any independent source
3,443 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.QA-IDENTITY
Issue
3,443 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.
Fix
Match the contract address against the project's official channels before trading.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoLiquidity burned — cannot be withdrawn
99.7% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 99.7% of the LP tokens were sent to a burn address — that liquidity can never be withdrawn by anyone. 0.3% is held, unlocked, by 1 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. No single one holds a majority: their exits thin the market rather than hand anyone the pool.QA-LIQUIDITY
Issue
99.7% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 99.7% of the LP tokens were sent to a burn address — that liquidity can never be withdrawn by anyone. 0.3% is held, unlocked, by 1 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. No single one holds a majority: their exits thin the market rather than hand anyone the pool.
Fix
Check the lock's end date and beneficiary on the locker's own page before relying on it.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoThe market for this token
Liquidity $122K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $2.2M (DexScreener, all pools).QA-MARKET
Issue
Liquidity $122K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $2.2M (DexScreener, all pools).
Fix
Size any position to the liquidity and daily volume shown — they set how much you can sell and at what price.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoAsset class: Project token
A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: mintable with no on-chain cap found. Control: an owner that could not be resolved. Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: 2% on buy, 2% on sell. Market: $122K of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: 1 days of market history.QA-PROFILE
Issue
A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: mintable with no on-chain cap found. Control: an owner that could not be resolved. Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: 2% on buy, 2% on sell. Market: $122K of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: 1 days of market history.
Fix
Check the project's own documentation for what the token is used for; this report covers what the contract allows.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoRecently launched — 1 day of market history
The token's oldest DEX pool is 1 day old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.QA-RECENT
Issue
The token's oldest DEX pool is 1 day old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.
Fix
Re-check ownership, liquidity and holder distribution as the token matures; those are the facts that move early.
Status
Acknowledged
Analysis
AI Copilotas of audit · Oct 31The contract utilizes standard OpenZeppelin-style ERC-20 logic, ensuring reliable token transfers and allowance management. 7.1 Architecture is modular, separating administrative logic from standard token operations. 7.2 Code Security is high, utilizing modern Solidity 0.8.x features to prevent arithmetic overflows. 7.3 Access Control is strictly enforced via the 'onlyMinter' modifier, though this creates a single point of failure.
7.4 Economic and 7.5 Governance aspects are heavily centralized under the 'minter' role. The minter can arbitrarily increase the total supply, which directly impacts the value of existing holdings. 7.6 External dependencies are minimal, reducing risks from third-party integrations. The lack of a multi-sig or timelock for administrative actions increases the risk of misuse.
7.7 Upgrades are not supported as the contract is not a proxy. 7.8 Operations are straightforward, with the contract logic being immutable post-deployment. This eliminates risks associated with malicious proxy upgrades or storage collisions.
Token holders should be aware that the 'minter' role possesses significant power to dilute supply and restrict liquidity.
It is strongly recommended to transition the 'minter' role to a multi-signature wallet or a decentralized governance contract to mitigate the risk of a single compromised key. Additionally, consider implementing a timelock mechanism for sensitive administrative functions like 'setPoolBlocked' or 'mint' to provide transparency and a window for the community to react to significant changes in token economics.
Contract & Record
Free for any token on the record. It links to this page and always shows the current score and the date it was checked.
- Oct 31, 202652Medium
Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the 币安人 contract address?
The 币安人 contract on BNB Chain is 0x039de4c967d71a05d308f8dd4b1fd4330973806f. Compare it with the address the project itself publishes before trading: other contracts can carry the same name and ticker.
Is 币安人 a scam?
Quantum Audit's risk score for 币安人 is 52/100 (Medium risk) as of Oct 31, 2026, computed by a deterministic function from on-chain facts — Contract verified: Verified; Mint: Mintable; Liquidity lock: Locked; Upgradeability: Fixed code; Honeypot: None found; Buy / sell tax: 2% / 2%. A score is a dated snapshot of those facts, not a guarantee; each one is listed on this page.
Is 币安人 liquidity locked?
Liquidity lock: Locked (as of Oct 31, 2026). Total DEX liquidity: $122.1K.
Who holds 币安人?
As of Oct 31, 2026, the 10 largest holders own 35.9% of the supply across 3,443 holders. The Holders section on this page shows who they are by holder type.
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